Rendered from the All Frontier Global corridor registry · every figure below carries a numbered source
India and Indonesia have no bilateral free trade agreement. Goods trade between them runs on the plurilateral ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement, to which Indonesia is a party as an ASEAN Member State[1]; the bilateral CECA announced in 2011 never got past pre-negotiation consultations and India’s own page on it stops that year[2]. The registry is explicit that the absence of a bilateral agreement rests on official silence rather than on any official statement, and records that weakness rather than papering over it. Two statistical series describe the corridor and the registry forbids blending them: the Indonesian one publishes a headline total for a calendar year, the Indian one publishes no total at all, so every Indian aggregate on this page is derived and appears only with its derivation. The AITIGA Review’s completion date is stated three different ways by three governments and is left unreconciled. This page renders the corridor registry record.
There is no bilateral India-Indonesia free trade agreement in force. Goods trade between the two is governed by the plurilateral ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), to which Indonesia is a party as an ASEAN Member State. India's own published inventories of its trade agreements do not list Indonesia. The PIB release of 18 December 2025 names India's concluded agreements as Oman (CEPA), the United Kingdom (CETA), EFTA, the UAE (CEPA), Australia (ECTA) and Mauritius (CECPA), and its live negotiations as Israel, the United States, the European Union, ASEAN (AITIGA), Australia (CECA), Mexico, New Zealand, Canada, the GCC and Qatar. Indonesia appears in neither list. The PIB release of 6 March 2026, 'India's achievements in Free Trade Agreements for the year 2025-26', describes nine FTAs spanning 38 countries and names Mauritius, the UAE, Australia, EFTA, the UK, Oman, New Zealand, the EU and the United States. Indonesia is not named and AITIGA is not mentioned.[3][2]
Agreement on Trade in Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India (AITIGA, also styled AIFTA in tariff-schedule documents).[1]
Signatories are the ten ASEAN Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam) and the Republic of India. Indonesia is bound to India through this instrument, not through any bilateral one.[1]
Signed 13 August 2009[1]; in force 1 January 2010[1].
Signature: Signed 13 August 2009 at Bangkok, Thailand and Ha Noi, Viet Nam.[1]
Entry into force: Article 23 provides for entry into force on 1 January 2010, or upon notification by India and at least one ASEAN Member State, with later entry accommodated through June 2010 or by mutual agreement. No official source located states the specific date on which the Agreement entered into force as between India and Indonesia individually — see Not yet verified.[1]
AITIGA Article 4 and Annex 1 divide tariff lines into: Normal Track (Normal Track 1, staged 2010-2013 or 2018; Normal Track 2, staged 2010-2016 or 2019-2021 depending on the party); Sensitive Track, under which 'Applied MFN tariff rates above five (5) per cent ... will be reduced to five (5) per cent' over defined periods; Special Products, which follow bespoke schedules; Highly Sensitive Lists, where lines are cut by 25-50 per cent by December 2019-2024 varying by country; and Exclusion Lists, which are 'Subject to annual tariff review with a view to improving market access'.[1]
The tracks are recorded as the treaty states them. No official source located gives the number or share of tariff lines India and Indonesia each placed in each track, nor the bilateral utilisation of AITIGA preferences — see Not yet verified.[1]
Palm oil is a named Special Product in India's AITIGA schedule, alongside coffee, black tea and pepper — the four products India carved out of normal staging. The schedule as printed in the treaty text runs, for each product, from a base rate to a final AIFTA preferential rate not later than 31.12.2019: Crude Palm Oil (CPO) base 80, staged 76 / 72 / 68 / 64 / 60 / 56 / 52 / 48 / 44 / 40 across 2010-2019, final 37.5 at 31.12.2019. Refined Palm Oil (RPO) base 90, staged 86 / 82 / 78 / 74 / 70 / 66 / 62 / 58 / 54 / 50, final 45 at 31.12.2019. Coffee base 100, final 45. Black Tea base 100, final 45. Pepper base 70, final 50.[1]
AITIGA Article 19 provides that the Joint Committee 'shall meet within one (1) year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement and then biennially ... to review this Agreement'. Exclusion List lines are separately 'subject to annual tariff review with a view to improving market access' under Annex 1.[1]
The current AITIGA Review is being conducted through this Joint Committee machinery. Note the treaty says biennially; the Joint Committee has in practice been meeting several times a year during the Review (10th meeting August 2025, 12th March 2026, 13th July 2026).[1][4]
Primary official sources for the agreement position: [4][10][11][12][13][14][3][15][16][2][8][17][18][7][19][5][1][6][20][21][9][22][23]
LIVE AS AT 18 AUGUST 2026. The most recent Indian official statement is the PIB release of 8 July 2026: 'India hosted the 13th ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) Joint Committee (JC) and related meetings at Vanijya Bhawan, New Delhi, from July 6 to 10, 2026, to review the progress of negotiations under the AITIGA Review. The meetings are being held in a hybrid format.' 'Meetings of three of the eight Sub-Committees under the AITIGA Joint Committee are currently being held on the sidelines of the 13th Joint Committee meeting. These include the Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation (SC-CPTF), the Sub-Committee on National Treatment and Market Access (SC-NTMA), and the Sub-Committee on Rules of Origin (SC-ROO).' 'The Joint Committee provided strategic guidance to the Sub-Committees in their respective areas of work and urged them to expedite the finalisation of the outstanding chapters under the AITIGA Review. To maintain the momentum of negotiations, the Sub-Committees were assigned time-bound deliverables and encouraged to work closely towards achieving tangible outcomes within the agreed timelines.' 'The 13th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting, held on July 7, 2026, was co-chaired by Additional Secretary, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Shri Nitin Kumar Yadav, and Deputy Secretary General (Trade), Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, Malaysia, Ms. Mastura Ahmad Mustafa. Delegations from all ASEAN Member States — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam — participated in the meeting.'[4]
The registry records each government’s own statement of when the Review is meant to finish, in that government’s own words, and reconciles none of them. One names a month, one names a year, and the host of the most recent Joint Committee names nothing.
