India–Japan trade corridor CEPA · in force 1 August 2011 · three unblended series

Rendered from the All Frontier Global corridor registry · every figure below carries a numbered source

India and Japan trade under a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed 16 February 2011[1] and in force since 1 August 2011[2] — the oldest agreement in this registry, and the only one whose entry-into-force arithmetic does not close. Three separate series describe the corridor and the registry forbids blending them: Japan’s Ministry of Finance customs returns in yen, the Government of India’s fiscal-year table in US dollars, and a third framing published by JETRO from a commercial database, which is neither government’s official series and is fenced off below with the registry’s own warning attached. The only tariff-line breakdown either government has ever published is thirteen years old, and it is rendered here with that stated. This page renders the corridor registry record: the agreement, all three series in their own tables, the mechanics, the logistics, and the figures no official source would supply.

At a glance

• AgreementComprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)[1]Signed 16 February 2011[1], in force 1 August 2011[2]. No suspension, termination, renegotiation round or upgrade negotiation has been announced by either government[3].
• StatusReview of implementation, not renegotiation[4]The 2026 summit formulation adds “full and effective utilization” to the standing review language — the first summit-level appearance of utilisation in the material fetched, with no mechanism, metric or deadline attached.
• Headline trade — Indian seriesUS$27.47 bn total, FY2025-26[5]Directly published in the source table’s own total row, not derived. Merchandise only, Indian fiscal year, US dollars.
• Headline trade — Japanese series2,862,400 million yen exported to India, 1,049,294 million yen imported from India, Calendar year 2025 (January-December)[6]Ministry of Finance customs returns in yen. The source prints no combined total, so none is shown; the balance it does print is a surplus for Japan.

The agreement

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the Republic of India. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs titles it exactly that; Japan Customs lists it in its in-force EPA table simply as 'Japan-India EPA'; India's DGFT lists it as 'India - Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement'. Commonly abbreviated CEPA by both governments; MOFA's own FTA policy index page uses 'Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement' in its page title while the treaty collection uses the full CEPA name.[1]

Naming is inconsistent across official sources but the instrument is one and the same. India's side additionally, and incorrectly relative to the treaty title, wrote 'Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CEPA)' in the PIB text of the India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade dated 29 August 2025; MOFA's English text of the same Joint Vision writes 'Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CEPA)' too. Both are variants of the treaty's actual title, which is Partnership, not Cooperation.[1][4]

Signed 16 February 2011[1]; entered into force 1 August 2011[2].

Signature: DGFT Appendix 2A (List of Free Trade Agreements / Preferential Trade Agreements) carries the India-Japan CEPA row with signature date 16.02.2011 and implementation date 01.08.2011. Both governments agree on the signature date.[1][7]

30 June 2011, in Tokyo[2]. The notes were exchanged in Tokyo on Thursday 30 June 2011. See Not yet verified for the unreconciled interval between this date, the Article 146 thirty-day rule, and the 1 August 2011 entry into force.

Article 146 (Entry into Force), in the Final Provisions chapter: 'This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing that their respective internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement have been completed.'[8]

Quoted from the Indian government's hosted treaty text and confirmed against the Japanese government's hosted treaty text. The Final Provisions chapter (Chapter 15) comprises Article 143 (Table of Contents and Headings), Article 144 (Annexes and Notes), Article 145 (Amendment), Article 146 (Entry into Force) and Article 147 (Termination).[8]

The entry-into-force arithmetic, and the two days nobody accounts for

The registry performs one arithmetic step here and records it as a derivation rather than as a fact. It is reproduced in full, in the registry’s own words, because the step is the reason the corridor’s founding date carries a caveat at all. The operative date remains the one both governments state.

In force and operating. As of the 7th Joint Committee meeting on 2 March 2026 the two governments described the agreement as having been 'in force for nearly 15 years'. No suspension, termination, renegotiation round or upgrade negotiation has been announced by either government in any source located.[3]

Verbatim: the attendees 'discussed the operation and implementation of the Japan-India CEPA, which has been in force for nearly 15 years.' The 16th Annual Summit Joint Statement of 2 July 2026 opens its trade paragraph 'Noting that more than 15 years have passed since the two countries signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)'. Note the difference: MOFA counts from entry into force, the Summit statement counts from signature.[3][4]

What the two governments mean by “review”

REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, NOT RENEGOTIATION. The two governments have committed, at successive Annual Summits and in escalating language, to accelerate a review of CEPA's IMPLEMENTATION. 19 March 2022 Joint Statement: 'Stressing the importance of promoting trade and investment between the two countries, they encouraged further review of the implementation of CEPA'. 15th Annual Summit, 29-30 August 2025: 'They recognised the need to enhance and diversify bilateral trade including by accelerating further review of the implementation of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to make it more forward-looking.' 16th Annual Summit, 2 July 2026: 'Noting that more than 15 years have passed since the two countries signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and recognizing the need to enhance and diversify bilateral trade, they concurred on accelerating the review of the implementation as well as full and effective utilization of the CEPA to make it more forward-looking.'[4]

Governance

Article 14 establishes the Joint Committee, composed of representatives of the Governments of the Parties. Its functions include reviewing and monitoring the implementation and operation of the Agreement, recommending amendments, supervising and coordinating the work of sub-committees, adopting implementing procedures and decisions, and carrying out other functions as agreed. On frequency: 'The Joint Committee shall meet once a year at the request of either Party or at such times as may be agreed by the Parties; and at such venues as may be agreed by the Parties.'[8]

The nominal cadence is annual. In practice only seven Joint Committee meetings have taken place in the roughly fifteen years since entry into force — the 7th was on 2 March 2026 — so the body has not met annually. Neither government publishes a list of past Joint Committee meetings or their dates.[8][3]

7th Joint Committee Meeting, held 2 March 2026 in Tokyo. Co-chaired by Mr. AKAHORI Takeshi, Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Shri Rajesh Agrawal, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, with officials from relevant ministries and agencies of both countries.[3]

Six sub-committees have been established under CEPA, in the areas of: Rules of Origin; Customs Procedures; Technical Regulations, Standards and Conformity Assessment Procedures & SPS Measures; Trade in Services; Improvement of Business Environment; and Movement of Natural Persons & Cooperation.[5]

Verbatim: 'various Sub-Committees (06) have been established under CEPA in areas of Rules of Origin, Customs Procedures, Technical Regulations, Standards and Conformity Assessment Procedures & SPS Measures, Trade in Services, Improvement of Business Environment, and Movement of Natural Persons & Cooperation.' No Japanese source located enumerates the sub-committees, and no source on either side reports when any sub-committee last met.[5]

Tariff coverage — two framings, and the thirteen-year-old one

'The CEPA envisages abolition of tariffs over 94% of items traded between India and Japan over a period of 10 years.'[5]

This is the trade-weighted headline the Government of India uses today. It is NOT reconcilable from any official source with the tariff-LINE percentages PIB published in 2013 and recorded separately below. Do not average or blend the two framings.[5][10]

Press Information Bureau, 5 August 2013 — thirteen years old at the access date, and still the only tariff-line breakdown either government has published

From India's Press Information Bureau, 5 August 2013: 'The Agreement is most comprehensive of all the agreements concluded by India so far as it covers more than 90% of the bilateral trade'. Japan liberalised 92% of tariff lines; India liberalised 87.16%. On immediate elimination: 'India has offered only 17.4% of tariff lines for immediate reduction of tariff to zero duty, as against 87% of tariff lines offered by Japan.' India committed to eliminating tariffs on 66.32% of lines within 10 years. India's sensitive list is 12.84% of tariff lines, representing 9.9% of trade volume; Japan's sensitive list is 8% of tariff lines, representing 3% of trade volume.[10]

Staging, scope, amendment and review clause

• Staging categories[11]

  Annex 1, Part 1 (General Notes) defines the staging categories used in both Schedules. Category A: 'Customs duties on originating goods classified under the tariff lines indicated with "A" shall be eliminated, as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement'. Category B5: eliminated 'in six equal annual instalments from the Base Rate to free'. Category B7: 'in eight equal annual instalments'. Category B10: 'in 11 equal annual instalments'. Category B15: 'in 16 equal annual instalments'. Category X: 'The originating goods classified under the tariff lines indicated with "X" shall be excluded from any commitment of reduction or elimination of customs duties'.

  Note the naming convention is off by one: B5 runs over six instalments, B7 over eight, B10 over eleven, B15 over sixteen, because the first instalment falls on the date of entry into force. India's Schedule is Part 2 of Annex 1; Japan's Schedule is Part 3. Japan Customs states that for Bn categories the 'First reduction: Date of entry into force' and 'Subsequent reduction: April 1 of each year'.

• Scope and annexes[12]

  The Agreement covers trade in goods, trade in services, investment, movement of natural persons, intellectual property, government procurement, telecommunications services, financial services, competition, and cooperation. Ten Annexes accompany the basic agreement: Annex 1 Schedules in relation to Article 19; Annex 2 Product Specific Rules; Annex 3 Operational Certification Procedures; Annex 4 Financial Services; Annex 5 Telecommunications Services; Annex 6 Schedules of Specific Commitments in relation to Article 62; Annex 7 Specific Commitments for the Movement of Natural Persons; Annex 8 Reservations for Measures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 90; Annex 9 Reservations for Measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 90; Annex 10 Expropriation. A separate Implementing Agreement pursuant to Article 13 accompanies the CEPA.

  Scope description of goods/services/investment/IP/government procurement/telecommunications/financial services also stated by PIB, 5 August 2013. The Annex list is taken from the MOFA collection page itself.

• Amendment history[13]

  One CEPA amendment is referred to in an official document. The Japan-India Summit Joint Statement of 19 March 2022 records an 'amendment promoting trade of fish surimi between Japan and India under Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)'.

  This is the only CEPA amendment named in any source located. Article 145 (Amendment) governs the mechanism. No date of entry into force for the surimi amendment, no tariff line, and no accompanying legal instrument could be located on either government's site.

• The Article 23 review clause[14]

  Article 23, paragraph 10: 'The Parties shall review the provisions of this Article, after 10 years of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, or earlier as may be agreed by the Parties.'

