India–Korea trade corridor CEPA in force since 1 January 2010 · upgrade unconcluded

Rendered from the All Frontier Global corridor registry · every figure below carries a numbered source

India and the Republic of Korea trade under a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed 7 August 2009[1] and in force since 1 January 2010[1][2]. The corridor is recorded here without a single government-owned trade series from either side, which the registry states is worse than any other corridor in this collection. Every Republic of Korea government host was blocked at the network layer, so Korea Customs’ own returns are absent; India’s own figures sit behind a form on the Department of Commerce databank that could not be submitted, so no Indian fiscal-year series is recorded either. What stands in their place is a table compiled by the Korea International Trade Association — a Korean business association, not a government agency — and republished by the Embassy of India, Seoul. That table is transcribed here as printed, including the row whose arithmetic does not close. The upgrade negotiation is live and its completion date is stated by one Indian source and by no other. This page renders the corridor registry record.

At a glance

• AgreementCEPA, in force 1 January 2010[1]Signed 7 August 2009[1]. The entry-into-force article of the treaty was not retrieved and nothing about the ratification mechanism is asserted[3].
• Upgrade negotiationResumed and active; latest round 12th Round, New Delhi, 25-27 May 2026.[4]One Government of India source dates conclusion to the first half of 2027 and three others decline to state any date at all. The registry records the target as single-sourced and uncorroborated[1][4][5].
• Headline trade — the only series there isUS$25,653 mn total, Calendar year 2025 (January-December)[6] KITA seriesCompiled by the Korea International Trade Association, a Korean business association and not a government agency, and republished by the Embassy of India, Seoul. It is neither government’s own series and is labelled as such at every point[6].
• Headline trade — Indian seriesabsent — not obtained[7]India’s bilateral figures for the Republic of Korea live in the Department of Commerce export-import databank behind a form that could not be submitted. The registry records this as a refusal, not an absence: the data exists and is current[7].

The agreement

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the Republic of India and the Republic of Korea. The preamble of the treaty text names the parties as 'The Republic of India (hereinafter referred to as "India") and the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as "Korea"), and hereinafter referred to jointly as "Parties"'. Indian official shorthand is inconsistent: the Embassy of India, Seoul writes 'India Korea CEPA (IKCEPA)'; DGFT Appendix 2A lists it as 'India - South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)'; the Press Information Bureau writes 'IK CEPA' and 'India-Korea CEPA'; the Department of Commerce Annual Report writes 'India Korea CEPA'.[3]

Signed 7 August 2009[1]; in force 1 January 2010[1].

Signature: Verbatim: 'The India Korea CEPA (IKCEPA) was signed on 7th August 2009 and came into effect on 1 Jan, 2010.' Independently confirmed by DGFT Appendix 2A, which prints the signature date as 07.08.2009.[1]

The entry-into-force article was not read, and that is recorded as a finding

NOT READ. The fetched rendering of the treaty text did not surface an entry-into-force article. Article 15.5 was visible and addresses amendments, but the provision governing entry into force, and any exchange-of-notes or notification mechanism, was not returned by the fetch.[3]

Recorded as a NEGATIVE finding, not as an absence of the provision. The agreement plainly has one; it was not retrieved. Nothing about the ratification mechanism is asserted in this file. Contrast the India-Japan file, where Article 146 was read in full and its arithmetic problem recorded.[3]

Current status

In force and operative. The Government of India lists 'India - Korea CEPA (upgraded negotiation)' among its live trade-agreement workstreams in the Department of Commerce's 2025 Year End Review, and separately lists 'India-Korea CEPA (Review)' in a Lok Sabha answer of 19 August 2025. Preferential certificates of origin for Indian exports to the Republic of Korea have been issued online through DGFT's Common Digital Platform since 6 March 2020, and origin data has been exchanged electronically between the two customs administrations since 6 December 2023, both of which establish that the agreement is operationally live and not merely nominally in force.[2][9][10][11]

Tariff coverage — two official framings from one mission, pointing opposite ways

TWO IRRECONCILABLE OFFICIAL FRAMINGS, BOTH FROM THE SAME MISSION. Framing A, tariff-line based, from the Embassy of India, Seoul CEPA page (updated 17 August 2026): '93.1 % for India and 83.7% for Korea' of tariff lines carry either zero or reduced tariffs; India's schedule contains 12,124 tariff lines of which approximately 4,011 remain non-zero for Korea, and Korea's schedule contains 11,293 lines of which approximately 1,617 remain non-zero. Framing B, trade-share based, from the Embassy's own economic relations page (updated 17 August 2026): 'Korea was to phase out or reduce tariffs on 90 percent of Indian exports while India would phase out or cut tariffs on 85 percent of Korean exports.'[1][6]