CONFLICTING BY SOURCE COUNTRY — RECORDED AS EACH GOVERNMENT STATES IT, NOT RECONCILED. INDONESIA states a date: the Directorate General of International Trade Negotiations, Indonesian Ministry of Trade, reported on 15 June 2026 that 'Indonesia berkomitmen untuk mendukung percepatan penyelesaian Reviu AITIGA yang ditargetkan selesai secara substansi pada bulan Oktober 2026' — Indonesia is committed to supporting acceleration of the AITIGA Review, targeted for substantive completion in October 2026. VIET NAM states a year: the Ministry of Industry and Trade headline of 31 March 2026 on the 12th Joint Committee is 'AITIGA JC 12: Promoting review and upgrade of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, aiming for the substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026'. INDIA states neither: the PIB release of 8 July 2026 on the 13th Joint Committee gives no target date at all, and the PIB release of 15 August 2025 on the 10th Joint Committee likewise gives none.[5][6][4]
Indonesia's own position in the Review, as stated by its Trade Ministry on 8 August 2026: 'Indonesia berkomitmen memenuhi target liberalisasi akses pasar sebesar 80 persen sebagaimana telah disepakati dalam perundingan AITIGA Review' — Indonesia commits to meeting the 80 per cent market access liberalisation target as agreed in the AITIGA Review negotiations. Against that: 'tingkat liberalisasi Indonesia saat ini yang mencapai 41,9 persen. Hingga Juli 2026, Indonesia telah menyampaikan penawaran akses pasar secara bertahap yang mencakup sekitar 57 persen dari target tersebut.' — Indonesia's current liberalisation level reaches 41.9 per cent; by July 2026 Indonesia had submitted phased market-access offers covering about 57 per cent of that target.[7]
'There is a marketed 24% gap between India & Indonesia in the market access level offered by both countries.' The same document records that 'ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) Review negotiations' are ongoing.[17]
India's official record of bilateral trade-agreement talks with Indonesia consists of two sentences and stops in 2011. The Department of Commerce page 'India-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)', filed under 'India's Current Engagements in RTAs', reads in full: 'Commencement of negotiations on India-Indonesia CECA was announced on 25th January, 2011 during the visit of Indonesian President to New Delhi.' and 'During the CITM's visit to Indonesia on 3-4 October 2011, both sides held India-Indonesia CECA pre-negotiation consultations.' Nothing after October 2011 appears on the page. The page carries no publication or last-updated date.
The page is live and still classifies the CECA as a 'current engagement', but records no round of formal negotiation ever having taken place — only 'pre-negotiation consultations' fifteen years ago. 'CITM' is Commerce and Industry Minister. Do not infer from this page that the CECA is either alive or dead; it states neither.
The live bilateral track as at 18 August 2026 is an Indonesian proposal for a Preferential Trade Agreement, not a CECA. Indonesia's Trade Ministry, reporting the 7 August 2026 meeting between Trade Minister Budi Santoso and India's Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal in Jaipur, states: 'Indonesia-India Preferential Trade Agreement (ID-IN PTA) akan melengkapi AITIGA dengan menyediakan akses pasar yang lebih luas, mengurangi hambatan nontarif, serta memperkuat fasilitasi perdagangan' — an Indonesia-India PTA would complement AITIGA by providing wider market access, reducing non-tariff barriers and strengthening trade facilitation. And: 'PTA akan menjadi langkah strategis untuk memperluas akses pasar, meningkatkan perdagangan yang lebih berimbang, serta memberikan kepastian yang lebih besar bagi pelaku usaha kedua negara' — the PTA would be a strategic step to widen market access, make trade more balanced, and give greater certainty to businesses in both countries.