  This is a review clause attached to one specific Article, not a general review clause for the Agreement as a whole. NO ARTICLE TITLED 'GENERAL REVIEW' EXISTS IN THIS AGREEMENT — the Final Provisions chapter runs Articles 143 to 147 and contains no general review provision. The political 'review' the two governments keep announcing at summits therefore has no dedicated treaty basis beyond the Joint Committee's Article 14 function of 'reviewing and monitoring the implementation and operation of this Agreement'.

Primary official sources for the agreement position: [1][12][14][11][2][15][3][16][17][18][4][19][20][21][13][22][23][24][25][26][6][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][9][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][10][42][43][44][5][45][8][7][46][47][48][49][50][51][52]

Trade flows

Series one — Japan, Ministry of Finance customs returns, in yen

Series owner: Japan — Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics of Japan, published by Japan Customs. Period: Calendar year 2025 (January-December). Basis: Merchandise, customs basis. Units as printed: '(Unit: millions of YEN, %)'.. Publication: Released as the 2025 Calendar Year (Jan.-Dec.) statistics; the page carries 'Mar.12.2026(Revised)'.[6].

Exports: Printed in the table 'Value of Exports and Imports by Area (Country)' under the ASIA grouping. Year-on-year change as printed: 9.9%. 2,862,400 million yen is 2.86 trillion yen.[6]

Imports: Year-on-year change as printed: 7.7%.[6]

Japan's total trade with India on this series is not printed as a single total in the source; only exports, imports and balance are given, so no combined total is recorded here rather than deriving one.[6]

The within-year path — January-June 2025 (provisional)

Exports: Year-on-year change as printed: 13.2%.[27]

Imports: Year-on-year change as printed: 25.6%.[27]

Recorded to show the within-year path and because this document is also the evidence that Japan Customs publishes NO India commodity breakdown — it carries commodity-level country tables for the USA, EU, China, South Korea, ASEAN, the Middle East and Russia, and none for India.[27]

The Japanese foreign ministry’s own table, kept separate

Series owner: Japan — Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Japan-India Relations (Basic Data)', table headed 'Japan-India Trade (Yen: billion)', attributed on the page to 'Japanese government documents'. Period: Calendar years 2015-2024[16].

Japan to India, as published: The MOFA table labels this column 'Japan to India'. The full series it publishes, Japan to India, in billion yen: 2015 981; 2016 889; 2017 1,044; 2018 1,236; 2019 1,176; 2020 1,021; 2021 1,423; 2022 2,018; 2023 2,333; 2024 2,651.[16]

India to Japan, as published: The MOFA table labels this column 'India to Japan'. The full series it publishes, India to Japan, in billion yen: 2015 589; 2016 509; 2017 619; 2018 585; 2019 593; 2020 500; 2021 744; 2022 833; 2023 805; 2024 1,059.[16]

Series two — India, Government of India fiscal-year table, in US dollars

Series owner: India — Government of India, published by the Embassy of India, Tokyo. Period: Indian fiscal years, April-March. Table headed '(US Dollar billion)'.. Basis: Merchandise. No services figures are published on this or any other Indian source located.[5].

Total, as published: DIRECTLY PUBLISHED IN THE TABLE'S TOTAL ROW, NOT DERIVED. Series as published, bilateral total in USD billion: 2020-21 15.33; 2021-22 20.57; 2022-23 21.96; 2023-24 22.85; 2024-25 25.15; 2025-26 27.47.[5]

Exports, as published: Series as published, India's exports to Japan in USD billion: 2020-21 4.43; 2021-22 6.18; 2022-23 5.46; 2023-24 5.15; 2024-25 6.25; 2025-26 6.04. Note India's exports FELL year on year in FY2025-26 while imports rose.[5]

Imports, as published: Series as published, India's imports from Japan in USD billion: 2020-21 10.9; 2021-22 14.39; 2022-23 16.49; 2023-24 17.69; 2024-25 18.9; 2025-26 21.43.[5]

This is the closest either government comes to naming the deficit as a problem in an official document.[9]

'India ranks 14th in Japan's total trade' with a 1.75% share; 'Japan ranks 10th in India's total trade' with a 2.26% share. Further: India ranks 8th in Japanese exports (2.61%) and 22nd in Japanese imports (0.98%); Japan ranks 21st in Indian exports (1.37%) and 10th in Indian imports (2.76%).[5]

Series three — the JETRO framing, fenced off

Series owner as stated: JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) — India country page, 'Overview and Basic Statistics'. JETRO states the data source as Global Trade Atlas (GTA), a COMMERCIAL database, compiled by JETRO. Page update date: 25 June 2026.. Period: Calendar years 2021-2025, customs basis, US dollars[47].

Exports, as published: Series as published, USD million: 2021 12,848; 2022 13,865; 2023 15,894; 2024 17,221; 2025 19,156.[47]

Imports, as published: Series as published, USD million: 2021 6,131; 2022 6,532; 2023 5,636; 2024 6,432; 2025 7,008.[47]

Balance, as published: Published as a balance column, not derived here. Series: 2021 6,717; 2022 7,333; 2023 10,258; 2024 10,789; 2025 12,148.[47]

Investment targets

• The JPY 5 trillion target[13]

  Announced at the Japan-India Summit in New Delhi on 19 March 2022, during Prime Minister Kishida's visit to India. Joint Statement wording: the intention to 'realize JPY 5 trillion of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India in the next five years'. MOFA's read-out of the follow-on summit of 24 May 2022 restates it as 'the 5-trillion-yen target of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India over the next 5 years, which was set on the occasion of Prime Minister Kishida's visit to India in March'.

  The target's PERIOD is stated three incompatible ways across official sources; see Not yet verified. Officially stated, with dates, as required.

• The outcome, stated two ways[20]

  Declared achieved. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting and Working Dinner on 29 August 2025 the leaders 'welcomed that the 5-trillion-yen target of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India over five years, set in 2022, was achieved in three years'. The 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement of the same visit uses softer language: 'the two Prime Ministers welcomed the progress made towards the target of 5 trillion Yen in public and private investment and financing in five years from Japan to India since 2022.'

  TWO OFFICIAL JAPANESE DOCUMENTS FROM THE SAME VISIT SAY DIFFERENT THINGS: the summit read-out says 'achieved in three years', the Joint Statement says only 'progress made towards'. Neither corrects the other. No source publishes the actual cumulative yen figure delivered against the 5 trillion target.

• The JPY 10 trillion target[17]

  Set at the 15th Annual Summit, Tokyo, 29-30 August 2025. Joint Statement wording: 'The two Prime Ministers set a new target of 10 trillion Yen in private investment in India from Japan.' The India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade adopted at the same summit frames it as 'Building upon the progress made in the 2022-2026 target of JPY 5 trillion of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India' and 'setting a new target of JPY 10 trillion of private investment'.

  NOTE THE CHANGE IN INSTRUMENT: the 5-trillion target was 'public and private investment AND FINANCING'; the 10-trillion target is 'PRIVATE investment' only. This is a materially different and harder measure. The Embassy of India, Tokyo dates the new target 'for the next decade' and, on its economic relations page, '(2025-2035)'. Neither Joint Statement states an end year.

• Progress against it[22]

  At the Japan-India Leaders' Meeting on 2 July 2026, MOFA recorded that towards the 10-trillion-yen goal 'investment commitments totaling 2 trillion yen have already been made'. MOFA's summary of Prime Minister Takaichi's visit puts it as 'Investment decisions on the scale of 2 trillion yen over the past year'. The 16th Annual Summit Joint Statement records only that the leaders 'appreciated the progress made towards the realization of the target of 10 trillion Yen set at the last Annual Summit', with no figure.

  Two trillion yen in the first year against a ten-trillion decade target. The Joint Statement, the document both governments signed, carries no number — the number appears only in the Japanese read-out.

• The Indian political framing[39]

  At the India-Japan Business Forum on 2 July 2026 Prime Minister Modi stated the aim that 'over the next decade, Japanese investment in India not only meets but surpasses the target of 10 trillion yen', and the goal to 'double the number of Japanese companies operating in India over the next ten years'.

  The company-doubling goal is a political statement of intent, not a bilateral target in any signed document. The address contains no mention of CEPA.

Investment stocks and flows

• Japanese FDI flow, Japanese series[16]

  924 billion yen, 2024.

  Series as published, billion yen: 2014 283; 2015 368; 2016 564; 2017 357; 2018 371; 2019 523; 2020 214; 2021 517; 2022 471; 2023 1,137; 2024 924. The 2023 figure is the series peak. MOFA separately states 'Japan was the 5th largest investor for India' dated FY2021.

• Japanese FDI flow, Indian series[5]

  Japanese outward FDI to India: FY2023-24 USD 3.1 billion; FY2024-25 USD 2.48 billion; FY2025-26 USD 3.2 billion (up to December 2025).

  Verbatim: 'Japanese outward FDI to India in 2023-24 and 2024-25 stood at USD 3.1 billion and USD 2.48 billion respectively, with USD 3.2 billion in 2025-26 (upto December 2025).' Corroborated by DPIIT's own factsheet, below.

• Japanese FDI flow, DPIIT factsheet[46]

  For the focus period April to December 2025 (FY2025-26), Japan is listed among the top five investing countries with FDI equity inflow of INR 28,136 crore / USD 3,200 million, a 7% share, ranked 4th.

  The USD 3,200 million matches the Embassy of India's USD 3.2 billion exactly, which is a genuine cross-check between two Indian government publications. Note the RANK conflict: DPIIT ranks Japan 4th for this period flow while the Embassy and PIB rank Japan 5th on cumulative stock. Different measures, both recorded.

• Cumulative Japanese FDI — three levels, unbridged[45]

  Stated at three different levels by Indian official sources with three different cut-offs, and no official source bridges them: (a) 'Cumulatively, from 2000 until June 2025, the investments to India have been around US$ 44.97 billion ranking Japan fifth among source countries for FDI' — Embassy of India, Tokyo, commercial relations page; (b) cumulative FDI April 2000 to December 2025 'Exceeded USD 47.59 billion', approximately 6.69% of total FDI, fifth-largest source — Embassy of India, Tokyo, economic relations page; (c) 'FDI from Japan: $43 billion (2000-2024)', fifth-largest source of foreign investment to India — PIB, 21 February 2025.

  All three are recorded verbatim rather than picking one. The cut-offs differ (June 2025, December 2025, calendar 2024) which explains part but not obviously all of the spread.

