ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) goods pillar in force since 2010 · upgrade review ongoing
Rendered from the All Frontier Global FTA registry · researched from official sources, August 2026 · every figure below carries a numbered source
IN FORCEREVIEW UNDERWAY
AIFTA's goods pillar (AITIGA) has been in force since 1 January 2010; the services and investment pillars followed on a staggered per-member basis from 2015–16[15]. The goods pillar is under an active, formally mandated review aimed at upgrading the agreement — the 13th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting was held 6–10 July 2026 in New Delhi, with three of eight sub-committees still working unspecified outstanding chapters and no confirmed conclusion date[5].
Also Known As: AIFTA, ASEAN-India FTA, and India-ASEAN FTA
Parties: India, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos (Lao PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
ASEAN States: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos (Lao PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
Structural Correction:
Skeleton Framing: The netcup skeleton presents AIFTA as if it were one omnibus agreement with five parallel 'chapters' (Trade in Goods, Services/AITIS, Investment/AICA, Rules of Origin, Dispute Settlement), on the same template as a single-treaty FTA like TEPA.
Verified Reality: AIFTA is actually an umbrella FRAMEWORK realized through THREE legally separate treaties, each independently signed and independently entered into force: (1) the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA, 2009/2010), (2) the ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement (AITISA, 2014/2015), and (3) the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement (AIIA, 2014/2015). 'Rules of Origin' is an annex within AITIGA, not a freestanding treaty. This record follows the skeleton's five-topic organization for continuity but corrects the underlying legal structure here.
Confidence: high — corroborated by ASEAN Secretariat's own outreach PDF, Centre for International Law (NUS) treaty database, WTO Center Vietnam, and Malaysia's official MITI FTA portal, which all independently list three separate signing/EIF date sets
Name: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and India
Signed Date: 2003-10-08
Signed Location: Bali, Indonesia (2nd ASEAN-India Summit)
Purpose: Established the legal and political basis for what the framework agreement itself called the 'ASEAN-India Regional Trade and Investment Area' (RTIA), later realized through AITIGA/AITISA/AIIA.
Full Name: ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA)
Signed Date: 2009-08-13
Signed Date Conflict Note: Singapore's MTI states 2009-08-14 (one day later); CIL-NUS's treaty database and Wikipedia both give 2009-08-13. Recorded as a minor, likely non-substantive one-day discrepancy — see conflicts.
Signed Location: Bangkok, Thailand (7th AEM-India Consultations)
Entered Into Force Date: 2010-01-01
Entered Into Force Note: CIL-NUS's database qualifies this as EIF '1 January 2010 for parties completing notifications by that date; later dates for parties completing internal requirements subsequently' — i.e., staggered by member, but a full per-member goods-EIF table was not located in this pass (see unsourced_gaps). Separately, Singapore's own MTI FAQ states the agreement became 'effective October 2010,' which may describe Singapore's own domestic implementation date rather than the general EIF — not reconciled in this pass.
Article Count: 24 articles, per Singapore MTI's AITIGA FAQ (single-sourced; not cross-checked against a second source in this pass)
Services Aitisa
ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement (AITISA)
2012-12-20, at the 10th ASEAN-India Summit, New Delhi (per Wikipedia; this is a negotiation-conclusion milestone, distinct from formal signature)
2014-11 (November 2014, per ASEAN Secretariat outreach PDF; exact day not specified in source)
Entered Into Force By Member
2015 07 01: Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India
2015 09 15:
Laos
2016 12 06:
Philippines
Cambodia and Indonesia's specific AITISA entry-into-force dates were not found in this pass; not confirmed whether they fall in the 2015-07-01 cohort or later — see unsourced_gaps.[15][14][24]
Investment Aiia
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement (AIIA)
2014-11 (November 2014, per ASEAN Secretariat outreach PDF; exact day not specified in source)
Entered Into Force By Member
2015 07 01: Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India
2016 03 17:
Philippines
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos's specific AIIA entry-into-force dates were not found in this pass — see unsourced_gaps.[15][14]
Status in detail
IN FORCE for all three pillars (goods since 2010; services/investment since 2015-2016 on a staggered per-member basis). The goods pillar (AITIGA) is under an active, formally mandated REVIEW aimed at upgrading/modernizing the agreement. The review is NOT YET CONCLUDED as of 2026-08-20.
