Rendered from the All Frontier Global FTA registry · researched from official sources, August 2026 · every figure below carries a numbered source
The India–MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement was signed 25 January 2004 and entered into force 1 June 2009. It remains a fixed-preference arrangement of roughly 450 tariff lines at 10–100% margins of preference — not a tariff-eliminating FTA[2][7][8]. A formal expansion negotiation relaunched in October 2025 and remains unresolved; no source confirms it has produced any expanded coverage yet[8][13][3][4][14][15][19].
India–MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)
Parties At Signing 2004: India, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
The PTA was concluded between India and MERCOSUR as constituted in 2003-2004, i.e., the four founding states only. Every source found that describes the PTA specifically (as opposed to MERCOSUR-bloc membership generally) continues through 2025-2026 reporting to describe the MERCOSUR side as these same four states — including a June 2026 Latin American trade-research article describing the agreement as 'covering the four founding states of the South American bloc: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.' See members block for Bolivia/Venezuela treatment.
Negotiation History:[7][3][14]
Annexes: I — Tariff concession schedule (India's offer), II — Tariff concession schedule (MERCOSUR's offer), III — Rules of Origin, IV — Safeguard Measures, and V — Dispute Settlement Procedures
Confidence: high — consistently described across multiple sources, though none of the annex texts themselves were retrieved in this pass[7]
IN FORCE
Unlike some other netcup skeletons in this estate, the india-mercosur-pta.php skeleton's core status claim — 'In-force since 2009 · 450-product preferential framework · expansion negotiating' — checks out as ACCURATE and current as of 2026-08-20. The PTA is still operating at its original ~450/452-line, 10-100%-margin scope; a real expansion negotiation was formally relaunched in October 2025 and remains unresolved. No stale-status correction is needed here, in contrast to the TEPA record's finding.
Signed Date: 2004-01-25
Entered Into Force Date: 2009-06-01[2][7][8]
WTO Notification:[8]
Confidence: high — the following line counts are identical across two independent sources (Drishti IAS and the Indian Embassy, Buenos Aires), which is treated as strong corroboration despite the directionality-label disagreement noted above[9][10]
Mercosur Offer on Indian Origin Goods:
India Offer on Mercosur Origin Goods:
Crude Soya Oil Tariff Rate Quota:[2]
Exclusions List:
Annex III of the PTA sets out Rules of Origin; secondary sources consistently describe a Change in Tariff Heading (CTH)-type approach combined with country-specific schedules and compliance obligations layered on top of the tariff preference itself ('tariff benefits alone do not override compliance obligations').
Value Add Threshold Skeleton Claim:
Required for preference claims; explicitly referenced in connection with the crude soya oil TRQ mechanism in the DGFT appendix.[7][12][2]
A 'fixed-preference' PTA like India-MERCOSUR is structurally different from an FTA, not just a smaller version of one. An FTA (per WTO Article XXIV) aims to eliminate duties on 'substantially all trade' between parties across nearly the full tariff schedule, converging toward broad, often 0%, market access. A fixed-preference PTA instead lists specific HS-code tariff lines in an annexed schedule and grants each listed line a fixed percentage discount off the pre-existing MFN duty — commonly 10%, 20%, or up to 100% (full elimination) for that specific line — while every tariff line NOT on the list keeps its ordinary MFN duty completely unchanged. India-MERCOSUR covers roughly 450-452 lines per side out of India's ~11,000-line tariff schedule, so — as one secondary source puts it — 'a large part of trade still falls outside its scope' by design, not by omission.
Confidence: high for the general mechanical distinction (consistent across multiple sources); the ~11,000-line total Indian tariff schedule figure is general trade-policy background, not from a source specific to this PTA[12][15]
PTA Operative Parties:
Source: MERCOSUR Secretariat's own official 'Countries' page (mercosur.int), fetched directly for this record
States Parties Full Members per Secretariat: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela (suspended)
Associated States: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Panamá, Perú, and Surinam
Confidence: high — official primary source, accessed directly
Accession Protocol Signed: 2012-12
Ratification Timeline:
Instrument of Ratification Delivered By Bolivia: 2024-07
Full 'State Party' per the MERCOSUR Secretariat's own live page, described there as a 'new State Party' with 'a term of up to 4 years to incorporate the normative acquis of the bloc' (i.e., a transition period running to approximately 2028). CFR independently corroborates 2024 as the year Bolivia became 'a permanent member.'