• Japanese corporate presence[41]

  Indian side, 21 February 2025: more than 1,400 Japanese companies operating in India, and 11 industrial townships hosting Japanese enterprises across 8 states. Japanese side: 'About 1,439 Japanese companies have branches in India in 2021'.

  The two numbers are close but the Japanese one is dated 2021 and the Indian one 2025, so the apparent agreement may be coincidence rather than corroboration. MOFA has not refreshed this datum.

• Japanese ODA[16]

  Japan's ODA to India, FY2024, as published by MOFA: Loans 276 billion yen; Grants 0.2 billion yen; Technical Cooperation 7 billion yen. India's Embassy in Tokyo publishes a longer commitment/disbursement series in JPY billion including 2023-24 commitment 893.645 and disbursement 580.81, and 2024-25 commitment 191.736 and disbursement 439.131, with total ODA commitments exceeding JPY 6.978 trillion since 1958.

  ODA is recorded because Japanese concessional lending is the financing channel for the trade-relevant logistics assets in this corridor — the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor and the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail. The two series are on different bases (Japanese fiscal year disbursement vs Indian commitment/disbursement) and are not comparable.

Targets that are not trade targets

The India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, 29-30 August 2025, commits to 'Launching an Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation that targets an exchange of more than 500,000 personnel in both directions in the next five years, including 50,000 skilled personnel and potential talents from India to Japan'.[35]

NO CURRENT BILATERAL TRADE-VALUE TARGET EXISTS. Every numeric bilateral target the two governments have set in the 2022-2026 period is an investment target (JPY 5 trillion, JPY 10 trillion) or a people target (500,000 personnel). The only trade-value target ever located is stale: a PIB release of 12 February 2014 referred to an expectation of 'the India-Japan Bilateral Trade to US$ 25 billion by 2014' as an outcome of CEPA.[42]

Corroborating sources

• Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Appendix 2A, List of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) / Preferential Trade Agreements[7]

  Independent Indian-government confirmation of the two headline agreement dates: 'India - Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement', Signed 16.02.2011, Implementation 01.08.2011. This matches MOFA's signature date and MOFA's entry-into-force date exactly.

• Japan Customs — Free Trade Agreement / Economic Partnership Agreement and Related Initiatives[30]

  The Japan-India EPA is listed among the twenty agreements Japan has in force, with linked 'General Information', 'Schedule of Japan' and 'Staging of Japan' resources. Confirms operative status from the Japanese customs administration, distinct from the foreign-ministry confirmation.

• JETRO — Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement country page[48]

  Confirms the agreement was 'signed on February 16, 2011' and 'entered into force on August 1, 2011'. Third independent Japanese-side confirmation of both dates. The page also identifies the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry as handling certificate of origin issuance operations based on EPA.

• Government of India, Department of Commerce — hosted copy of the India-Japan CEPA treaty text[8]

  India's own commerce ministry hosts the full CEPA text, confirming the Indian government treats the MOFA-published instrument as authoritative. Article 146 and Article 14 read identically in the Indian and Japanese hosted copies.

Where the official figures conflict

The registry records conflicting official statements as conflicts. Nothing below is averaged, bridged or decided between; each statement is shown with the body that published it, in that body’s own words.

• The three series diverge, and nothing reconciles them[47][5][6]

  Set against the Indian series the divergence is large and unexplained by any official source: JETRO puts Japan's 2025 exports to India at USD 19.16 billion while India puts its FY2025-26 imports from Japan at USD 21.43 billion; JETRO puts Japan's 2025 imports from India at USD 7.01 billion while India puts its FY2025-26 exports to Japan at USD 6.04 billion. Different periods, different compilers, different valuation bases. Not reconcilable from anything fetched.

• Partner ranks: two governments, two answers, one of them undated[5][16]

  CONFLICTS WITH THE JAPANESE SOURCE, ON DIFFERENT YEARS. MOFA's Basic Data page states 'India was the 18th largest trading partner for Japan' and 'Japan was the 13th largest trading partner for India', both dated 2021. The Embassy figures carry no year label at all. Both are recorded; neither is preferred; the gap between 18th and 14th is plausibly the five years between them but no official source says so.

• The JPY 5 trillion outcome, stated two ways in one day[20]

  TWO OFFICIAL JAPANESE DOCUMENTS FROM THE SAME VISIT SAY DIFFERENT THINGS: the summit read-out says 'achieved in three years', the Joint Statement says only 'progress made towards'. Neither corrects the other. No source publishes the actual cumulative yen figure delivered against the 5 trillion target.

• Cumulative Japanese FDI at three incompatible levels[45][5]

  CUMULATIVE JAPANESE FDI INTO INDIA IS PUBLISHED AT THREE INCOMPATIBLE LEVELS BY INDIAN OFFICIAL SOURCES AND NO SOURCE BRIDGES THEM: 'around US$ 44.97 billion' from 2000 until June 2025 (Embassy of India, Tokyo, commercial relations page); 'Exceeded USD 47.59 billion' for April 2000 to December 2025 at approximately 6.69% of total FDI (Embassy of India, Tokyo, economic relations page); and '$43 billion (2000-2024)' (PIB, 21 February 2025). The differing cut-offs explain part of the spread but the two Embassy figures, six months apart, differ by USD 2.62 billion against a reported FY2025-26 nine-month inflow of USD 3.2 billion, which is not obviously consistent. Japan's RANK is also inconsistent: the Embassy and PIB both say fifth-largest source cumulatively, while DPIIT's own factsheet for April-December 2025 ranks Japan FOURTH among the top five investing countries for that period with INR 28,136 crore / USD 3,200 million and a 7% share. Those are different measures — cumulative stock versus period flow — and are recorded separately without reconciliation.

• Tariff coverage: trade-weighted against tariff-line, thirteen years apart[10][5]

  THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' TARIFF-COVERAGE FRAMINGS ARE IRRECONCILABLE AND ONE OF THEM IS THIRTEEN YEARS OLD. The Embassy of India, Tokyo says today that CEPA 'envisages abolition of tariffs over 94% of items traded between India and Japan over a period of 10 years' — a trade-weighted framing with no tariff-line detail. PIB's release of 5 August 2013 gives the only tariff-LINE breakdown either government has published: Japan liberalised 92% of lines and India 87.16%; India offered 'only 17.4% of tariff lines for immediate reduction of tariff to zero duty, as against 87% of tariff lines offered by Japan'; India eliminates on 66.32% of lines within 10 years; India's sensitive list is 12.84% of lines and 9.9% of trade volume, Japan's 8% of lines and 3% of trade volume. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE BRIDGES THE 94% TRADE-WEIGHTED FIGURE TO THE LINE-LEVEL PERCENTAGES, and neither government has restated or updated the 2013 numbers in the thirteen years since. Do not average, reconcile or pick one. DERIVATION RECORDED: adding the ten-year staging period referred to in the 94% claim to the 1 August 2011 entry-into-force date gives 1 August 2021, so the staging window on that framing has closed; that addition was performed in this pass and NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES IT. No official source confirms that the staging is in fact complete, and none reports what was actually delivered against the schedules — that is arguably the most consequential unanswered question about this agreement and neither government addresses it.

• The foreign ministry’s table names no statistical source[16][6]

  MOFA'S TRADE TABLE HAS NO NAMED STATISTICAL SOURCE. The Japan-India Relations (Basic Data) page attributes both its trade table and its direct investment table only to 'Japanese government documents', without naming the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, JETRO or any specific publication. The figures are consistent in shape with the Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics recorded separately in this file (MOFA 2024: Japan to India 2,651 billion yen; Japan Customs 2025: 2,862,400 million yen, +9.9%), but the two are recorded as separate blocks because MOFA does not identify its own source and the correspondence has not been verified line by line.

Top goods, each direction

Neither government publishes valued commodity baskets for this corridor. India publishes commodity names without values, shares or periods; Japan publishes no India commodity table at all. The only percentage shares available come from the JETRO framing, and they are fenced off with the same warning as the JETRO series above.

India’s exports to Japan — names only, no period stated by the source

• Organic Chemicals[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Vehicles (Other than railways & trams)[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Nuclear Reactor[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Aluminium and Articles thereof[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Fish & other aquatic invertebrates[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

Verbatim: 'India's primary exports to Japan are Organic Chemicals, Vehicles (Other than railways & trams), Nuclear Reactor, Aluminium and Articles thereof, Fish & other aquatic invertebrates.' NO VALUES, NO SHARES AND NO PERIOD ARE GIVEN. The list is ordered as published; whether that order is by value is not stated. 'Nuclear Reactor' is HS Chapter 84 shorthand (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances), not a reactor trade — the source does not explain this.[5]

India’s imports from Japan — names only, no period stated by the source

• Nuclear Reactors[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Copper and Articles thereof[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Electrical Machinery and Equipment[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Inorganic Chemicals[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

• Iron and Steel[5]

  named without a value, a share or a period in the source

Verbatim: 'India's primary imports from Japan are Nuclear Reactors, Copper and Articles thereof, Electrical Machinery and Equipment, Inorganic Chemicals and Iron and Steel.' NO VALUES, NO SHARES AND NO PERIOD.[5]

The JETRO shares, on the JETRO basis only

What is not published, recorded as evidence of absence

Mechanics and open issues

Fifteen years in, the mechanics of this agreement are documented mostly from the treaty text and from Japan Customs explainers; the Indian administrative layer is thin and one Japanese ministry could not be read at all. Where a document was retrievable only by title, that is stated in the entry rather than filled in.

• Rules of origin — the general rule[14]

  Article 27 sets the two routes to originating status: a good qualifies where 'the good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the Party' or where 'the good is not wholly obtained or produced in the Party, provided that the good satisfies the requirements of Article 29.' Article 29 sets the substantive test as a DOUBLE requirement: a qualifying value content 'of not less than 35 percent' calculated using the formula in Article 30, AND that 'all non-originating materials used in the production of the good have undergone ... a change in tariff classification at the six-digit level.'

  QVC 35 percent PLUS CTC at HS-6 is a strict combined rule by the standards of India's other agreements — many use 'or' rather than 'and' at the general-rule level. Product-specific rules in Annex 2 may vary this per line; Annex 2 was NOT read line by line in this pass. Do not quote the 35 percent as if it applied universally without the CTC condition attached.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA text, Articles 27, 29 and 30

• Rules of origin — de minimis[14]

  Article 32 provides that 'Non-originating materials used in the production of a good that do not satisfy an applicable rule for the good shall be disregarded, provided that the totality of such materials does not exceed specific percentages' set in the Article.