The netcup skeleton frames 'AIFTA Review Round 4 conclusion' as the immediate 'next milestone' for every one of its five topic sections. Verified reality as of 2026-08-20: the review has already passed through at least 13 Joint Committee meetings (the 13th held 2026-07-06/10 in New Delhi), not 'round 4' — the skeleton is stale by roughly nine Joint-Committee meetings and appears frozen at the state of the review as of its 4th meeting (May 2024), i.e., over two years out of date. Additionally, the review's own original target of concluding 'in 2025' (stated as of the 3rd meeting, Feb 2024, and reaffirmed at the 6th meeting, Nov 2024) has already been missed. The most recent target found in this pass (12th meeting, March 2026) is a softened 'substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026' — and even that carries no confirmed date: at the 13th meeting (July 2026), three of eight sub-committees were still active on unspecified 'outstanding chapters,' with only unquantified 'time-bound deliverables' assigned. This is the single most important correction this record makes.
2010-01-01 (see agreement.component_agreements.goods_aitiga for staggering/conflict notes)
Summary: Three different 'start' milestones are found across sources and are NOT the same event: (1) Singapore's MTI FAQ states the review was 'launched' 2020-08-29; (2) India's PIB states that in September 2022 'both sides tasked the AITIGA Joint Committee to undertake the review'; (3) the first two Joint-Committee meetings specifically on the review were held in May and August 2023 (finalizing the Terms of Reference and negotiating structure), with substantive negotiations only beginning at the 3rd meeting in February 2024.
Resolution: Not reconciled to one 'start date' in this pass — a 2019/2020-era leaders'-level agreement-in-principle to review AITIGA is plausible (consistent with the ~2020 MTI date) but was not independently confirmed against a primary ASEAN or Indian government summit document. Recorded as a genuine open question rather than compressed into one date.
Confidence: medium — dated only via a later release's retrospective summary
2023-08
Meeting 2
N: 2
Location: not specified in sources found
Note: Terms of Reference finalized; eight sub-committees established.
Confidence: medium — dated only via a later release's retrospective summary
2024-02-16/19
Meeting 3
N: 3
Location: New Delhi (Vanijya Bhawan)
Substantive negotiations initiated (market access, rules of origin, standards/TBT, conformity assessment). Target stated: 'aiming to conclude the review in 2025.' A secondary source (IAS Gyan) dates this meeting 2024-02-18/19 instead — minor date conflict, PIB's official 16-19 range used as primary.[1]
2024-05-07/09
Meeting 4
N: 4
Location: Putrajaya, Malaysia
Four sub-committees met in person (National Treatment & Market Access, Rules of Origin, Standards/Technical Regulations, Legal & Institutional); SPS sub-committee met separately May 3.[3]
Location: New Delhi (related meetings 2024-11-15/22)
Note: All 8 sub-committees active; target 'review completion in 2025' reaffirmed.[5]
~2025-02 (Jakarta)
Meeting 7
N: 7
Location: Jakarta, Indonesia
Inferred only from the 6th meeting's stated 'next meeting' date — no dedicated 7th-meeting release was independently located in this pass.
Confidence: low — inferred, not directly sourced
concluded 2025-04-11
Meeting 8
N: 8
Location: New Delhi, 5-day session
Co-chaired by Rajesh Agrawal (India) and Dr. Sugumari S. Shanmuga (Malaysia). Trade context cited: USD 121 billion bilateral trade in 2023-24.[7]
~2025-06/07 (exact date not found)
Meeting 9
N: 9
Location: not specified in sources found
Existence inferred from a Vietnamese trade-portal article referring to 'nine rounds of negotiations... since 2022' with the 10th 'scheduled for mid-July' — no dedicated PIB or other release for the 9th meeting was independently located.
Confidence: low — inferred, not directly sourced
2025-08-10/14
Meeting 10
N: 10
Location: New Delhi (Vanijya Bhawan, hybrid)
Seven of eight sub-committees convened. Trade context cited: USD 123 billion bilateral trade in 2024-25. Next meeting set for 2025-10-06/07, Jakarta.[6]
~2025-10-06/07 (Jakarta)
Meeting 11
N: 11
Location: Jakarta, Indonesia
Inferred only from the 10th meeting's stated next-meeting date — no dedicated 11th-meeting release was independently located in this pass.