SEQUENCING MATTERS AND IS ONE-SIDED IN THE RECORD. All quoted language is Indonesia's. No Indian official source located records this meeting at all, or India's response to the PTA proposal. Do not state that India accepted, welcomed or agreed to a PTA — no official Indian text supporting that was found. See Not yet verified.
Paragraph 20 of the India-Indonesia Joint Statement of 7 July 2026 sets the agreed order of operations: 'The leaders highlighted that economic and trade cooperation remains a key pillar of the dynamic India-Indonesia ties. Both leaders acknowledged the vast economic and developmental synergies between India's vision of ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ and ‘Indonesia Emas 2045’, and the role of broader and deeper economic integration between the two countries for unlocking greater economic opportunities. Towards this, the leaders expressed desire for a timely conclusion of ASEAN India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) review for a balanced, mutually beneficial and facilitative trade environment, followed by a comprehensive deeper bilateral trade engagement to enhance bilateral trade.'
This is the closest thing to an agreed bilateral-track statement at head-of-government level: AITIGA review FIRST, 'followed by' deeper bilateral engagement. It stops short of naming a CEPA, CECA, FTA or PTA. The word used is 'engagement', not 'agreement'. The leaders set no date and no target value.
Paragraph 21 of the Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'Both leaders emphasised the need to fully utilise and strengthen the existing bilateral economic mechanisms, including the convening in 2026 of the 2nd meeting of the Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI), the 4th Biennial Trade Ministers' Forum (BTMF), and the 1st meeting of the Joint Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD). They noted that these mechanisms should work towards achieving concrete and business-oriented outcomes in addressing outstanding tariff and non-tariff issues, improving market access, facilitating trade and investment, and advancing cooperation in finance, digital economy, industry and supply chains, while respecting each country's domestic regulations and development priorities.'
Three named mechanisms, all scheduled for 2026: WGTI (2nd), BTMF (4th), EFD (1st). No official source located confirms that any of the three has yet met in 2026 — see Not yet verified. The ordinal '1st meeting' of the EFD as at July 2026 is itself notable given the Dialogue was announced earlier.
Series owner: Indonesia — Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian Perdagangan). Sign convention: Exports and imports are INDONESIA'S. Indonesian exports = Indian imports; Indonesian imports = Indian exports.[7].
| Measure | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Total bilateral trade | US$23.13 bn published as a total, not derived | CY2025 |
| Indonesia’s exports to India | US$18.3 bn | CY2025 |
| Indonesia’s imports from India | US$4.84 bn | CY2025 |
| Indonesia’s surplus | US$13.46 bn | CY2025 |
Surplus: The surplus was read from the release and is arithmetically consistent with the export and import figures quoted verbatim above (18.30 - 4.84 = 13.46), but the surplus sentence itself was not captured verbatim. Treat the two components as the primary record.[7]
| Measure | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Total bilateral trade | US$11.89 bn | January-June 2026 |
| Indonesia’s exports to India | US$9.28 bn | January-June 2026 |
| Indonesia’s imports from India | US$2.6 bn | January-June 2026 |
| Indonesia’s surplus | US$6.68 bn | January-June 2026 |
| Measure | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Total bilateral trade | US$27 bn | CY2023 |
| Indonesia’s exports to India | US$20.3 bn | CY2023 |
| Indonesia’s imports from India | US$6.7 bn | CY2023 |
| Indonesia’s surplus | US$13.6 bn | CY2023 |
The Indonesian series is the better-labelled of the two: the periods are unambiguous calendar years and the Ministry publishes a total. It is also the more recent record of the corridor's direction of travel, running to June 2026. BPS-Statistics Indonesia, the primary Indonesian statistical authority, could not be made to yield an India-specific bilateral figure — see Not yet verified.[7][19]
Series owner: India — Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCIS), Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, published through the Trade Intelligence and Analytics (TIA) Portal. Period as labelled by the portal: FY 2025-26 (YTD)[8].
| Measure | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| India’s exports to Indonesia | US$4.49 bn printed on the dashboard | FY2025-26 as labelled |
| India’s imports from Indonesia | US$20.29 bn printed on the dashboard | FY2025-26 as labelled |
| Total trade | US$24.78 bn derived, not published — derivation below | FY2025-26 as labelled |
| India’s trade balance | US$15.8 bn a deficit for India; derived, not published — derivation below | FY2025-26 as labelled |
Exports: Printed on the dashboard as '$4.49Bn' with a change of '-16.52%'. Source attribution printed as '(Source: DGCIS)'. Currency string on the portal is US dollars.[8]
Imports: Printed as '$20.29Bn' with a change of '-10.92%'. India runs a very large merchandise DEFICIT with Indonesia on this series — imports are roughly four and a half times exports.[8]
The TIA dashboard labels these Indonesia figures 'FY 2025-26 (YTD)'. The same portal defines the label as follows: 'YTD (Year To Date) refers to April-June for Financial year & January-June for Calendar year.' Read literally, that would make USD 4.49 billion and USD 20.29 billion the April-June 2025 quarter only. Two things contradict that literal reading. First, the portal's own freshness string is 'Data Updated for June 2026', which is fifteen months after April-June 2025 and sits inside FY2026-27, so an April-June 2025 window would be an implausible thing for the dashboard to be showing. Second, and decisively, the printed year-on-year changes reconcile to the FULL prior fiscal year, not to a quarter of it.[8]
MERCHANDISE ONLY. No official Indian source located gives India-Indonesia SERVICES trade at all, in any year. The corridor as recorded here is a goods corridor because that is all the official record contains.[8]
Series owner: India — Department of Commerce, as reproduced by the Consulate General of India, Medan. Units as published: US$ million[17].