Schedules, staging and the amendment article — all unread

• Staging categories[3]

  NOT READ. Article 2.4 was retrieved — 'Each Party shall reduce or eliminate its customs duties on originating goods of the other Party in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-A' — but the Annex 2-A schedules, and therefore the staging tracks and their definitions, were not returned by the fetch of the treaty text.

  The commonly cited eight-year elimination period appears in this file only as reported by the Embassy of India, Seoul's older 2022 page, not from the schedules. NO STAGING CATEGORY LABELS ARE ASSERTED HERE.

• The amendment article[3]

  Article 15.5 addresses amendments. Its text was not returned in full by the fetch; only its subject was identifiable.

  Recorded because the upgrade track is legally an amendment exercise — the 2015 summit mandate is phrased as 'negotiations to amend the IKCEPA' — so the amendment article is the operative provision, and it is unread. No CEPA amendment has ever been notified: the only instrument that reached in-principle agreement, the 2018 Early Harvest Package, remains unnotified.

Primary official sources for the agreement position: [1][6][12][13][4][14][5][15][16][11][17][2][8][18][19][20][21][22][10][3][23][24][9][7][25][26]

The upgrade track

RESUMED AND ACTIVE. Negotiations to upgrade the CEPA were suspended after the 11th round (Seoul, July 2024) and were formally restarted by a 'Joint Declaration on Resuming the Negotiations to upgrade the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and ROK', signed on 20 April 2026 during the State Visit of President Lee Jae Myung to India. The Press Information Bureau states the Joint Declaration was 'signed on April 20, 2026 by the commerce ministers of both nations'. The most recent round officially reported is the 12TH ROUND, held in New Delhi from 25 to 27 May 2026.[4]

12th Round, New Delhi, 25-27 May 2026.[4]

Delegation heads as printed by PIB: for India, 'Ms. Kapil Chaudhary, Joint Secretary, Department of Commerce'; for the Republic of Korea, 'Mr. Park Geun-oh, Director General for Trade Agreement Policy, MOTIE'. Subjects as printed: 'Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures, Investment, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards'. The Embassy of India, Seoul independently states 'The latest round (12th) was held in New Delhi from 25 - 27 May, 2026', which matches. NOTE: PIB writes the Korean ministry as 'MOTIE', but the Korean ministry's own English website now operates under the domain english.motir.go.kr and the name 'Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources' (MOTIR). That renaming COULD NOT BE VERIFIED FROM ANY KOREAN GOVERNMENT PAGE because every .go.kr domain was unreachable in this pass — see refusals. The name change is therefore NOT asserted here.[4][1]

Two outcomes are officially recorded. First, sub-groups: 'It was also decided to constitute sub-groups to discuss cooperation in the areas of digital trade, supply chain cooperation, and strategic industrial cooperation.' Second, a timeline commitment without a date: both countries 'reaffirmed their commitment to conclude the CEPA upgrade negotiations in a time-bound manner, with the objective of achieving a modernised and mutually beneficial agreement.' The release ALSO records the deficit as a shared agenda item: 'Both sides acknowledged India's bilateral trade deficit, which has risen significantly since the IK CEPA came into force in 2010'.[4]

The completion date: one source says 2027, three say nothing

The registry records the conclusion target as conflicted and single-sourced. It is rendered here with that attribution attached, in the registry’s own words, and it is not reconciled.