Confidence: low — inferred, not directly sourced
2026-03-30
Meeting 12
N: 12
Location: ASEAN Secretariat HQ, Jakarta
Working groups on RoO, customs procedures, trade facilitation, and other sub-committees examined outstanding issues (National Treatment/Market Access, Standards/Technical Regulations, SPS, Trade Remedies, Legal/Institutional). Target stated: 'substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026.'[10]
2026-07-06/10
Meeting 13
N: 13
Location: New Delhi (Vanijya Bhawan, hybrid)
MOST RECENT MEETING AS OF THIS RECORD. Co-chaired by Nitin Kumar Yadav (India, Additional Secretary, Dept. of Commerce) and Mastura Ahmad Mustafa (Malaysia, Deputy Secretary General for Trade — Malaysia holds the 2026 ASEAN chairmanship). Only 3 of 8 sub-committees met (Customs Procedures & Trade Facilitation; National Treatment & Market Access; Rules of Origin). Directive: 'expedite the finalisation of the outstanding chapters,' with unspecified 'time-bound deliverables' assigned. No completion date given. Trade context cited: USD 128 billion bilateral trade in 2025-26 (~11% of India's global trade).[2][8]
Sub Committees: National Treatment and Market Access (SC-NTMA), Rules of Origin (SC-ROO), Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation (SC-CPTF), Trade Remedies, Legal and Institutional Issues, and Economic and Technical Cooperation
Sub Committees Source Url: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2076227®=48&lang=2
Target Date Evolution:
2024 02 Stated: conclude the review in 2025 (3rd JC meeting)
2025 07 Secondary Source Target: India reportedly pushing for conclusion by end-2025 against ASEAN preference for a slower 'consensus-driven approach' (India's World, dated 2025-07-01)
2026 03 Stated: substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026 (12th JC meeting) — a visibly softened target versus the original 2025 date
2026 07 Stated: no completion date stated; only 'time-bound deliverables' for outstanding chapters (13th JC meeting)
Assessment: The review has run past its original target by at least 18+ months as of this record's access date, with no firm new completion date publicly attached as of the most recent (13th) meeting.
Finding: India has identified an inverted duty structure in specific sectors — where import duties on inputs exceed duties on finished goods — naming 'ferro alloys, aluminum, copper pipes and tubes, textile staple fibers, and several chemical' preparations as problem areas.
Confidence: medium — single secondary source (India Briefing), not cross-checked against an official Indian government list of affected tariff lines
Trade Deficit:
Finding: India's trade deficit with ASEAN has widened substantially since AIFTA's entry into force and is repeatedly cited as central to India's push for review — see trade.deficit_trend below.
Confidence: high — deficit figures for FY2022-23 are corroborated across 3 independent sources
Finding: India suspects non-ASEAN (implicitly Chinese) goods are being trans-shipped through ASEAN member states to gain preferential tariff treatment, exploiting what India considers lax RoO enforcement and the absence of a 'melt-and-pour'-style rule for some product categories. CAROTAR 2020 (see roo.carotar_2020) was India's unilateral domestic response to this concern, applied economy-wide across all its FTAs, not an AIFTA-specific renegotiated term.
Confidence: medium-high — recurring theme across CSDR, India Briefing, and India's World, but no official Indian government document naming confirmed circumvention cases was located in this pass
Finding: Indian exporters reportedly face 'stringent standards, regulatory hurdles, and delays in customs procedures' in ASEAN markets, disproportionately affecting pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and processed foods.
Confidence: medium — secondary/think-tank source (ORF), not independently corroborated with specific named measures
Tariff Commitment Asymmetry:
Finding: India argues its own tariff-elimination commitment under AITIGA (cited between 71% and 74.2% of tariff lines depending on source) exceeds what several major ASEAN economies offered, particularly Indonesia (cited between 41% and 50.1%) and Vietnam (cited between 66.5% and 69.7%) — see goods.per_member_tariff_commitments for the full, non-reconciled set of figures.
Confidence: medium — directionally consistent across all sources but with materially different precise percentages; not resolved to single numbers
Finding: ASEAN's stated position emphasizes a 'consensus-driven,' technical, non-public negotiating process, preferring to preserve existing trade advantages rather than restructure the deal; one secondary source (dated 2025-07-01) characterized ASEAN as 'highly reluctant' to address India's concerns and, elsewhere, as 'stonewalling' the review. Neither characterization was independently corroborated by an official ASEAN statement in this pass, and both predate the apparent modest re-acceleration visible in the March/July 2026 Joint Committee releases.
Confidence: low-medium — opinion/analysis framing from Indian secondary sources, not an ASEAN-sourced statement
The WTO RTA database (rtais.wto.org) is a dynamic application that did not render usable content via automated fetch in this pass. Formal GATT Article XXIV notification date/document series for AIFTA was not independently confirmed — recorded as a gap, not a zero. See unsourced_gaps.
Investment
Chapter Name Official: ASEAN-India Investment Agreement (AIIA)
Confirmed only at the structural level (signing ~Nov 2014, staggered EIF 2015-2016 — see agreement.component_agreements.investment_aiia). Unlike the TEPA pilot record (where the investment chapter's actual legal character was independently checked against legal-analysis sources), AIIA's substantive provisions were NOT independently re-verified in this pass — this was a deliberate scoping choice given the task's emphasis on the AITIGA/goods review as the critical current item.[15][14]
Skeleton Claims Unverified:
Claims: The skeleton asserts AIIA provides 'national-treatment + most-favoured-nation + fair-and-equitable-treatment + protection-against-expropriation' and an 'investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) framework.'