  The specific percentages were not resolved in the fetched excerpt of the treaty text and are NOT recorded here. See Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA text, Article 32

• Rules of origin — where the detail lives[12]

  Annex 2 contains the Product Specific Rules. Annex 3 contains the Operational Certification Procedures. Both are published as separate PDFs in MOFA's Japan-India CEPA treaty collection alongside the basic agreement and the Implementing Agreement pursuant to Article 13.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA treaty document collection

• Certificate of origin — issuing authorities[15]

  Under the Implementing Procedures, Rule 9, the competent governmental authorities and designees are: for India, the Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; for Japan, the Origin Certification Policy Office of the Trade Administration Division.

  JETRO's Japan-India CEPA page separately identifies the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry as handling 'certificate of origin issuance operations based on EPA' — i.e. the JCCI acts as the operational issuer under the Origin Certification Policy Office. India's DGFT Appendix 2A does NOT list an authorised issuing agency for the India-Japan CEPA row, although it does for several other agreements. See Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Implementing Procedures under the Japan-India CEPA, published 1 August 2011

• Certificate of origin — operational rules[15]

  Certificates are to be issued within three days of shipment (Rule 3). Retroactive issuance is available: a certificate 'may be issued retroactively ... within 12 months from the date of shipment' on the exporter's request, and must be marked 'ISSUED RETROACTIVELY'. Third-country invoicing is accommodated: where the invoice is issued by a person in a non-Party, the 'Third Country Invoicing' box is checked and 'the full legal name and address of the person that issues the invoice' is entered in field 8. Documentation counts differ by destination: India requires 'the original and three copies'; Japan requires 'only the original' (Rule 1(c)).

  The asymmetric copy requirement — three copies into India, one into Japan — is a small but real friction on the Indian import side and is recorded because it is officially stated.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Implementing Procedures under the Japan-India CEPA

• Claiming preference on import into Japan[32]

  Japan Customs accepts three origin certification methods across its EPAs: 'a certificate of origin issued by the competent authority of the exporting country' (third-party certification); 'origin declaration on a commercial document made by an approved exporter'; and 'an origin certification document completed by an importer, exporter, or producer' (self-certification). 'These documents are valid for 1 year from the date of their issuance or completion.' Documents must ordinarily be submitted at the time of import declaration, with postponement permitted in unavoidable circumstances. For consignments valued at 200,000 yen or less, origin documentation is not required to claim EPA preference.

  THIS FAQ IS WRITTEN FOR ALL OF JAPAN'S EPAs COLLECTIVELY AND DOES NOT SAY WHICH METHODS ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE JAPAN-INDIA EPA SPECIFICALLY. Given that the Japan-India Implementing Procedures describe a competent-authority certificate, third-party certification is the method the treaty instrument itself provides for. Whether approved-exporter or self-certification is available under this particular EPA is NOT stated by any source located and is not asserted here.

  Source organisation: Japan Customs — Customs Answer (FAQ) 1524, origin certification procedures for preferential tariff treatment under an Economic Partnership Agreement

• Japan's tariff elimination schedule for Indian goods[31]

  Japan Customs explains that Japan eliminates or reduces tariffs 'in line with the schedule described in Annex1 of the EPA', with three treatments. Category A: 'Tariff elimination as from the date of entry into force of EPA' — examples given are durians, asparagus, lobsters, shrimps and wood products. Category Bn (n = 5, 7, 10 or 15): gradual reduction over n+1 phases, with 'First reduction: Date of entry into force' and 'Subsequent reduction: April 1 of each year' — examples given are curry, capsicums, dogfish and sea bass. Category X: 'Excluded from any commitment' — examples given are rice, wheat, beef, pork, chicken, tunas and wine. Japan's schedule is Part 3 of Annex 1; India's schedule is Part 2.

  Every worked example Japan Customs gives is agricultural or fishery. The FAQ gives NO industrial examples and NO automotive examples. The 1 April subsequent-reduction date matters operationally: Japanese staged reductions step on the Japanese fiscal year boundary, not the CEPA anniversary.

  Source organisation: Japan Customs — Customs Answer (FAQ) 4035, 'Elimination of Tariff on Imported Goods under Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement'

• Tariff commitment mechanism and the MFN floor[14]

  Article 19: '1. Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, each Party shall eliminate or reduce its customs duties on originating goods of the other Party designated for such purposes in its Schedule in Annex 1, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in such Schedule. 2. In cases where its most-favoured-nation applied rate of customs duty on a particular good is lower than the rate of customs duty to be applied in accordance with paragraph 1 on the originating good which is classified under the same tariff line as that particular good, each Party shall apply the lower rate with respect to that originating good.'

  The paragraph 2 MFN floor is why CEPA preference margins erode automatically wherever either party cuts its MFN rate: the trader always gets the lower of the two, so the agreement never becomes worse than MFN, but its distinctive value shrinks as MFN falls. This is a mechanical explanation of why utilization of an old EPA declines and is offered here as reasoning, not as a sourced claim about this corridor.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA text, Article 19

• Governance — the Joint Committee's treaty function[8]

  Article 14 gives the Joint Committee the functions of reviewing and monitoring the implementation and operation of the Agreement, recommending amendments, supervising and coordinating the work of sub-committees, adopting implementing procedures and decisions, and other agreed functions; and provides that it 'shall meet once a year at the request of either Party or at such times as may be agreed by the Parties; and at such venues as may be agreed by the Parties.' Six sub-committees sit beneath it.

  The Joint Committee, not any dedicated review article, is the only treaty vehicle for the 'review' the two governments repeatedly announce at summits. Seven meetings in fifteen years against a nominal annual cadence.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Department of Commerce — hosted India-Japan CEPA text, Article 14

• Amendment and termination[14]

  Article 145 governs Amendment; Article 147 governs Termination; Article 146 governs Entry into Force; Article 143 covers Table of Contents and Headings and Article 144 covers Annexes and Notes. Together these five articles are Chapter 15, Final Provisions.

  The texts of Articles 145 and 147 were not resolved in the fetched excerpts and their operative wording is NOT recorded here.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA text, Chapter 15

• Indian-side administrative listing[7]

  The India-Japan CEPA appears in DGFT Appendix 2A, the official List of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) / Preferential Trade Agreements maintained under India's Foreign Trade Policy, recorded as signed 16.02.2011 and implemented 01.08.2011.

  Appendix 2A lists agencies authorised to issue Certificates of Origin (Preferential) for several agreements but NOT for the India-Japan CEPA row. The version fetched carries no explicit update date; its most recent internal reference is to October 2014.

  Source organisation: Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India — Appendix 2A

• Japanese certificate-of-origin format change — TITLE ONLY, BODY NOT READ[53]

  METI's press release index carries an item titled 'Certificates of Origin are shifted to issuance in PDF format under EPAs for India and Malaysia', dated 14 April 2023, at https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2023/0414_004.html.

  ONLY THE TITLE WAS RETRIEVABLE. The page body returned empty through the fetch tool on repeated attempts in this pass, as did every other meti.go.jp URL tried. The effective date of the change, the issuing body, the transitional arrangements and whether paper certificates remain valid are therefore NOT recorded as facts. Do not infer operational detail from the headline.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan — press release index entry, 14 April 2023

Logistics

This corridor has Japanese money in Indian freight infrastructure and no official statement connecting any of it to the agreement. Each asset is recorded with the purpose its own financier states, and the flagship rail project is recorded with an explicit warning that no official source describes it as trade infrastructure.

• Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (WDFC), Dadri/Delhi to Mumbai[51]

  Japanese ODA-financed dedicated freight railway of 'approximately 1,500km' connecting Dadri-Delhi to Mumbai. JICA states the initiative aims to 'create India's largest industrial belt zone by linking industrial parks and harbors of six states between Delhi and Mumbai in order to promote trade, foreign export and direct investment.' The Palanpur-Mehsana (Gujarat) section of 70km was inaugurated in Ahmedabad on 30 September 2022. Japanese ODA loans to the project reached a 'cumulative total of 580,787 million Japanese yen' (stated as approximately INR 33,000 crore).

  THIS IS THE ONLY LOGISTICS ASSET IN THE CORRIDOR THAT AN OFFICIAL SOURCE EXPLICITLY TIES TO TRADE PROMOTION, and the tie is to India's trade generally — 'promote trade, foreign export and direct investment' — NOT to India-Japan bilateral trade and NOT to CEPA. No official source connects the WDFC to CEPA tariff preferences, to bilateral trade volumes, or to any bilateral target. JICA published a further ODA loan of INR 2,254 crores for Dedicated Freight Corridor Project (Phase 1)(V) in a separate release; that release was not fetched in this pass and its figures are not recorded.

  Source organisation: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) — 'Western Dedicated Freight Corridor Project Supported by Japan (Palanpur - Mehsana (Gujarat) section) inaugurated in Ahmedabad', 30 September 2022

• Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal (JNPCT), Navi Mumbai[52]

  JICA committed USD 69.6 million from LEAP (Leading Asia's Private Infrastructure Fund) on 20 January 2023 to the refurbishment, operation and maintenance of the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal on a public-private partnership basis under a 30-year concession. JICA describes JNPCT as 'one of the largest and important container ports in India' and states the project will 'contribute to reducing logistics costs by easing congestion at the port'. JICA's own release headline frames the purpose as to 'enhance international trade through efficient and state-of-art logistic infrastructure'.

  Japanese capital in an Indian gateway port, explicitly justified on trade-facilitation grounds. No TEU capacity figure is given in the release. Again, no link to CEPA is made by any source. The WDFC's Mumbai end and JNPT are geographically the same corridor mouth, but no official source in this pass states that relationship as a designed connection.