| Period | India’s exports | India’s imports | Total trade | Change on a year earlier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020-21 | US$5,026.21 mn | US$12,470.17 mn | US$17,496.38 mn | -8.83% |
| 2021-22 | US$8,471.51 mn | US$17,702.83 mn | US$26,174.34 mn | 49.6% |
| 2022-23 | US$10,024.3 mn | US$28,820.41 mn | US$38,844.71 mn | 48.4% |
| 2023-24 | US$5,988.88 mn | US$23,410.67 mn | US$29,399.55 mn | -24.32% |
| 2024-25 | US$5,380 mn | US$22,778.45 mn | US$28,158.45 mn | -4.22% |
The two series are of broadly similar magnitude but are NOT comparable and diverge in ways no official source explains. India's DGCIS-based figure for its imports from Indonesia is USD 20.29 billion for FY2025-26 (April 2025-March 2026); Indonesia's Trade Ministry figure for its exports to India is USD 18.30 billion for CY2025 (January-December 2025). India's exports to Indonesia are USD 4.49 billion for FY2025-26; Indonesia's imports from India are USD 4.84 billion for CY2025. The periods overlap by nine months only.[8][7]
'ASEAN remains one of India's key trading partners, accounting for around 11 per cent of India's global trade. Bilateral trade between India and ASEAN reached USD 128 billion during 2025-26.'
Indian fiscal year. Places the India-Indonesia corridor in scale: on the Indian series the corridor is of the order of USD 24.78 billion against an India-ASEAN total of USD 128 billion, but that ratio is our arithmetic on two differently-sourced figures and is not published by anyone.
'Bilateral trade reached USD 123 billion in 2024-25' (India-ASEAN).
Independently confirms the shape of the corridor from the Indonesian side for 2023: total USD 27.0 billion, Indonesian exports USD 20.3 billion, Indonesian imports USD 6.7 billion, Indonesian surplus USD 13.6 billion, with coal and palm oil as the top two Indonesian export lines. The heavy Indonesian surplus is a stable structural feature across every year and both series.
Confirms from the Indian side that India runs a large and persistent merchandise deficit with Indonesia: Indian imports exceeded Indian exports in every one of the five fiscal years FY2020-21 to FY2024-25, by a factor of between 2.1x and 4.2x. Also confirms coal and palm oil as the dominant Indonesian export lines and gives Indian investment in Indonesia as US$1.56 billion across 7,292 projects (2000-2024) against Indonesian investment in India of US$658.64 million (April 2000-2024).
Every commodity list on this page is Indonesian. No Indian-series bilateral commodity breakdown exists in the official record the registry located, in any year. Indonesian product names are carried in the language they were published in as well as in English, because the registry recorded them that way.
| Commodity | As published |
|---|---|
| Coal | batu bara |
| Palm oil | minyak sawit |
| Stainless steel | baja nirkarat |
| Industrial monocarboxylic fatty acids | asam lemak monokarboksilat industri |
| Synthetic corundum | korundum buatan |
| Commodity | As published |
|---|---|
| Buffalo meat | daging kerbau |
| Peanuts / groundnuts | kacang tanah |
| Goods-carrying vehicles | kendaraan pengangkut barang |
| Tractor parts and accessories | suku cadang dan aksesori traktor |
| Raw tobacco | tembakau mentah |
| Commodity | Value |
|---|---|
| Coal | US$7,256 mn |
| Palm oil | US$4,516 mn |
| Stainless steel | US$1,254 mn |
| Copper ores | US$931 mn |
| Articles of jewellery | US$466 mn |
| Commodity | Value |
|---|---|
| Petroleum oils other than crude (refined products) | US$921 mn |
| Motor vehicles | US$555 mn |
| Bovine meat | US$320 mn |
| Groundnuts | US$259 mn |
| Tractor parts | US$226 mn |
'India exports refined petroleum products, maize, commercial vehicles, telecommunication equipment, oil seeds, animal feed, cotton, steel products and plastics to Indonesia.' 'India exports pharmaceuticals in bulk and formulations to Indonesia.' 'India is the largest buyer of crude palm oil from Indonesia and imports coal, minerals, rubber, pulp and paper and hydrocarbons reserves.'[18]
The operative mechanics of this corridor are Indian customs notifications on palm oil, an unfinished payments framework, and one comparison the registry makes itself and marks as derived — the finding that the only agreement binding the two countries confers no benefit on the corridor’s largest agricultural flow. Notification numbers, serial numbers and rates are reproduced as printed, including the point at which repeated reads of the same document disagreed.