Finding: Not independently checked against the AIIA treaty text or a legal-analysis secondary source in this pass. Given that the analogous TEPA investment chapter was found (in the pilot record) to be materially MIS-described by its own skeleton, this AIIA claim should be treated with comparable skepticism until separately verified — flagged as an open risk, not confirmed either way.
Confidence: unverified — explicitly a gap, not a confirmation
ASEAN Side Average: 76.4% of tariff lines committed to progressive duty elimination, with over 90% of tariff lines eventually liberalized to some degree (a mix of elimination and reduction). The 76.4% figure is corroborated identically across the ASEAN Secretariat's own outreach PDF and ASEAN Briefing (secondary), and is noted elsewhere as an average inflated by Singapore's 100% commitment.
Confidence: high for the 76.4%/90% headline figures
India Tariff Categories
Source: UN ESCAP working paper (AWP No. 107), citing India's AITIGA tariff schedule
Categories
Normal Track 1:
Tariff Lines: 7775
Commitment: duty eliminated
Deadline: 2013-12-31
Normal Track 2:
Tariff Lines: 1252
Commitment: duty eliminated
Deadline: 2016-12-31
Sensitive Track:
Tariff Lines: 1805
Commitment: duty reduced to 5%
Deadline: 2016-12-31
Highly Sensitive Special Products
Products: crude palm oil, refined palm oil, coffee, black tea, and pepper
Commitment: duty reduced to 37.5%-50% (varies by product)
Deadline: 2019-12-31
Exclusion List:
Tariff Lines: 1297
Commitment: no tariff concessions
These figures are INDIA's own commitment schedule, not ASEAN's. The skeleton's claim of 'Normal Track 1 (zero-tariff by 2013/2016) + Normal Track 2 (zero-tariff by 2016/2018)' does not match: verified India-side deadlines are NT1→2013, NT2→2016 (not 2018). The '2018' figure appears to conflate India's schedule with a different member's or an ASEAN-wide date — flagged in conflicts.[17]
Finding: ASEAN's more developed members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines — 'ASEAN-6') completed their Normal Track reductions on an earlier schedule; the newer/less-developed members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam — 'CLMV') were given until 2021-12-31 for Normal Track and 2024-12-31 for final Sensitive Track reductions.
Confidence: medium — sourced to ASEAN Briefing (secondary); specific ASEAN-6 completion dates were not individually itemized in the source
Per Member Tariff Commitments
Different sources give materially different percentages for the same countries. Per the provenance rule, all variants are retained rather than collapsed to one number.[19][22][26][11]
India
Value: 74.2%
Source: CSDR (csdronline.com)
Value: 71%
Source: India's World (indiasworld.in), dated 2025-07-01
Indonesia
Value: 50.1%
Source: CSDR (csdronline.com)
Value: 44% market access
Source: ORF (orfonline.org)
Value: 41%
Source: India's World (indiasworld.in), dated 2025-07-01
Vietnam
Value: 69.7%
Source: CSDR (csdronline.com) and vntr.moit.gov.vn (Vietnam MOIT trade portal)
Value: 66.5%
Source: India's World (indiasworld.in), dated 2025-07-01
Thailand
Value: 67%
Source: India's World (indiasworld.in), dated 2025-07-01 — single-sourced, not cross-checked
Singapore
Value: 100% duty-free access
Source: CSDR (csdronline.com); consistent with Singapore's general reputation as AIFTA's most liberal ASEAN party
Finding: Ferro alloys, aluminum, copper pipes and tubes, textile staple fibers, and several chemical preparations identified by India as sectors where input duties exceed finished-goods duties under the current schedule.
Confidence: medium — single secondary source
Trade Value Targets Historical
These are ASPIRATIONAL TARGETS announced at various India-ASEAN summits, NOT achieved-trade-value data points. Kept clearly separate from the actual trade.series figures below to avoid conflation.[24]
Targets
Year Announced: 2007
Target: USD 50 billion in bilateral trade
Confidence: low — sourced only to Wikipedia in this pass
Year Announced: 2009
Target: revised to USD 70 billion within two years
Confidence: low — sourced only to Wikipedia in this pass
Year Announced: 2012
Target: USD 100 billion by 2015; USD 200 billion within a decade
Confidence: low — sourced only to Wikipedia in this pass
Chapter Name Official: ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement (AITISA)
Confirmed only at the structural level (signing ~Nov 2014, staggered EIF 2015-2016 — see agreement.component_agreements.services_aitisa). This research pass focused on the goods/AITIGA review per the task's critical-item instruction; AITISA's substantive commitments were NOT independently re-verified.[15][14]
Skeleton Claims Unverified:
Claims: The skeleton asserts a 'Mode 1-4 services-trade framework,' '65+ services sub-sectors' bilateral commitment schedules, a 'Mode 4 services-mobility framework,' and 'Most-Favoured-Nation provisions.'