  Source organisation: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 20 January 2023

• Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail (MAHSR) — NOT OFFICIALLY TRADE INFRASTRUCTURE[4]

  Both Annual Summit Joint Statements describe MAHSR as the flagship bilateral project. 15th Annual Summit, 29-30 August 2025: 'The Prime Ministers noted the importance of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail as a flagship project between India and Japan' and 'The Indian side appreciates Japan's offer to introduce, in the early 2030s, the E10 series of the Shinkansen that runs on the Japanese signalling system.' 16th Annual Summit, 2 July 2026: the leaders 'reaffirmed the importance of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail as a flagship project between Japan and India'; 'Prime Minister Takaichi stated that Japan fully understands India's target to commence commercial operations on priority sections in 2027'; and 'They acknowledged the goal of introducing the E10'. The India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade lists 'High-speed rail systems, including "Make in India" next-generation rolling stock, functional signaling and operational control systems'.

  RECORDED WITH AN EXPLICIT WARNING. MAHSR is a passenger high-speed rail project. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE IN THIS PASS DESCRIBES IT AS TRADE INFRASTRUCTURE, states a freight function, or links it to CEPA or to bilateral trade volumes. It is recorded here only because the task asked for Shinkansen-adjacent trade infrastructure 'ONLY as officially stated re trade' — and the honest answer is that it is not officially stated re trade. Its trade relevance, if any, runs through the 'Make in India' rolling-stock localisation clause, which is an industrial-policy statement, not a trade-flow statement.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 16th Japan-India Annual Summit Joint Statement, 2 July 2026; earlier wording from the 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897540.pdf) and the Joint Vision (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897542.pdf)

• Japan Industrial Townships (JITs)[41]

  Eleven industrial townships hosting Japanese enterprises across eight Indian states, per PIB on 21 February 2025, alongside more than 1,400 Japanese companies operating in India. The 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement records: 'They endorsed bilateral efforts to support Japan Industrial Townships (JITs) and strengthen cooperation in logistics, textiles, food processing, agriculture, automotives, industrial capital goods and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) under the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (IJICP).' The 16th Annual Summit Joint Statement of 2 July 2026 carries the sectoral list forward — 'They endorsed bilateral efforts to strengthen cooperation in logistics, textiles, food processing, agriculture, automotives, and industrial capital goods under IJICP' — but the JITs are not named by that title in the economic sections of the 2026 statement.

  'Logistics' is named as an IJICP cooperation sector in both summit statements, which is the closest official link between the bilateral political framework and freight. No official source names any specific JIT site, its logistics connectivity, or its trade throughput. DPIIT's Japanese Industrial Townships page returned an empty body through the fetch tool in this pass.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 21 February 2025; summit wording from MOFA (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897540.pdf) and (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054198.pdf)

• Next Generation Mobility Partnership (NGMP)[38]

  A Memorandum of Cooperation on the Next Generation Mobility Partnership was among the sixteen outcomes of the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit on 2 July 2026. Per PIB's list of outcomes it 'facilitates investment in rail, automotive, aviation, shipbuilding, ports, logistics, and urban development'. The partnership was originally launched at the 15th Annual Summit on 29 August 2025, when the leaders agreed 'to launch a new Next-Generation Mobility Partnership'. MOFA's summary of the July 2026 visit describes the MoC as covering six sectors.

  This is the newest official instrument in the corridor that names ports and logistics as investment targets. It is an investment-facilitation MoC, NOT a trade instrument, and it does not amend or interact with CEPA in any way stated by either government. The six sectors MOFA refers to and the seven listed by PIB do not match; neither side enumerates them identically.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'List of Outcomes: Prime Minister of Japan's visit to India for the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit', 2 July 2026

Developments 2022–26

• 19 March 2022

  Japan-India Summit in New Delhi sets the JPY 5 trillion investment target and calls for a CEPA implementation review[13]

  Prime Ministers Kishida and Modi issue a Joint Statement recording the intention to 'realize JPY 5 trillion of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India in the next five years'. On trade: 'Stressing the importance of promoting trade and investment between the two countries, they encouraged further review of the implementation of CEPA'. The statement also records an 'amendment promoting trade of fish surimi between Japan and India under Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)' and refers to 'the flagship bilateral cooperation project of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail (MAHSR)'.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Summit Joint Statement, 19 March 2022

• 30 September 2022

  Palanpur-Mehsana section of the Japanese-financed Western Dedicated Freight Corridor inaugurated[51]

  JICA marks the inauguration in Ahmedabad of the 70km Palanpur-Mehsana (Gujarat) section of the WDFC, with cumulative Japanese ODA loans to the project of 580,787 million yen. JICA frames the corridor as intended to 'promote trade, foreign export and direct investment'.

  Source organisation: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

• 20 January 2023

  JICA commits USD 69.6 million to Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal under LEAP[52]

  Private Sector Investment Finance for the refurbishment, operation and maintenance of JNPCT in Navi Mumbai on a PPP basis under a 30-year concession, to 'contribute to reducing logistics costs by easing congestion at the port'.

  Source organisation: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

• 14 April 2023

  METI announces a shift to PDF issuance of Certificates of Origin under the EPAs for India and Malaysia — TITLE ONLY[53]

  A METI press release of this date is titled 'Certificates of Origin are shifted to issuance in PDF format under EPAs for India and Malaysia'. The body of the release could not be read through the fetch tool in this pass and no operational detail is recorded.

  Recorded as a dated event on the strength of its title only. Nothing about its content is asserted.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan

• 21 February 2025

  Commerce Minister Goyal addresses the India-Japan Economy and Investment Forum[41]

  PIB records FDI from Japan of USD 43 billion over 2000-2024, Japan as India's fifth-largest source of foreign investment, more than 1,400 Japanese companies operating in India, and 11 industrial townships hosting Japanese enterprises across 8 states. Goyal characterises the partnership as 'Sushi and spices, distinct yet complementary'. The release states CEPA was signed in 2011 and has 'significantly strengthened bilateral trade'; it announces no review or upgrade.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau

• 29 August 2025

  15th Annual Summit in Tokyo: JPY 5 trillion target declared achieved in three years; new JPY 10 trillion private investment target set[20]

  Prime Ministers Ishiba and Modi meet in Tokyo. MOFA's summit read-out: the leaders 'welcomed that the 5-trillion-yen target of public and private investment and financing from Japan to India over five years, set in 2022, was achieved in three years' and 'concurred to set a new target of 10 trillion yen in private investment to India and to continue working on improving the business environment.' The Joint Statement records: 'They recognised the need to enhance and diversify bilateral trade including by accelerating further review of the implementation of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to make it more forward-looking.' Also launched or welcomed: the Japan-India Economic Security Initiative, Digital Partnership 2.0, the Japan-India AI Cooperation Initiative (JAI), a new Next-Generation Mobility Partnership, a Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources on critical minerals, a memorandum on the Joint Crediting Mechanism, and a joint statement of intent on hydrogen and ammonia.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Summit Meeting and Working Dinner; Joint Statement at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897540.pdf; Indian text at https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2161985&reg=48&lang=2

• 29 August 2025

  India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade adopted — eight directions, including a 500,000-person mobility target[35]

  Eight directions: Next Generation Economic Partnership; Next Generation Economic Security Partnership; Next Generation Mobility; Next Generation Ecological Legacies; Next Gen Technology and Innovation Partnership; Investing in Next Gen Health; Next Gen People-to-People Partnership; Next-Gen State-Prefecture Partnership. On trade: 'Enhancing and diversifying bilateral trade and investment through accelerating further review of the implementation of the India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CEPA)'. On mobility: 'Launching an Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation that targets an exchange of more than 500,000 personnel in both directions in the next five years, including 50,000 skilled personnel and potential talents from India to Japan'. On investment: 'Building upon the progress made in the 2022-2026 target of JPY 5 trillion ... setting a new target of JPY 10 trillion of private investment'.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau; Japanese text at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897542.pdf

• 29 August 2025

  India-Japan Economic Forum held in Tokyo; 170 private-sector MOUs reported[49]

  Held at the Imperial Hotel Tokyo, 14:00-17:00, with approximately 700 participants. Japanese attendees included PM Ishiba, METI Minister Muto Yoji, Environment Minister Asao Keiichiro and JETRO Chairman Ishiguro Norihiko; PM Modi attended for India. Chairman Ishiguro highlighted 'as many as 170 memorandums of understanding that had been signed between private companies from both countries'. Cooperation was framed around talent exchange, science and technology, and cutting-edge industries.

  JETRO's account contains no CEPA mention and no bilateral trade or investment figure beyond the MOU count.

  Source organisation: JETRO — 'India-Japan Economic Forum' Held with Indian PM Modi in Attendance

• 29 August 2025

  India-Japan Economic Security Cooperation fact sheet published[40]

  PIB fact sheet covering the India-Japan Dialogue on Economic Security (November 2024), the Semiconductor Policy Dialogue, the 11th Energy Dialogue (August 2025), the 11th Science & Technology Joint Committee (June 2025), Digital Partnership 2.0 renewed 2025, and the India-Japan AI Cooperation Initiative. Notes MeitY-METI semiconductor cooperation signed July 2023 and Renesas establishing an OSAT facility in Gujarat with CG Power. Financial items include a JBIC loan of JPY 60 billion for bamboo-based bioethanol production in Assam and an NTT DATA investment of INR 10,500 crores for an AI data centre cluster in Hyderabad.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'Fact Sheet: India-Japan Economic Security Cooperation'

• 20 January 2026

  JETRO publishes its FY2025 survey of Japanese companies operating overseas[50]

  Valid responses from 5,109 companies across Asia and Oceania, a 39.6% response rate from 12,900 questionnaires issued between 19 August and 17 September 2025. On India, 'the trend toward a stronger appetite for expansion continues', attributed to 'growing local demand as the main reason'. Digital technology utilisation in India is reported to 'exceed 60%', against ASEAN's 52.1%. 66.5% of companies overall anticipate profits.

  India-specific profitability percentages were not resolved in the fetched content and are not recorded.

  Source organisation: JETRO — FY2025 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies Operating Overseas (Asia and Oceania)

• 2 March 2026

  7th Joint Committee under the India-Japan CEPA meets in Tokyo[9]

  Co-chaired by Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs AKAHORI Takeshi for Japan and Commerce Secretary Rajesh Agrawal for India. MOFA: the two sides 'discussed the operation and implementation of the Japan-India CEPA, which has been in force for nearly 15 years' and the Japanese side conveyed its intention to 'resolve trade and investment issues faced by both countries and further deepen economic cooperation in various fields'. On the sidelines Agrawal met the METI Vice Minister; discussions covered bilateral trade and investment, improving the business environment, and the upcoming 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO. Agrawal stressed harnessing 'the full benefits of the CEPA, including the movement of natural persons', identified 'significant potential for growth in Indian exports to Japan in sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and services', and 'underlined the importance of achieving a more balanced bilateral trade relationship to ensure long-term sustainability'. He described CEPA as providing 'a stable framework ensuring tariff certainty and regulatory predictability'. A Trade and Investment Roadshow was organised by the Embassy of India in Japan with the CII and Keidanren.