Two Indian government embassy pages (Buenos Aires and Asunción) and one Indian press article (Tribune India) state Bolivia joined/was 'incorporated' in 2015 — a full nine years earlier than the MERCOSUR Secretariat's own dating. This is likely a conflation of the 2015 'amended protocol' procedural milestone (per the detailed Wikipedia ratification timeline) with actual completed accession, which per the Secretariat itself did not finish until mid-2024.
The MERCOSUR Secretariat's own current page is treated as authoritative for accession-completion timing (July 2024); the 2015 claims in Indian secondary/embassy sources are flagged as likely stale or imprecise rather than adopted.
Same gap as Venezuela: no source found addresses whether Bolivia's 2024 full MERCOSUR accession has any bearing on India-MERCOSUR PTA coverage. All PTA-specific descriptions found continue to name only the four founding states.
Confidence: high for the Secretariat's own 2024 dating and the detailed ratification timeline; the PTA-relationship conclusion is an inference from absence of contrary evidence — see unsourced_gaps[1][17][18][10][11][14]
User Question: Did the long-discussed widening of coverage (skeleton says 2,000+ products; this record's task brief mentions 2,500+) go anywhere?
NO — not as of 2026-08-20. The PTA remains at its original ~450/452-line, 10-100%-margin scope. A concrete, formally-launched renegotiation only began in October 2025, targets conclusion around October 2026, and no source found confirms it has produced any actual expanded coverage yet.[8][13][3][4][14][15][19]
Timeline of Attempts
First round of PTA-expansion negotiations reportedly launched, per the ADB/ARIC tracker.
low-medium — single secondary aggregator source, not corroborated by any Indian official primary source, and no evidence found that these talks concluded in any expanded coverage.
Periodic bilateral references to expansion interest, per the netcup skeleton's own framing and general secondary commentary, without concrete evidence of forward movement located in this pass.
Ahead of PM Modi's five-nation tour (which included Brazil and Argentina), a senior Indian government official is quoted on record: 'India has been proposing an expansion of the PTA with Mercosur nations. However, there has been no consensus regarding this among the bloc.' This is explicit, dated confirmation that expansion had NOT progressed as of mid-2025.
Confidence: high — Business Standard, a reputable Indian financial daily, quoting a named-category (senior) government official
Joint Declaration for Deepening of the MERCOSUR-India Trade Agreement signed in New Delhi by India's Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal and Brazil's Vice President/Trade Minister Geraldo Alckmin. Formally relaunches expansion talks covering both tariff and non-tariff issues, describes the expansion as 'substantial, aiming for a significant share of bilateral trade to benefit from tariff preferences,' commits to private-sector/stakeholder consultation, and sets a target to 'conclude the negotiations within one year from the launch.' Next procedural step specified: a Joint Administration Committee meeting under Article 23 of the PTA, plus a technical dialogue, to define the actual scope.
Confidence: high — official PIB release
Piyush Goyal publicly reiterates the (then-latest) full-year India-Brazil trade figure and calls the current bilateral trade level 'suboptimal,' urging 'greater ambition' — general momentum-building language, no update on expansion-negotiation progress specifically.
Confidence: high — official PIB release
Roughly 10 months into the October-2025 Joint Declaration's 'within one year' target window (which would run to approximately October 2026). No source located in this pass confirms that the Article 23 Joint Administration Committee meeting has actually convened, that the technical dialogue has concluded, or that any tariff-line expansion has taken legal effect. Expansion status: IN PROGRESS / UNRESOLVED, not concluded.
Confidence: gap, not a finding — absence of evidence of completion is not confirmation of non-completion, but no positive evidence of completion was found either
Numeric Target Conflict:
Uncorroborated Outlier Claim:
Trade Growth Target Tied to Expansion:[14]
Three non-reconcilable trade-value series were found; per the provenance rule they are recorded separately below and NOT averaged or blended. They differ in scope (Brazil-only vs full MERCOSUR bloc), basis (calendar year vs Indian fiscal year), and era (current vs a 2013 historical reference point).