Finding: None of these specific figures or provisions were independently corroborated against a primary AITISA text or a secondary analysis in this pass. Not repeated as confirmed fact — see unsourced_gaps.
Confidence: unverified
Rules of origin
AIFTA content (regional value content) test, with a change-in-tariff-classification alternative/companion test at the sub-heading (6-digit HS) level, per Annex 2 (Rules of Origin) of AITIGA.
Value Content Threshold: AIFTA content must not be less than 35% of FOB value.
Direct Method: (AIFTA material cost + labour cost + overhead cost + direct cost + profit) / FOB price × 100% ≥ 35%
Indirect Method: (value of non-AIFTA materials + value of undetermined-origin materials) / FOB price × 100% ≤ 65%
Material Valuation Basis: Non-originating materials valued on a CIF-import-value basis, or the earliest ascertained price paid for materials of undetermined origin, per Malaysia's official MITI FTA portal.
CTSH — Change in Tariff Sub-Heading, i.e. a 6-digit Harmonized System level change — for non-originating materials.
Skeleton Correction:
Skeleton Claim: The netcup skeleton states RoO requires '35% local-value-add + Change of Tariff Heading (CTH) at 4-digit HS level.'
Verified Finding: The tariff-shift test is CTSH (6-digit sub-heading level), not CTH (4-digit heading level) — confirmed identically by an official UN ESCAP working paper and Malaysia's official government MITI FTA portal. The skeleton's '4-digit CTH' claim is INCORRECT; the actual requirement operates at the finer 6-digit sub-heading level.
Confidence: high — two independent sources (one UN, one ASEAN-member-government) agree on CTSH specifically
Summary: Sources disagree on whether the 35% value-content test and the CTSH tariff-shift test are ALTERNATIVE routes to origin (either one qualifies) or a COMBINED/joint requirement (both must be satisfied). UN ESCAP's paper describes CTSH as available 'alternatively' to the value test (implying OR). Malaysia's official MITI FTA portal states a good qualifies if AIFTA content ≥35% of FOB value 'AND' non-originating materials have undergone CTSH (implying a combined test).
Resolution: NOT reconciled in this pass — the primary legal text (Annex 2, Rule 4/5 of AITIGA) was not directly retrieved (a CIL-NUS database page linked to it but full document text was not fetched; two further attempts at other secondary RoO-focused pages returned 404/irrelevant content). Recorded as an open precision question rather than asserted either way. The task's own framing ('35% RVC + CTSH') is consistent with the combined/AND reading, but this record does not treat that as independently confirmed.
Confidence: unresolved
Products meeting AIFTA origin criteria, when used as materials in further production within any AIFTA member country, are considered originating in the country where that further working/processing took place (standard bilateral/regional cumulation).
Appendix B (Product Specific Rules) exists as a distinct annex; the CIL-NUS treaty database page notes it was, at the point the underlying document was catalogued, 'under negotiation' — current status of finalization not independently re-checked in this pass.
A separate 'Appendix C: Single List of Textiles and Textile Products' exists within the RoO annex structure, per CIL-NUS — contents not independently examined in this pass.
Certificate of Origin Form AI is the AITIGA-specific preferential origin document; goods must also meet 'direct consignment'/direct-transport-style requirements.[17][14][16][28]
Full Name: Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020
Notification Number: 81/2020-Customs (N.T.)
Notification Date: 2020-08-21
Effective Date: 2020-09-21
Issuing Authority: Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC), Ministry of Finance, Government of India
Purpose: India's unilateral domestic anti-circumvention framework: importers must retain origin-supporting documentation for 5 years from the Bill of Entry date, declare specific origin-criteria information, and are subject to customs verification requests within defined timelines; repeat-offending exporters of identical goods can face rejection of preferential claims.
Scope Note: CAROTAR 2020 applies economy-wide across ALL of India's FTAs/PTAs/CECAs/CEPAs, not as an AIFTA-specific renegotiated term — it is India's general response to the transshipment/circumvention concern discussed under status.review.sticking_points.rules_of_origin_circumvention. The source used does not explicitly name AIFTA, though ASEAN-origin goods clearly fall within its general scope.