  No outcome document, decision, amendment or work programme was published by either side. This is the single most important CEPA-specific event in the corridor in the period covered, and it produced no public deliverable.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 4 March 2026; Japanese read-out at https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_02129.html

• 12 March 2026

  Japan Customs publishes revised calendar-year 2025 trade statistics[6]

  Exports to India 2,862,400 million yen (+9.9%); imports from India 1,049,294 million yen (+7.7%); balance +1,813,106 million yen in Japan's favour (+11.2%). Units as printed: millions of yen, per cent.

  Source organisation: Japan Customs / Ministry of Finance — Value of Exports and Imports, 2025 Calendar Year, revised 12 March 2026

• 1 April 2026

  Japan establishes a dedicated Japan-India Economic Affairs Division inside MOFA[25]

  MOFA created 'the Japan-India Economic Affairs Division under the Southwest Asia Division, Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs Department', to facilitate Japanese corporate expansion and investment in India in light of 'India's high rate of economic growth', and to strengthen collaboration with India on economic security through coordinated public and private sector initiatives.

  A structural signal: Japan created a country-specific economic desk for India, which it does not do lightly. No equivalent Indian institutional change was located.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 'The Establishment of the Japan-India Economic Affairs Division'

• 22 April 2026

  1st Japan-India AI Strategic Dialogue held in Mumbai and Bengaluru[26]

  Held 21-22 April 2026. Japan represented by Deputy Assistant Minister Takahiro Hanada of MOFA's Economic Bureau; India by Joint Secretary Amit A Shukla of the Ministry of External Affairs. Held under the Japan-India AI Cooperation Initiative (JAI), covering industrial-domain projects, talent exchange, governance, and coordination in international forums. Japanese startup ONESTRUCTION and Indian operator DataKaveri Systems signed an MOU on the India Urban Data Exchange.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

• 2 July 2026

  16th Annual Summit in Delhi: Takaichi and Modi agree to accelerate CEPA review AND 'full and effective utilization'[37]

  Prime Minister TAKAICHI Sanae visits India 1-3 July 2026; the summit is held on 2 July. Joint Statement, paragraph 12: 'Noting that more than 15 years have passed since the two countries signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and recognizing the need to enhance and diversify bilateral trade, they concurred on accelerating the review of the implementation as well as full and effective utilization of the CEPA to make it more forward-looking.' Also: 'They endorsed bilateral efforts to strengthen cooperation in logistics, textiles, food processing, agriculture, automotives, and industrial capital goods under IJICP'; 'They also reaffirmed the importance of enhancing bilateral financial cooperation and collaboration on payment systems between Japan and India, including local currency transactions'; and 'They appreciated the progress made towards the realization of the target of 10 trillion Yen set at the last Annual Summit.' Sixteen outcome documents were announced, including a Joint Declaration on Economic Security, a Joint Statement on Cooperation in AI, a Joint Statement on Energy Resilience between MoPNG and METI, Memoranda of Cooperation on batteries, on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, on geology and mineral exploration, on the Next Generation Mobility Partnership, and on the India-Japan Cooperative Biogas for Growth (CBG) Initiative targeting 1,000 biogas and organic fertiliser plants; 2027 was designated the 'India-Japan Year of Shared Horizons' for the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

  The addition of 'full and effective utilization' to the standing 'review of the implementation' formula is the first time either government has put CEPA UTILIZATION in a summit-level document in the material fetched. It remains an aspiration with no mechanism, no metric and no deadline attached.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 16th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement; Japanese text at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054198.pdf; outcomes list at https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2280591&reg=3&lang=1

• 2 July 2026

  Japan-India Joint Economic Forum: 2 trillion yen of investment decisions reported against the 10 trillion yen target[23]

  Held in Delhi with more than 150 Japanese companies and more than 80 Indian companies, alongside Keidanren, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, India's DPIIT, CII and FICCI. MOFA records that towards the 10-trillion-yen goal 'investment commitments totaling 2 trillion yen have already been made', and separately describes 'Investment decisions on the scale of 2 trillion yen over the past year'. 129 private-sector cooperation projects were announced (MOFA's leaders'-meeting read-out gives approximately 120 cooperation documents). Suzuki Motor's Kharkhoda plant opening was highlighted. Panels covered energy, critical minerals, economic security, innovation, human resources and North Eastern Region development. PM Takaichi launched a 'Japan-India CBG Initiative' and the 'POWERR Asia' dialogue on petroleum reserves. PM Modi 'welcomed investment from Japan and expressed his expectations for further strengthening bilateral relations through cooperation in the field of economy.'

  MOFA's own two accounts of the same day give 129 and approximately 120 for the cooperation documents. Both are recorded; neither is corrected by the other. The forum produced no CEPA outcome.

  Source organisation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Joint Economic Forum; leaders' meeting read-out at https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/pageite_000001_01706.html; visit summary at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054641.pdf

• 2 July 2026

  PM Modi tells the India-Japan Business Forum he expects the JPY 10 trillion target to be surpassed and Japanese company numbers to double[39]

  Modi states the aim that 'over the next decade, Japanese investment in India not only meets but surpasses the target of 10 trillion yen', and the goal to 'double the number of Japanese companies operating in India over the next ten years'. The address contains no mention of CEPA.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — English Translation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Address at the India-Japan Business Forum

• 5 August 2026

  Embassy of India, Tokyo refreshes its commercial and economic relations pages with the FY2025-26 trade series[5]

  Both the India-Japan Commercial Relations page and the Economic: India-Japan Relations page carry 'Page last updated on: August 05, 2026'. The commercial page publishes the Indian fiscal-year merchandise series through FY2025-26 (exports USD 6.04 billion, imports USD 21.43 billion, total USD 27.47 billion) and cumulative Japanese FDI of around USD 44.97 billion from 2000 until June 2025; the economic page gives cumulative Japanese FDI exceeding USD 47.59 billion for April 2000 to December 2025.

  This is the freshest Indian-government publication of the bilateral trade series located in this pass, and the only one. It is also the newest source in this file.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Tokyo; second page at https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjQw

Not yet verified

The second item is the entry-into-force derivation reproduced in the agreement section above; it is repeated here because this is where the registry files it. Where an item quotes a figure, the marker points to the source this page does carry on that subject — not to a source for the unverified figure itself, which by definition has none.

The registry records what could not be sourced as well as what could. These are open items, listed exactly as the registry states them — not gaps we have filled from memory or inference.