The Government of India reduced the basic customs duty on crude edible oils. PIB: the BCD on 'crude edible oils namely crude sunflower, soybean, and palm oils has been reduced from 20% to 10%'. The release records the consequence for the refining margin: the 'import duty differential between crude and refined edible oils' moves 'from 8.75% to 19.25%'.
THIS RELEASE CITES NO NOTIFICATION NUMBER AND NO EFFECTIVE DATE beyond its own publication date of 11 June 2025 — see Not yet verified. It also does not mention Indonesia or Malaysia anywhere, so nothing in the official Indian record ties this measure to the Indonesia corridor, notwithstanding that palm oil is Indonesia's second-largest export line to India. The widened crude-refined differential is the operative fact for the corridor: it favours importing crude palm oil for refining in India over importing refined palm oil.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'Centre reduces Basic Custom duty (BCD) on major imported Crude edible Oils from 20% to 10%', 11 JUN 2025 6:34PM (Release ID 2135774)
Notification No. 45/2025-Customs, dated 24 October 2025, issued by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), 'In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962'. Rows bearing HS 1511, as printed: S.No. 46, tariff item '1511 10 00', description 'Crude Palm Oil', rate '10%'. S.No. 47, tariff item '1511 90', description 'All goods', rate '32.5%'. S.No. 48, heading '1511', description 'Palm stearin, whether crude, RBD or other, having free fatty acid (FFA) 20% or more', rate '7.5%'. The notification is a consolidating instrument that supersedes 31 prior notifications dating from 1957 to 2025 and applies prospectively except as regards actions taken before supersession.
VERIFICATION METHOD AND A RECORDED CONFLICT. The 1511 rows above were obtained by a literal string search of the notification PDF for the digits '1511' and for 'palm', and agreed with a separate read of the same document. A THIRD automated read of the same PDF returned S.No. 46 as aircraft of heading 8802 rather than crude palm oil. The row NUMBERS should therefore be treated with caution; the RATES against HS 1511 were consistent across the two reads that returned palm oil at all. The notification does not state a single coming-into-force date; individual entries carry their own expiry dates, one of which is 31 March 2026. Anyone relying on the current rate should re-verify against the CBIC tariff before use.
Source organisation: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue — Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24 October 2025, as published by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs
India's AITIGA Special Products schedule fixes the AIFTA preferential rate for Crude Palm Oil at 37.5 per cent and for Refined Palm Oil at 45 per cent, both from 31 December 2019. India's applied basic customs duty under Notification No. 45/2025-Customs is 10 per cent on crude palm oil (1511 10 00) and 32.5 per cent on 1511 90. Comparing the two officially stated sets of numbers: 37.5 is greater than 10, and 45 is greater than 32.5. The AITIGA preferential rate is therefore ABOVE India's applied MFN-basis rate on both palm oil legs, so an Indonesian exporter claiming AITIGA preference on palm oil into India would pay more, not less, than under the ordinary applied rate.
DERIVATION RECORDED IN FULL ABOVE. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THIS CONCLUSION. It is a comparison of two published numbers, nothing more. It is recorded because it is the single most consequential mechanic in this corridor: the largest agricultural trade flow between the two countries is untouched by the only trade agreement that binds them, which is context for why Indonesia is pressing both the AITIGA Review and a bilateral PTA. Caveats that could not be checked against any official source: whether additional levies (agriculture infrastructure and development cess, social welfare surcharge) alter the comparison; whether the 45 per cent RPO line maps to 1511 90; and whether any later notification has changed the applied rate. Do not present this as a sourced fact.
Source organisation: DERIVED. Arithmetic comparison of two officially stated figures: ASEAN Secretariat AITIGA treaty text (Special Products schedule for India) and Government of India Notification No. 45/2025-Customs of 24 October 2025
The Reserve Bank of India and Bank Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 7 March 2024 in Mumbai, signed by Governors Shaktikanta Das and Perry Warjiyo, to promote the use of local currencies — the Indian Rupee and the Indonesian Rupiah — for bilateral transactions. The MoU covers 'all current account transactions, permissible capital account transactions and any other economic and financial transactions as agreed upon by both countries'. It is intended to let exporters and importers invoice and settle in their domestic currencies and to develop an INR-IDR foreign exchange market.
The RBI release does not state when the framework becomes operational. Note the terminology difference between the two central banks: India's side and the leaders' joint statement use 'Local Currency Transaction (LCT)'; Bank Indonesia's own long-standing framework for other partners is 'Local Currency Settlement (LCS)'.