Confidence: medium-high for the notification number/dates (secondary compliance-industry source, not a direct CBIC gazette fetch in this pass)
Dispute settlement
The netcup skeleton describes a dispute-settlement framework covering state-state disputes via consultation/good-offices/mediation/arbitration, plus investor-state disputes 'via AICA,' and attributes a coordinating role to an 'ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Investment.'
NOT independently verified in this pass. This record does not confirm or repeat the skeleton's specific claims (including whether AIFTA dispute settlement operates via a standalone ASEAN-India Dispute Settlement Mechanism instrument, a chapter within AITIGA itself, or some other structure) — excluded from confirmed facts pending further research.
Confidence: gap, not a finding
Trade flows
Multiple India-ASEAN trade-value figures were found spanning FY2022-23 through FY2025-26, all sourced to Indian government (PIB/Commerce Ministry) figures either directly or via wire/secondary reporting. Per the provenance rule they are recorded as a labeled year-by-year series rather than blended. Two FY2023-24 variants (USD 121bn vs USD 122.67bn) could not be reconciled to one number in this pass and are both retained.
Basis: Indian fiscal year (April 2023-March 2024), USD · accessed 2026-08-20
Differs from variant A by ~USD 1.67 billion — not reconciled; both retained.
India-ASEAN bilateral trade, FY2024-25 — THIS RECORD'S SECONDARY HEADLINE (most recent year with an export/import breakdown) — PIB (10th AITIGA JC meeting release, aggregate) + CSDR (breakdown)[6][19]
Measure
Value
Total Trade
USD 123 billion
India Exports to ASEAN
USD 38.96 billion (down 5.77% y/y)
India Imports From ASEAN
USD 84.16 billion (up 5.65% y/y)
Trade Deficit Derived
USD ~45.2 billion (84.16 − 38.96; arithmetic derived in this record, not itself quoted in either source)
Basis: Indian fiscal year (April 2024-March 2025), USD, goods · accessed 2026-08-20
The USD 123bn aggregate (PIB) and the 38.96+84.16=123.12bn breakdown (CSDR) are independently consistent with each other, giving cross-validated confidence in this year's figures despite coming from two different source documents.
India-ASEAN bilateral trade, FY2025-26 — THIS RECORD'S PRIMARY HEADLINE (latest complete Indian fiscal year as of 2026-08-20) — India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry (via PIB release covering the 13th AITIGA JC meeting), corroborated independently by at least 7 further outlets[2][25][33][27][29][30]
Measure
Value
Total Trade
USD 128 billion (Rs 11,31,136 crore)
Share of Indias Global Trade
~11%
Basis: Indian fiscal year (April 2025-March 2026), USD / INR · accessed 2026-08-20
This is the correct 'latest same-series full-year' headline figure: FY2025-26 ended 2026-03-31, a fully closed fiscal year as of this record's 2026-08-20 access date. No exports/imports breakdown for this specific year was located in this pass — see unsourced_gaps. Corroborated by: The Star (Malaysia), TV BRICS, IANS, Eastern Mirror Nagaland, Prokerala, BERNAMA, Assam Tribune, IBC World News, Screen Print India — all citing the same underlying Commerce Ministry figure.
Reading the series in sequence (FY22-23 $131.58bn → FY23-24 ~$121-123bn → FY24-25 $123bn → FY25-26 $128bn) shows a dip after FY2022-23 followed by two years of gradual recovery. This is a simple arithmetic reading of the sourced figures above, not itself asserted by any single source.
Deficit Trend
Deficit figures across years, from multiple sources — not a single continuous series, but directionally consistent (widening deficit over the agreement's lifetime).
Points
2011
Deficit: USD 7.5 billion
Source: ORF (orfonline.org)
2020 (India's stated concern at the time)
Deficit: ~USD 24 billion
Source: ASEAN Briefing (aseanbriefing.com)
FY2022-23
Deficit: USD 43.57 billion
Source: corroborated across CSDR, vntr.moit.gov.vn (Vietnam MOIT), and ORF (~$44bn, rounded)
Confidence: high — 3-source agreement
FY2024-25
Deficit: ~USD 45.2 billion (derived)
Source: derived from CSDR's exports/imports figures — see trade.series FY2024-25 entry
FY2009-FY2023: India's imports from ASEAN grew 234.4% while exports grew only 130.4%, per ORF — consistent with the widening-deficit pattern above.[22][18][19][11]
Milestones
2003-10-08
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation signed in Bali, establishing the basis for what would become AIFTA.
ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) signed in Bangkok, at the 7th AEM-India Consultations. (Singapore's MTI dates this one day later, 2009-08-14 — see conflicts.)
Confidence: high
2010-01-01
AITIGA enters into force (staggered by member for full completion of internal requirements; see agreement.component_agreements.goods_aitiga).