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| India Exports to Brazil | USD 8.35 billion |
| India Imports From Brazil | USD 6.85-6.86 billion (trivial rounding difference between the two official sources) |
| Total Trade | USD 15.21 billion (PIB rounds this to 'USD 15 billion') |
| Trade Balance | USD 1.49 billion in India's favor |
Basis: Calendar year 2025, USD, goods (services breakdown not separately given) · accessed 2026-08-20
Growth Framing Conflict:
Partial Year Context Not Full Year:
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| India Exports to Mercosur | USD 8.12 billion |
| India Imports From Mercosur | USD 9.36 billion (primarily Brazil-sourced) |
| Implied Total | approximately USD 17.48 billion |
Basis: Indian fiscal year, USD, goods, full MERCOSUR bloc (not Brazil-only) · accessed 2026-08-20
Confidence: medium — recurs across three secondary sources but none is a primary government database fetch
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Trade | USD 15.2 billion, described at the time as approximately 60% of India's total trade with Latin America |
Basis: Calendar year 2013, USD · accessed 2026-08-20
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: low-medium
Confidence: medium
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: medium
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: high
Confidence: gap, not a finding
Recorded exactly as the registry states each disagreement — the conflicting values, the organisations behind them, and how this record handles it.
Most sources (DGFT's own word order, eximguru, Ramirro, UnderstandUPSC, Business Standard) treat 450 as India's own tariff offer (concessions India grants MERCOSUR-origin goods) and 452 as MERCOSUR's offer (concessions on Indian-origin goods). The Indian Embassy in Buenos Aires' page reverses this framing.
How this record handles it: Majority framing adopted as primary finding; the granular 10/20/100% line-count breakdown (internally consistent across two independent sources under that framing) is used to anchor the record rather than the single-number headline alone.
A single secondary aggregator (UnderstandUPSC) claims a '2019 expansion' took coverage to 'over 800 tariff lines.' This is not corroborated by the DGFT's own 2023-updated appendix (still shows 450/452), by July 2025 reporting describing expansion as stalled with 'no consensus,' or by the October 2025 Joint Declaration's framing of expansion as a fresh launch.
How this record handles it: Treated as very likely inaccurate; excluded from confirmed coverage figures and flagged rather than repeated as fact.
The MERCOSUR Secretariat's own official page and the Council on Foreign Relations both date Bolivia's completed MERCOSUR accession to 2024 (instrument of ratification delivered July 2024, after Brazil's Congress gave the final required ratification in December 2023). Two Indian government embassy pages (Buenos Aires, Asunción) and one Indian press article (Tribune India) instead state Bolivia joined/was 'incorporated' in 2015.
How this record handles it: MERCOSUR Secretariat's own current page treated as authoritative (2024); the 2015 claims are flagged as likely conflating an intermediate 2015 procedural milestone (an amended accession protocol) with actual completed accession.
Consulate General of India, São Paulo, cites a 2024 baseline of USD 12.51 billion and 21.6% growth to reach the USD 15.21 billion 2025 total. Embassy of India, Brasília, and a PIB release instead cite a ~USD 12.20 billion 2024 baseline and 25% growth to the same 2025 total.
How this record handles it: Not reconciled to one number; both retained in trade.series[0] with the discrepancy flagged.
No official source specifies an exact numeric target for the tariff-line expansion under negotiation since October 2025. Secondary sourcing suggests a range discussed of roughly '1,500-2,000' products; the netcup skeleton says '2,000+'; this task's brief referenced '2,500+ discussed for years.' The October 2025 Joint Declaration itself uses only qualitative language ('a significant share of bilateral trade').
How this record handles it: No single figure adopted as confirmed; recorded as unresolved in expansion.numeric_target_conflict.
The netcup skeleton claims a '60% local-value-add framework... significantly stricter than typical 30-35%.' No source retrieved in this pass (including the official DGFT appendix) states any specific value-content percentage for this PTA's Rules of Origin.
How this record handles it: Flagged as unverified rather than repeated as fact; the actual Annex III text was not located in this pass — see unsourced_gaps.
What the registry could not source, listed exactly as it states it — not gaps filled from memory or inference.
Numbered to match the markers in the text above. Every figure on this page traces to one of these.
Researched from official sources, August 2026 · rendered from the FTA registry.
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