Source organisation: Reserve Bank of India — press release, 7 March 2024; parallel release issued by Bank Indonesia
Paragraph 24 of the India-Indonesia Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'Both leaders welcomed the progress towards the operationalisation of guidelines on Local Currency Transaction (LCT) between the Reserve Bank of India and Bank Indonesia and noted that this would further promote trade and investment between India and Indonesia and deepen financial integration between the two economies.'
READ THE TENSE. Twenty-eight months after the MoU was signed, the two heads of government were welcoming 'progress towards the operationalisation of guidelines' — not the operation of the mechanism itself. As at 18 August 2026 no official source located states that rupee-rupiah settlement is live for India-Indonesia trade, names any appointed cross-currency dealer bank, or gives any settled volume. Do not describe the corridor as having working local-currency settlement.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, 7 July 2026 (Release ID 2282084)
Paragraph 34 of the Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'The two leaders welcomed the progress towards the implementation of the Cross-Border QR Payment Linkage between India and Indonesia.' Separately, in his press statement of the same day, the Prime Minister of India said: 'India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) will soon be integrated with Indonesia's payment system.'
Both are forward-looking. 'Progress towards the implementation' and 'will soon be integrated' are not statements that either mechanism is live. No go-live date is given for either.
Source organisation: Prime Minister's Office, Government of India — PM's press statement during the joint press statement with the President of Indonesia, 7 July 2026; joint statement paragraph from PIB Release ID 2282084
Paragraph 33 of the Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'Both leaders welcomed the launch of Indonesia Open Network (ION), based on Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) architecture in India.'
This is the one item in the corridor's digital-trade layer stated as having actually LAUNCHED rather than being in progress. The statement gives no launch date, no operator and no scope.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, 7 July 2026 (Release ID 2282084)
Non-tariff barriers are officially acknowledged as an outstanding problem in this corridor by both sides. Joint Statement paragraph 21 directs the bilateral mechanisms to work on 'addressing outstanding tariff and non-tariff issues, improving market access'. Indonesia's Trade Ministry, 8 August 2026: 'Menurutnya, kedua forum tersebut dapat menjadi wadah untuk mengidentifikasi peluang perdagangan, menyelesaikan hambatan nontarif secara konstruktif' — these two forums can be a venue to identify trade opportunities and resolve non-tariff barriers constructively. Indonesia's proposed bilateral PTA is framed as 'mengurangi hambatan nontarif' — reducing non-tariff barriers.
NEITHER GOVERNMENT NAMES A SINGLE SPECIFIC NON-TARIFF BARRIER in any source located. No product, no measure, no agency, no case. The problem is acknowledged only in the abstract. See Not yet verified.
Source organisation: Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Trade press release of 8 August 2026; and Government of India, PIB Release ID 2282084, 7 July 2026
The Sub-Committee on Rules of Origin (SC-ROO) is one of the eight sub-committees under the AITIGA Joint Committee, and was one of the three that met on the sidelines of the 13th Joint Committee in New Delhi, 6-10 July 2026, alongside the Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation (SC-CPTF) and the Sub-Committee on National Treatment and Market Access (SC-NTMA). The full set of sub-committees, as named at the 10th Joint Committee of August 2025, comprises SC-CPTF, SC-LII (Legal and Institutional Issues), SC-NTMA, SC-SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary), SC-ROO, SC-STRACAP (Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures) and SC-TR (Trade Remedies).
COUNT DISCREPANCY RECORDED, NOT RESOLVED. The July 2026 release says there are EIGHT sub-committees; the August 2025 release names SEVEN. No official source located names the eighth. Do not assert what it is. Rules of origin are the operative mechanic for whether any AITIGA concession can actually be claimed on an India-Indonesia consignment; no origin criterion, value-addition threshold or certification procedure for AITIGA was located in this pass.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — Release ID 2282336 (8 July 2026) and Release ID 2156828 (15 August 2025)
Three items, none of them an operating fact: a welcome of an interest, an exhortation, and a platform described as potential. No port pair, shipping service, air cargo route, container volume or transit time is named by either government.
Paragraph 32 of the India-Indonesia Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'President Prabowo welcomed India's interest in partnering on the integrated development of the Sabang Port.'
The only named physical logistics node in the entire India-Indonesia corridor record located in this pass. Sabang sits at the northern tip of Sumatra, opposite India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands, at the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca. The sentence records an Indonesian WELCOME of an Indian INTEREST — not a project, an agreement, an investment, a timeline or a value. No official source located states what 'integrated development' would involve, who would build or fund it, or whether any Indian entity has been designated.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, 7 July 2026 (Release ID 2282084); identical text at pmindia.gov.in
Paragraph 31 of the Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'Both leaders emphasised the importance of enhanced maritime and air connectivity between the countries and encouraged greater air connectivity and port-to-port connections.'