Confidence: high
2012-12-20
Negotiations for the Trade in Services and Investment agreements concluded at the 10th ASEAN-India Summit, New Delhi.
Confidence: medium — Wikipedia only in this pass
2014-11
ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement (AITISA) and ASEAN-India Investment Agreement (AIIA) formally signed.
Confidence: high
2015-07-01
AITISA and AIIA enter into force for Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India.
Confidence: high
2015-09-15
AITISA enters into force for Laos.
Confidence: high
2016-03-17
AIIA enters into force for the Philippines (the last AIFTA party to bring the investment pillar into force).
Confidence: high
2016-12-06
AITISA enters into force for the Philippines (the last AIFTA party to bring the services pillar into force).
Confidence: high
2019-12-31
Deadline for India's Highly Sensitive/Special Products (palm oil, coffee, black tea, pepper) tariff reductions to 37.5-50%.
Confidence: high
2020-08-21 / 2020-09-21
India's CBIC issues CAROTAR 2020 (Notification 81/2020-Customs (N.T.)), its unilateral economy-wide anti-circumvention rules covering all FTA-preferential imports including AIFTA-origin goods; notified 2020-08-21, effective 2020-09-21.
Confidence: medium-high
2020-08-29
Per Singapore's MTI, the AITIGA review is 'launched' on this date — the earliest concretely-sourced review milestone found, though its relationship to the later Sept-2022/2023 milestones below is unresolved (see status.review.origin_and_launch_conflict).
Confidence: medium — single official source, not cross-checked
2021-12-31
Deadline for CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) Normal Track tariff eliminations.
Confidence: medium
2022-09
India and ASEAN formally task the AITIGA Joint Committee with undertaking the review.
Deadline for India's Normal Track 2 and Sensitive Track tariff commitments.
Confidence: high
2024-12-31
Deadline for CLMV final Sensitive Track tariff reductions.
Confidence: medium
2025-04-11
8th AITIGA JC meeting concludes, New Delhi (5-day session).
Confidence: high
2025-08-10/14
10th AITIGA JC meeting, New Delhi — 7 of 8 sub-committees active.
Confidence: high
2026-03-30
12th AITIGA JC meeting (JC12), Jakarta — target softened to 'substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026.'
Confidence: high
2026-07-06/10
13th AITIGA JC meeting, New Delhi (most recent as of this record) — only 3 of 8 sub-committees active; 'outstanding chapters' still unresolved; no completion date given.
Confidence: high
Sources disagree
Recorded exactly as the registry states each disagreement — the conflicting values, the organisations behind them, and how this record handles it.
Sources disagree
Skeleton Stale Review Round
The netcup skeleton (spine source) frames 'AIFTA Review Round 4 conclusion' as the imminent next milestone across all five of its topic sections. Verified reality: by 2026-08-20 the review has already held at least 13 Joint Committee meetings (13th held 2026-07-06/10), and the original 'conclude in 2025' target has already slipped to an unconfirmed 'substantial conclusion... in 2026.' The skeleton appears frozen at roughly the 4th-meeting stage (May 2024) — over two years and nine meetings stale.
How this record handles it: Use the status.review.joint_committee_meetings chronology (through the 13th meeting) as current; do not carry forward the skeleton's 'Round 4' framing.
Sources disagree
Roo CTH vs CTSH
Skeleton claims RoO requires 'Change of Tariff Heading (CTH) at 4-digit HS level.' Verified: two independent sources (UN ESCAP working paper; Malaysia's official MITI FTA portal) both specify CTSH (Change in Tariff Sub-Heading, 6-digit level), not CTH (4-digit).
How this record handles it: Use CTSH/6-digit as the corrected characterization; do not carry forward the skeleton's CTH/4-digit claim.
Sources disagree
Roo and Or Ambiguity
UN ESCAP's paper frames the 35% value-content test and the CTSH tariff-shift test as alternatives ('alternatively'), implying a good qualifies via EITHER test. Malaysia's official MITI FTA portal states both conditions with 'AND,' implying a good must satisfy BOTH.
How this record handles it: NOT reconciled in this pass — primary treaty text (Annex 2, Rule 4/5) was not directly retrieved. Recorded as an open question in roo.and_or_unresolved_conflict; do not present a single definitive AND/OR answer downstream without further verification against the primary legal text.
Sources disagree
Normal Track 2 Deadline
Skeleton states 'Normal Track 2 (zero-tariff by 2016/2018).' Verified (UN ESCAP, India-specific schedule): India's own Normal Track 2 deadline was 2016-12-31, not 2018. The '2018' figure does not match any deadline found for India in this pass and may conflate India's schedule with a different member's.
How this record handles it: Use 2016-12-31 for India's Normal Track 2 deadline; the skeleton's '2018' figure is unconfirmed and likely incorrect.