• NO OFFICIAL COMMODITY-LEVEL TRADE VALUES EXIST FOR THIS CORRIDOR FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT. This is the single largest hole in the file. Japan's Ministry of Finance publishes commodity-by-country tables in its trade statistics releases for the USA, the EU, China, South Korea, ASEAN, the Middle East and Russia, and publishes NONE for India — India appears only as a one-line exports/imports/balance row in 'Value of Exports and Imports by Area (Country)' (verified in both the 2025 calendar-year release and the January-June 2025 provisional release). Japan Customs' Trade Statistics (Download) page routes commodity-by-country data to the e-Stat portal, which is form-driven with no fetchable India-specific URL. On the Indian side, the Embassy of India, Tokyo publishes commodity NAMES with no values, no shares and no period; commerce.gov.in's Export Import Data Bank is form-driven; and the Department of Commerce Annual Report fetched contains no Japan-specific trade discussion. The only percentage shares in this file (Top goods, both Japanese directions) come from JETRO's India country page, which JETRO states is compiled from Global Trade Atlas — a COMMERCIAL database — and denominated in USD. They are recorded in a separate series block and must never be applied to the Ministry of Finance yen figures.
• THE ENTRY-INTO-FORCE ARITHMETIC DOES NOT CLOSE, AND NO OFFICIAL SOURCE EXPLAINS IT. Article 146, read identically in the MOFA-hosted and commerce.gov.in-hosted treaty texts, provides that the Agreement 'shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing that their respective internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement have been completed.' MOFA's announcement states that the exchange of diplomatic notes 'took place in Tokyo on Thursday, June 30' and that 'the Agreement will enter into force on Monday, August 1.' DERIVATION RECORDED: counting thirty days following 30 June 2011 gives 30 July 2011, which is two days before the stated entry into force. This arithmetic was performed in this pass; NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES IT and no official source reconciles the two-day difference. Possible explanations — that the notification date under Article 146 differs from the date of the note exchange, that the count runs from a later completion of internal procedures, or that the parties agreed a calendar-month convention — are all UNSOURCED SPECULATION and none is asserted. Both published dates are recorded as published. The operative fact for the registry is 1 August 2011, because that is what both governments state.
• NO CEPA UTILIZATION RATE EXISTS FOR EITHER DIRECTION, DESPITE UTILIZATION NOW BEING A SUMMIT-LEVEL COMMITMENT. The 16th Annual Summit Joint Statement of 2 July 2026 commits the two governments to 'full and effective utilization of the CEPA', which is the first summit-level appearance of the word in the material fetched, and neither government publishes a number against it. On the Japanese side, Japan Customs maintains 'Time Series Data by EPA' giving 'value/quantity of imports with application of preferential tariff rate provided in EPAs which Japan has in force', in units of JPY 1,000, with India present under code 'IN' as the 'Japan-India EPA' — but the CSV download URLs were not exposed on the pages reachable in this pass (both toukei/epa/epa_happyou2_e.htm and toukei/epa/epa_happyou_e.htm returned HTTP 404 on direct fetch, and the kyotsu/kokusai/toukei/index_e.htm listing described the files without giving retrievable links). Japan Customs additionally warns that its EPA country codes reflect 'country of origin indicated in import declarations' under NON-PREFERENTIAL rules of origin and may differ from the EPA partner whose rules were actually satisfied — so even if retrieved, the series would need that caveat. On the Indian side, NO utilization data exists at all: India's Department of Commerce release 'Crafted in India, Delivered Globally: Exports Powered by Trade Agreements' of 18 December 2025 surveys India's FTAs, gives tariff-line coverage for Oman, the UK, the UAE and others, publishes no utilization rates for anything, and DOES NOT MENTION THE JAPAN CEPA AT ALL. India's Free Trade Agreements (2025-26) Key Highlights, published by commerce.gov.in in March 2026, covers only the USA, EU, New Zealand, Oman and the UK — Japan is absent from India's own current FTA showcase.
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THE AUTOMOTIVE OR AUTO-PARTS TREATMENT UNDER CEPA, AND NOTHING IS ASSERTED HERE. Annex 1 could not be read at HS-line level: the fetched excerpt of ijcepa_x01_e.pdf returned Part 1 (General Notes, from which the staging category definitions in mechanics are taken verbatim) and the opening agricultural and food chapters of Part 2 (India's Schedule); Part 3 (Japan's Schedule) was not reached, and HS 8703 (motor cars) and HS 8708 (motor vehicle parts) do not appear in the retrieved text for either Schedule. Japan Customs FAQ 4035, which is the official plain-language explainer for this specific EPA, gives worked examples for category A (durians, asparagus, lobsters, shrimps, wood products), category Bn (curry, capsicums, dogfish, sea bass) and category X (rice, wheat, beef, pork, chicken, tunas, wine) — every single one agricultural or fishery, with NO industrial or automotive example. PIB's 2013 tariff-line breakdown names no sectors. Both the 15th and 16th Annual Summit Joint Statements list 'automotives' as a cooperation sector under the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership, which is industrial cooperation, NOT a tariff commitment. Suzuki's Kharkhoda plant was highlighted at the July 2026 Joint Economic Forum as investment, not trade. DO NOT ASSERT ANY AUTOMOTIVE TARIFF OUTCOME, QUOTA, PHASE-IN OR EXCLUSION FOR THIS CORRIDOR ON THE BASIS OF THIS FILE.
• THE JPY 5 TRILLION TARGET'S PERIOD IS STATED FOUR DIFFERENT WAYS BY OFFICIAL SOURCES AND NONE CORRECTS ANOTHER. The March 2022 Joint Statement itself says only 'in the next five years'. MOFA's 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement says 'in five years from Japan to India since 2022'. PIB's text of the India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade says 'the 2022-2026 target'. The Embassy of India, Tokyo economic relations page says 'JPY 5 trillion for 2022-2027 period'. All four are recorded verbatim in the investment-target record above and none is preferred. Worse, the OUTCOME is stated two ways within a single day's documents: MOFA's summit read-out of 29 August 2025 says the target 'was achieved in three years', while the Joint Statement issued from the same visit says only that the leaders 'welcomed the progress made towards' it. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE PUBLISHES THE ACTUAL CUMULATIVE YEN DELIVERED against the 5 trillion target, so the achievement claim cannot be checked against anything.
• THE JPY 10 TRILLION TARGET HAS NO STATED END YEAR IN EITHER JOINT STATEMENT. Both the MOFA and PIB texts of the 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement say only 'a new target of 10 trillion Yen in private investment in India from Japan'. The India-Japan Joint Vision says 'setting a new target of JPY 10 trillion of private investment' with no period. Only the Embassy of India, Tokyo attaches dates, saying 'for the next decade' on one page and '(2025-2035)' on another. Note also the change of instrument between the two targets, which no official source flags: the 5 trillion target covered 'public and private investment AND FINANCING'; the 10 trillion target covers 'PRIVATE investment' only. These are not comparable measures and the 'doubling' framing implicit in 5 to 10 is not supported by any official source.
• CUMULATIVE JAPANESE FDI INTO INDIA IS PUBLISHED AT THREE INCOMPATIBLE LEVELS BY INDIAN OFFICIAL SOURCES AND NO SOURCE BRIDGES THEM: 'around US$ 44.97 billion' from 2000 until June 2025 (Embassy of India, Tokyo, commercial relations page); 'Exceeded USD 47.59 billion' for April 2000 to December 2025 at approximately 6.69% of total FDI (Embassy of India, Tokyo, economic relations page); and '$43 billion (2000-2024)' (PIB, 21 February 2025). The differing cut-offs explain part of the spread but the two Embassy figures, six months apart, differ by USD 2.62 billion against a reported FY2025-26 nine-month inflow of USD 3.2 billion, which is not obviously consistent. Japan's RANK is also inconsistent: the Embassy and PIB both say fifth-largest source cumulatively, while DPIIT's own factsheet for April-December 2025 ranks Japan FOURTH among the top five investing countries for that period with INR 28,136 crore / USD 3,200 million and a 7% share. Those are different measures — cumulative stock versus period flow — and are recorded separately without reconciliation.[5][45][46]
• NO INDIA-JAPAN SERVICES TRADE FIGURE EXISTS FROM ANY OFFICIAL SOURCE. Every trade number in this file is merchandise. CEPA covers trade in services (Annex 6 contains Schedules of Specific Commitments in relation to Article 62) and Movement of Natural Persons (Annex 7), and at the 7th Joint Committee India's Commerce Secretary named 'services' among the sectors with significant export growth potential and stressed harnessing 'the full benefits of the CEPA, including the movement of natural persons' — yet neither government publishes a services-trade value for this corridor. This is a structural difference from the India-UK corridor file, where a separate Indian services series exists. The absence should not be read as services trade being small; it should be read as unmeasured in public official data.
• EVERY METI.GO.JP PAGE ATTEMPTED RETURNED AN EMPTY BODY OR HTTP 403 IN THIS PASS. Four URLs were tried: the EPA/FTA/Economic Frameworks index (english/policy/external_economy/trade/FTA_EPA/index.html), the 'What is an EPA' page (policy/trade_policy/epa/about_en/), the 2026 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners priorities PDF (english/report/data/2026WTO/pdf/20260612_02en.pdf), the 'Utilizing the EPA to import to Japan' guidance (policy/trade_policy/epa/process_en/i-step1.html), and the 14 April 2023 Certificates of Origin press release (english/press/2023/0414_004.html). NOTHING FROM METI IS RECORDED AS A FACT IN THIS FILE except the title of the 2023 press release as indexed, which is explicitly flagged as title-only in both mechanics and developments. In particular, METI's view of India's tariff or non-tariff barriers, which its annual WTO compliance report normally sets out chapter by chapter, is entirely absent from this file. A future pass should retry METI through a different fetch route.
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE CONNECTS ANY LOGISTICS ASSET IN THIS CORRIDOR TO CEPA. JICA states that the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor is intended to 'promote trade, foreign export and direct investment' and that the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal project will 'contribute to reducing logistics costs by easing congestion at the port' — both recorded — but neither release, nor any summit statement, nor any PIB or MOFA document fetched, links either asset to CEPA tariff preferences, to India-Japan bilateral trade volumes, or to any bilateral target. The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail is described in every official source located ONLY as a 'flagship project'; it is a passenger railway and NO OFFICIAL SOURCE DESCRIBES IT AS TRADE INFRASTRUCTURE OR ATTRIBUTES ANY FREIGHT FUNCTION TO IT. It is recorded in logistics with that warning attached, because the honest answer to 'Shinkansen-adjacent trade infrastructure as officially stated re trade' is that no such official statement exists. The Dedicated Freight Corridor is likewise never mentioned in any of the four Japan-India summit joint statements fetched (2022, 2025, 2026) or in the Joint Vision.
• THE 7TH JOINT COMMITTEE PRODUCED NO PUBLISHED DELIVERABLE, AND THE FIRST SIX ARE UNDOCUMENTED. Neither MOFA's release of 2 March 2026 nor PIB's of 4 March 2026 records any decision, amendment, recommendation, work programme or timetable from the 7th Joint Committee. Neither government publishes a list of previous Joint Committee meetings, so the dates of the 1st through 6th meetings could not be established, nor could the cadence be checked against Article 14's 'once a year'. PIB does not name the Japanese co-chair; MOFA names him as Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs AKAHORI Takeshi. No source states when any of the six CEPA sub-committees last met, or whether any of them met alongside the 7th Joint Committee.
• THE INDIAN FISCAL-YEAR TRADE SERIES RESTS ON A SINGLE OFFICIAL SOURCE. The Embassy of India, Tokyo is the only Government of India publication located that carries India-Japan trade by fiscal year. commerce.gov.in's own CEPA landing page (commerce.gov.in/PageContent.aspx?Id=137) returned HTTP 404 in this pass; the Department of Commerce Annual Report fetched (2023-24) contains no Japan-specific trade content; the Ministry of External Affairs India-Japan Bilateral Brief PDF returned HTTP 403; and the Consulate General of India, Fukuoka commercial relations page returned HTTP 403. There is therefore no second Indian government publication of the same numbers to check against. Additionally, the Embassy's table carries NO 'April-March' label and NO 'provisional' marking on the table itself — the fiscal-year designation appears only in the surrounding prose — so whether the FY2025-26 row is final or provisional is not stated anywhere.
• THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' TARIFF-COVERAGE FRAMINGS ARE IRRECONCILABLE AND ONE OF THEM IS THIRTEEN YEARS OLD. The Embassy of India, Tokyo says today that CEPA 'envisages abolition of tariffs over 94% of items traded between India and Japan over a period of 10 years' — a trade-weighted framing with no tariff-line detail. PIB's release of 5 August 2013 gives the only tariff-LINE breakdown either government has published: Japan liberalised 92% of lines and India 87.16%; India offered 'only 17.4% of tariff lines for immediate reduction of tariff to zero duty, as against 87% of tariff lines offered by Japan'; India eliminates on 66.32% of lines within 10 years; India's sensitive list is 12.84% of lines and 9.9% of trade volume, Japan's 8% of lines and 3% of trade volume. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE BRIDGES THE 94% TRADE-WEIGHTED FIGURE TO THE LINE-LEVEL PERCENTAGES, and neither government has restated or updated the 2013 numbers in the thirteen years since. Do not average, reconcile or pick one. DERIVATION RECORDED: adding the ten-year staging period referred to in the 94% claim to the 1 August 2011 entry-into-force date gives 1 August 2021, so the staging window on that framing has closed; that addition was performed in this pass and NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES IT. No official source confirms that the staging is in fact complete, and none reports what was actually delivered against the schedules — that is arguably the most consequential unanswered question about this agreement and neither government addresses it.[5][10]
• RULES-OF-ORIGIN DETAIL BELOW THE GENERAL RULE IS UNRESOLVED. Article 29's general rule — qualifying value content of not less than 35 percent AND change in tariff classification at the six-digit level — is recorded verbatim, but Annex 2 (Product Specific Rules) was NOT read line by line in this pass, so it is not known which product lines vary the general rule, in which direction, or by how much. The specific percentages in the Article 32 de minimis provision were not resolved in the fetched excerpt and are NOT recorded. Annex 3 (Operational Certification Procedures) was not read; the Implementing Procedures document published on 1 August 2011 was read and is the source of the certificate-of-origin mechanics recorded. Japan Customs FAQ 1524 lists three origin certification methods across all of Japan's EPAs without saying which apply under the Japan-India EPA specifically, so only third-party certification — which the Japan-India Implementing Procedures do provide for — is treated as established for this corridor.
• INDIA'S DGFT DOES NOT NAME AN AUTHORISED CERTIFICATE-OF-ORIGIN AGENCY FOR THIS AGREEMENT. DGFT Appendix 2A carries the India-Japan CEPA row with its signature and implementation dates but lists no issuing agency, although it does list agencies for several other agreements. The CEPA Implementing Procedures name 'Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry' as India's competent governmental authority, but that is the ministry, not an operational issuing body. DGFT's Common Digital Platform for issuance of Certificates of Origin (coo.dgft.gov.in) lists the UK DCTS, Australia ECTA, India-UAE CEPA, India-Mauritius CECPA, India-Korea CEPA, India-Mercosur PTA and India-Thailand EHS among its relevant documents and DOES NOT LIST THE INDIA-JAPAN CEPA AT ALL. Whether Indian exporters to Japan can obtain a CEPA certificate of origin through the common digital platform, or must use a paper route, IS NOT ESTABLISHED BY ANYTHING FETCHED. Given India requires 'the original and three copies' for imports under this agreement, the paper route appears still to be live, but that is an inference and is not asserted.
• THE CAROTAR 2020 RULES COULD NOT BE READ. India's Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 govern how an Indian importer claims preferential duty under any of India's trade agreements, including this one, and impose declaration, origin-information-possession and verification obligations. The CBIC page hosting them returned HTTP 403 through the fetch tool, as did a CBIC customs notification page. No CAROTAR content is recorded in this file, so the Indian import-side compliance burden under CEPA is undocumented here.
• THE PARTNER-RANK FIGURES CONFLICT ACROSS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND ONE SET IS UNDATED. MOFA's Basic Data page states 'India was the 18th largest trading partner for Japan' and 'Japan was the 13th largest trading partner for India', both explicitly dated 2021, and 'Japan was the 5th largest investor for India' dated FY2021, and 'About 1,439 Japanese companies have branches in India in 2021'. The Embassy of India, Tokyo states 'India ranks 14th in Japan's total trade' at a 1.75% share and 'Japan ranks 10th in India's total trade' at a 2.26% share, with NO YEAR GIVEN, plus India 8th in Japanese exports (2.61%), 22nd in Japanese imports (0.98%), Japan 21st in Indian exports (1.37%) and 10th in Indian imports (2.76%). Both sets are recorded. The intervening five years plausibly account for the movement from 18th to 14th and from 13th to 10th, but no official source says so and the Embassy figures carry no reference period at all. MOFA has evidently not refreshed the ranks, company count or investment rank on its Basic Data page even though the trade and investment tables on that same page run to 2024.[16][5]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES A BILATERAL TRADE-VALUE TARGET. The only numeric bilateral targets the two governments have set in the current period are investment (JPY 5 trillion, JPY 10 trillion) and people (500,000 personnel exchange in five years, including 50,000 skilled personnel from India to Japan). The sole trade-value target ever located is a PIB reference of 12 February 2014 to an expectation of 'the India-Japan Bilateral Trade to US$ 25 billion by 2014'. DERIVATION RECORDED: comparing that stale target with the Indian series recorded in this file, USD 25.15 billion was first reached in FY2024-25, a decade after the target year. That comparison was made in this pass by placing two officially published numbers side by side; NO OFFICIAL SOURCE MAKES IT.[42][5]
• MOFA'S TRADE TABLE HAS NO NAMED STATISTICAL SOURCE. The Japan-India Relations (Basic Data) page attributes both its trade table and its direct investment table only to 'Japanese government documents', without naming the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, JETRO or any specific publication. The figures are consistent in shape with the Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics recorded separately in this file (MOFA 2024: Japan to India 2,651 billion yen; Japan Customs 2025: 2,862,400 million yen, +9.9%), but the two are recorded as separate blocks because MOFA does not identify its own source and the correspondence has not been verified line by line.[16][6]
• THE 500,000-PERSON MOBILITY TARGET IS NOT OFFICIALLY LINKED TO CEPA. The India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade sets it under a standalone 'Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation'. CEPA Annex 7 contains Specific Commitments for the Movement of Natural Persons, and India's Commerce Secretary stressed harnessing 'the full benefits of the CEPA, including the movement of natural persons' at the 7th Joint Committee, but NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THAT THE 500,000 TARGET RUNS THROUGH CEPA OR THAT CEPA COMMITMENTS WILL BE USED TO DELIVER IT. The two are recorded adjacently in the mobility-target record above with that separation made explicit. No source states the current annual flow of Indian professionals to Japan under CEPA Annex 7, or whether the Annex 7 commitments have ever been used at scale.
• THE SURIMI AMENDMENT IS THE ONLY KNOWN CEPA AMENDMENT AND ALMOST NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT IT. The 19 March 2022 Joint Statement refers to an 'amendment promoting trade of fish surimi between Japan and India under Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)'. No date of adoption, no date of entry into force, no tariff line, no legal instrument and no Joint Committee decision text could be located on either government's site. Whether any further amendments have been made under Article 145 in the fifteen years since entry into force is unknown, because neither government publishes an amendment register for this agreement.