Aspirational. Names no port pair, no route, no shipping line, no airline, no frequency and no volume. Nothing in this paragraph is an operating fact.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, 7 July 2026 (Release ID 2282084)
Paragraph 25 of the Joint Statement of 7 July 2026: 'Both leaders noted the importance of the Red and White Cooperative Network as a potential logistical distribution platform in Indonesia, to deliver, among others, pharmaceuticals and medical products from both countries, in accordance with respective domestic laws and regulations.'
'Potential', not operating. This is an Indonesian domestic cooperative distribution network being flagged as a possible last-mile channel for Indian pharmaceutical exports. No official source located describes its coverage, its operator, or any Indian product actually moving through it. Read alongside the MoU between CDSCO and BPOM on medical products regulation signed at the same visit.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, 7 July 2026 (Release ID 2282084)
The Agreement on Trade in Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN and the Republic of India signed at Bangkok, Thailand and Ha Noi, Viet Nam by the ten ASEAN Member States including Indonesia, and India. Entry into force 1 January 2010 under Article 23.
Source organisation: ASEAN Secretariat — AITIGA treaty text
'Commencement of negotiations on India-Indonesia CECA was announced on 25th January, 2011 during the visit of Indonesian President to New Delhi.' Pre-negotiation consultations followed during the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister's visit to Indonesia on 3-4 October 2011. India's Department of Commerce page records nothing after that date.
Source organisation: Government of India, Department of Commerce — India-Indonesia CECA page
Governors Shaktikanta Das and Perry Warjiyo signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Mumbai to promote the use of the Indian Rupee and Indonesian Rupiah for bilateral transactions, covering 'all current account transactions, permissible capital account transactions and any other economic and financial transactions as agreed upon by both countries', and aiming to develop an INR-IDR foreign exchange market.
Source organisation: Reserve Bank of India — press release, 7 March 2024
PIB's 'List of Outcomes: State visit of President of Indonesia to India (January 23-26, 2025)' records five signed instruments: (1) Health cooperation, between India's Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Indonesia's Ministry of Health; (2) Maritime safety and security, between the Indian Coast Guard and BAKAMLA, Indonesia (a renewal); (3) Traditional medicine quality assurance, between the Pharmacopoeia Commission for Indian Medicine and Homoeopathy, Ministry of AYUSH, and the Indonesian Food and Drug Authority; (4) Digital development cooperation, between India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and Indonesia's Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs; (5) Cultural Exchange Programme between the two Ministries of Culture for 2025-28. In addition the 3rd India-Indonesia CEOs Forum presented a joint report to officials of both countries with the Prime Minister and the President present.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'List of Outcomes: State visit of President of Indonesia to India (January 23-26, 2025)', 25 January 2025 (Release ID 2096278)
PIB records the reduction and states that the import duty differential between crude and refined edible oils widens 'from 8.75% to 19.25%'. Indonesia is not mentioned in the release.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 11 June 2025 (Release ID 2135774)
India hosted the 10th Joint Committee at Vanijya Bhawan, New Delhi from 10 to 14 August 2025, with seven sub-committees named: SC-CPTF, SC-LII, SC-NTMA, SC-SPS, SC-ROO, SC-STRACAP and SC-TR. The release records that India-ASEAN 'Bilateral trade reached USD 123 billion in 2024-25' and that the next meeting was scheduled for 6-7 October 2025 in Jakarta, Indonesia, hosted by Malaysia. Discussions built on 'eight active rounds of negotiations'. No target date for concluding the Review is given.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 15 AUG 2025 3:35PM (Release ID 2156828)
Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) notification issued under section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, superseding 31 prior notifications dating from 1957 to 2025. Rows bearing HS 1511: crude palm oil (1511 10 00) at 10%; 1511 90 all goods at 32.5%; palm stearin with FFA 20% or more at 7.5%.
Source organisation: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, via CBIC
'On March 30, 2026, the 12th Meeting of the Joint Committee on the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA JC 12) took place at the ASEAN Secretariat Headquarter (Jakarta, Indonesia).' Delegations discussed outstanding issues across sub-committees including Rules of Origin, Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation, Standards and Technical Regulations, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Trade Remedies, and Legal and Institutional Issues. The reporting ministry's headline frames the meeting as 'aiming for the substantial conclusion of negotiations in 2026'.
Recorded from a Vietnamese government source because no Indian or Indonesian official account of the 12th Joint Committee was located. Viet Nam is an AITIGA party and a participant in the meeting.