Sources disagree
Review Launch Date Three Way
Three different 'review start' dates are sourced to three different milestones: Singapore MTI's 'launched 2020-08-29'; India's PIB 'tasked Sept 2022'; and the actual first Joint-Committee meeting on the review, May 2023.
How this record handles it: Not reconciled to one date — all three retained in status.review.origin_and_launch_conflict as describing plausibly different stages (leaders'-level mandate vs formal institutional tasking vs first working-level meeting) rather than a single contradicted fact.
Sources disagree
AITIGA Signing Date One Day
CIL-NUS treaty database and Wikipedia both give AITIGA's signing date as 2009-08-13; Singapore's official MTI FAQ gives 2009-08-14.
How this record handles it: Used 2009-08-13 as primary (two independent sources vs one), but not fully resolved — likely a minor, non-substantive discrepancy (e.g., timezone/dateline effects around a Bangkok signing reported by a Singapore government document), similar in nature to the pilot record's chapter-count discrepancy.
Sources disagree
Singapore Eif General vs Specific
The general/multilaterally-cited AITIGA entry-into-force date is 2010-01-01. Singapore's own official MTI FAQ separately states the agreement became 'effective October 2010.'
How this record handles it: Not reconciled — could describe Singapore's specific domestic implementation date distinct from the treaty's general EIF, but this was not confirmed against a second Singapore-specific source in this pass.
Sources disagree
FY2023-24 Trade Value Variance
India-ASEAN bilateral trade for FY2023-24 is cited as USD 121 billion (All India Radio, via 8th JC coverage) versus USD 122.67 billion (IAS Gyan, secondary).
How this record handles it: Both retained in trade.series as variant A/B; not reconciled to one figure.
Sources disagree
Per Member Tariff Percentage Variance
India's, Indonesia's, and Vietnam's specific tariff-line commitment percentages vary by 2-9 percentage points depending on the source (e.g., Indonesia cited at 41%, 44%, and 50.1% across three different sources).
How this record handles it: All variants retained separately in goods.per_member_tariff_commitments, each attributed to its source; none picked as authoritative.
Not yet verifiable
What the registry could not source, listed exactly as it states it — not gaps filled from memory or inference.
Full per-member AITIGA (goods) entry-into-force date table — only the general 2010-01-01 date plus the CIL-NUS note that 'later dates' applied for some parties was found; specific laggard countries and dates for the GOODS pillar (as opposed to the well-documented services/investment staggering) were not identified.
Cambodia and Indonesia's specific AITISA (services) entry-into-force dates.
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos's specific AIIA (investment) entry-into-force dates.
AIIA's actual substantive legal character (NT/MFN/FET/expropriation/ISDS) — the skeleton's claims were not checked against the treaty text or a legal-analysis source in this pass; given the TEPA pilot's experience of a skeleton materially mischaracterizing an analogous investment chapter, this should be treated as an open risk, not assumed correct.
Dispute settlement mechanics for AIFTA as a whole (state-state and any investor-state mechanism) — the skeleton's claims about a consultation/arbitration framework and an 'ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Investment' role were not verified against any source in this pass.
Primary legal text of AITIGA Annex 2 (Rules of Origin), specifically Rule 4/5 — needed to resolve the AND/OR ambiguity between the 35% value-content test and the CTSH tariff-shift test.
Whether Appendix B (Product Specific Rules) of the RoO annex has since been finalized — CIL-NUS's catalogued version described it as 'under negotiation,' with no independent check of current status in this pass.
FY2025-26 India-ASEAN trade breakdown by exports vs. imports (and therefore the FY2025-26 deficit) — only the USD 128 billion aggregate was found; no source in this pass split it into exports/imports for this specific year.
Formal WTO RTA database (GATT Article XXIV) notification date and document series for AIFTA/AITIGA — rtais.wto.org did not return usable content via automated fetch in this pass.
Specific content of the 'outstanding chapters' referenced at the 13th Joint Committee meeting (July 2026) — no release found names which chapters remain unresolved or why.
Dedicated sourcing for the 7th, 9th, and 11th AITIGA Joint Committee meetings — their approximate timing was inferred from adjacent meetings' 'next meeting' statements, but no dedicated release for any of the three was independently located.
2019-era (or earlier) leaders'-level origin of the AITIGA review concept, if any predates Singapore MTI's cited 2020-08-29 'launch' date — not confirmed against a primary ASEAN or Indian summit document in this pass.
Confirmation that CAROTAR 2020 has been specifically invoked against AIFTA-origin goods (as opposed to being a general framework that could apply to them) — the source used for CAROTAR 2020 did not name AIFTA explicitly.