Sources

Numbered to match the markers in the text above. Every figure on this page traces to one of these; nothing is estimated, averaged or carried over from outside the registry.

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement policy page mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 'Exchange of Diplomatic Notes concerning the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the Republic of India', 30 June 2011 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 'The 7th Meeting of the Joint Committee Established under the Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement', 2 March 2026 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 16th Japan-India Annual Summit Joint Statement, 2 July 2026; earlier wording from the 15th Annual Summit Joint Statement (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897540.pdf) and the Japan-India Summit Joint Statement of 19 March 2022 (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100319162.pdf) mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
5. Embassy of India, Tokyo — India-Japan Commercial Relations page, last updated 5 August 2026 indembassy-tokyo.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
6. Japan Customs / Ministry of Finance — Value of Exports and Imports, 2025 calendar year, revised 12 March 2026 customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
7. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Appendix 2A, List of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) / Preferential Trade Agreements content.dgft.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
8. Government of India, Department of Commerce — hosted copy of the India-Japan CEPA text; identical wording read from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan copy at https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/epa201102/pdfs/ijcepa_ba_e.pdf commerce.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
9. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 4 March 2026 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
10. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'CEPA With Japan', 5 August 2013 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Annex 1 to the Japan-India CEPA, 'Schedules in relation to Article 19', Part 1 General Notes mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA treaty document collection mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Summit Joint Statement, New Delhi, 19 March 2022 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India CEPA text, Article 23(10) mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Implementing Procedures under the Japan-India CEPA, published 1 August 2011 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Relations (Basic Data) mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 15th Japan-India Annual Summit Joint Statement, 29-30 August 2025; Indian text at https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2161985&reg=48&lang=2 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
18. mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
19. mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Summit Meeting and Working Dinner, 29 August 2025 mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
21. mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Leaders' Meeting and Luncheon, 2 July 2026; visit summary at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054641.pdf mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — Japan-India Joint Economic Forum; leaders' meeting read-out at https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/pageite_000001_01706.html; visit summary at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054641.pdf mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
24. mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan — 'The Establishment of the Japan-India Economic Affairs Division' mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan mofa.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
27. Japan Customs / Ministry of Finance — Value of Exports and Imports, 2025 (Calendar Year) (January-June) (Provisional) customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
28. customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
29. customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
30. Japan Customs — Free Trade Agreement / Economic Partnership Agreement and Related Initiatives customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
31. Japan Customs — Customs Answer (FAQ) 4035, 'Elimination of Tariff on Imported Goods under Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement' customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
32. Japan Customs — Customs Answer (FAQ) 1524, origin certification procedures for preferential tariff treatment under an Economic Partnership Agreement customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
33. customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
34. customs.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
35. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, 29 August 2025; identical wording in the MOFA text at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100897542.pdf pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
36. pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
37. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 16th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement; Japanese text at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101054198.pdf; outcomes list at https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2280591&reg=3&lang=1 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
38. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'List of Outcomes: Prime Minister of Japan's visit to India for the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit', 2 July 2026 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
39. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — English Translation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Address at the India-Japan Business Forum, 2 July 2026 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
40. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'Fact Sheet: India-Japan Economic Security Cooperation' pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
41. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 21 February 2025; Japanese figure from MOFA Basic Data (https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html) pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
42. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'Bilateral Trade with Japan', 12 February 2014 pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
43. pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
44. pib.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
45. Embassy of India, Tokyo — Economic: India-Japan Relations page, last updated 5 August 2026; other figures at https://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/eoityo_pages/NjA, and https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2105293 indembassy-tokyo.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
46. Government of India, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade — FDI equity inflow factsheet, focus year 2025-26 (April to December 2025) dpiit.gov.in accessed 18 August 2026
47. JETRO, compiled from Global Trade Atlas jetro.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
48. JETRO — Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement country page jetro.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
49. JETRO — 'India-Japan Economic Forum' Held with Indian PM Modi in Attendance jetro.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
50. JETRO — FY2025 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies Operating Overseas (Asia and Oceania) jetro.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
51. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) — 'Western Dedicated Freight Corridor Project Supported by Japan (Palanpur - Mehsana (Gujarat) section) inaugurated in Ahmedabad', 30 September 2022 jica.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
52. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 20 January 2023 jica.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026
53. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan — press release index entry, 14 April 2023 meti.go.jp accessed 18 August 2026

Data verified 18 August 2026 · rendered from the corridor registry.