Source organisation: Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (moit.gov.vn), article published Tuesday 31/03/2026 15:18
The Director General of International Trade Negotiations, Johni Martha, received the Ambassador of India to Indonesia at the Ministry of Trade. The item records: 'Indonesia berkomitmen untuk mendukung percepatan penyelesaian Reviu AITIGA yang ditargetkan selesai secara substansi pada bulan Oktober 2026' — Indonesia is committed to supporting the acceleration of the AITIGA Review, targeted for substantive completion in October 2026. It also records that 'Kementerian Perdagangan juga menyambut baik peningkatan hubungan perdagangan dengan India secara regional dan bilateral' — the Ministry welcomes the strengthening of trade relations with India both regionally and bilaterally — and that inter-agency coordination is under way to meet targets set by the AITIGA Joint Committee in March 2025.
Source organisation: Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Trade, Directorate General of International Trade Negotiations, item dated Monday 15 June 2026 13:22 WIB
Joint statement issued 7 July 2026. Paragraph 20 records the leaders' desire for 'a timely conclusion of ASEAN India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) review ... followed by a comprehensive deeper bilateral trade engagement'. Paragraph 21 commits to convening in 2026 the 2nd WGTI, the 4th BTMF and the 1st EFD. Paragraph 24 welcomes 'progress towards the operationalisation of guidelines on Local Currency Transaction (LCT)'. Paragraph 32 records that 'President Prabowo welcomed India's interest in partnering on the integrated development of the Sabang Port'. Paragraph 33 welcomes the launch of the Indonesia Open Network (ION) built on ONDC architecture; paragraph 34 welcomes progress towards a Cross-Border QR Payment Linkage. Instruments concluded at the visit include an MoU between NFTDC, Midwest Ltd. and PT. Perusahaan Mineral Nasional (PERMINAS) on rare earths, an MoU on Minerals and Technology of Steel Supply Chain, a Strategic Joint Venture between Steel Authority of India Ltd. and PT. Krakatau Steel to explore a stainless-steel slab manufacturing facility in Indonesia, an Implementation Arrangement on Professional Health Workforce Development, an MoU between CDSCO and BPOM on medical products regulation, a renewed MoU on Maritime Safety and Security with an Implementing Arrangement between BAKAMLA RI and the Indian Coast Guard, and MoUs on disaster management, research/technology/innovation, outer space (extension), elections management (ECI-KPU) and telecommunications.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 07 JUL 2026 (Release ID 2282084); Prime Minister's Office, pmindia.gov.in
India hosted the 13th Joint Committee and related meetings at Vanijya Bhawan, New Delhi from 6 to 10 July 2026 in hybrid format. The Joint Committee itself met on 7 July 2026, co-chaired by Additional Secretary, Department of Commerce Shri Nitin Kumar Yadav and Malaysia's Deputy Secretary General (Trade) Ms. Mastura Ahmad Mustafa. Three of the eight sub-committees met on the sidelines: SC-CPTF, SC-NTMA and SC-ROO. The Joint Committee 'urged them to expedite the finalisation of the outstanding chapters under the AITIGA Review' and assigned 'time-bound deliverables'. All ten ASEAN Member States including Indonesia participated. India-ASEAN trade is given as USD 128 billion during 2025-26, around 11 per cent of India's global trade.
Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 08 JUL 2026 11:06AM (Release ID 2282336); corroborated by Prasar Bharati / Akashvani News, 8 July 2026
Indonesia's Minister of Trade Budi Santoso met India's Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal in Jaipur, India on Friday 7 August 2026, on the margins of the BRICS Trade Ministers' Meeting of 6-7 August 2026. Indonesia proposed an Indonesia-India Preferential Trade Agreement (ID-IN PTA) to 'complement AITIGA by providing wider market access, reducing non-tariff barriers, and strengthening trade facilitation', describing it as 'a strategic step to expand market access, increase more balanced trade, and provide greater certainty for businesses of both countries'. Indonesia restated its AITIGA Review position: an 80 per cent market-access liberalisation target as agreed in the Review, against a current level of 41.9 per cent, with offers covering about 57 per cent of the target tabled by July 2026. Trade figures given: 2025 total USD 23.13 billion (Indonesian exports USD 18.30 billion, imports USD 4.84 billion); January-June 2026 total USD 11.89 billion (exports USD 9.28 billion, imports USD 2.60 billion).
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT LOCATED IN THIS PASS, eleven days before the access date. Entirely one-sided in the official record: no Indian government source located mentions this meeting.
Source organisation: Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Trade — press release published Saturday 8 August 2026 08:57 WIB
The first item is the corridor’s foundational weakness: the absence of a bilateral agreement is an argument from official silence, not a sourced statement, and the registry says so rather than asserting the negative. Where an item quotes a figure, the marker points to the source this page does carry on that subject — not to a source for the unverified figure itself, which by definition has none.
The registry records what could not be sourced as well as what could. These are open items, listed exactly as the registry states them — not gaps we have filled from memory or inference.
Numbered to match the markers in the text above. Every figure on this page traces to one of these; nothing is estimated, averaged or carried over from outside the registry.
Data verified 18 August 2026 · rendered from the corridor registry.
Developed by Amit Jain at allfrontierglobal.com
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