CONFLICTED. The Embassy of India, Seoul states the April 2026 instrument was 'A Joint Declaration on Resuming & Expediting CEPA Upgrade Negotiations for Early Conclusion by first half of 2027 was announced at the Summit meeting.' The Press Information Bureau's own list of State Visit outcomes gives the instrument's title WITHOUT any date, as 'Joint Declaration on Resuming the Negotiations to upgrade the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and ROK', and PIB's account of the 12th round says only that the parties will conclude 'in a time-bound manner' with no date. The Joint Strategic Vision adopted at the same summit says the leaders 'welcomed the decision to resume and expedite the CEPA upgrade negotiations for early conclusion' — 'early conclusion', no year.[1][5][4]

Where the mandate came from, and how many rounds there have been

The political mandate dates from a 2015 summit and the negotiations from 2016. Embassy of India, Seoul: 'The Prime Ministers of India and Korea, at the summit meeting held on 18 May 2015 in Korea, agreed on commencement of negotiations to amend the IKCEPA.' PIB's 2024 Year End Review adds the purpose: '...agreed on commencement of negotiations to amend the IKCEPA with a view to achieve qualitative and quantitative increase of trade through an agreed road map. In pursuance of above, the negotiations for upgradation of India-Korea CEPA started in 2016'.[8][1]

MINOR DATING CONFLICT ON THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS. Two Indian sources say 2016 without a month. korea.net, the Republic of Korea's official government website, said in November 2022 that 'upgrade negotiations began June 2016'. The month is therefore attested only on the Korean side and only by a portal, not a ministry.[8]

Partially documented and internally inconsistent across Indian government sources. Rounds 1 to 8 were completed by June 2019, after which korea.net records that 'talks stalled after June 2019'. The 9th round was held in Seoul on 3-4 November 2022. The 10th round was announced at the 9th as one that 'will be hosted by India in early 2023'. The 11th round was held in Seoul in July 2024. The 12th round was held in New Delhi on 25-27 May 2026. The Department of Commerce Annual Report 2024-25 and PIB's 2024 Year End Review both state '11 rounds of negotiations have been held with the last round held in Seoul in July 2024'; the Embassy of India, Seoul now states '12 rounds of negotiations at Chief Negotiators level (JS/AS-DG level) and several inter-sessional rounds have been held.'[1][8]

The Early Harvest Package, agreed in principle and never notified

Agreed in principle in 2018 and never brought into effect. Embassy of India, Seoul: after six rounds both countries agreed 'in-principle' on an Early Harvest Package covering goods, rules of origin, and services, 'subject to each country's domestic approval procedures. The same is yet to be notified.'[1]

Trade flows

What this series is, and what it is not

Series owner: Korea International Trade Association (KITA) — a Korean business association, NOT a government agency. Republished by the Embassy of India, Seoul (Government of India).[6]

Series publisher: Embassy of India, Seoul — India-ROK trade and economic relations page, page last updated 17 August 2026[6]

Period: Calendar year 2025 (January-December). Basis: Merchandise. Table headed in US dollars; values as printed are in US$ million. The table's own source line reads 'Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA)'.[6]

Columns as printed: Year | Total trade | Growth % | Indian exports to ROK | Growth % | ROK Export to India | Growth%[6]

India’s exports: Printed as 6,422 with growth -0.2%. India's exports to Korea FELL year on year for the second consecutive year (2023 6,728; 2024 6,431; 2025 6,422) and remain BELOW the 2022 peak of 8,897 and below the 2021 level of 8,056.[6]

Korea’s exports: Printed as 19231 (no thousands separator in the source for this cell) with growth 2.9%. This is the HIGHEST value in the published series — Korean exports to India have never been higher.[6]

The deficit is derived. Here is the derivation.

Korea sold India roughly three times what it bought from India in 2025 on this table. That ratio is NOT stated by any official source and is not recorded as a figure here.[6]

The full table as printed, defects included

The registry transcribes this table as it is printed and corrects nothing. Two rows are arithmetically broken and both are reproduced broken, with the registry’s own transcription note beneath and the specific defects set out under Not yet verified. No growth statement on this page is computed from this table.

The Indian government series — absent, and why

NOT OBTAINED

The page was reached and its metadata read: country dropdown includes 'KOREA RP'; years offered 2018-2019 through 2025-2026; currency options 'US $ Million' or 'Rs Crore'; 'Data available 2017-2018 to 2025-2026'; 'Last data updated on 07/08/2026'; source stated as 'Metadata on DGCI&S'. THE FIGURES REQUIRE A FORM SUBMISSION WHICH COULD NOT BE PERFORMED, and the page returned 'No Result found'. Direct HTTP access to tradestat.commerce.gov.in was additionally refused at the network layer. NO INDIAN FISCAL-YEAR TRADE SERIES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS RECORDED IN THIS FILE. This is a refusal, not an absence: the data demonstrably exists and is current to 7 August 2026.[7]

Source as the registry records it: Department of Commerce, Government of India — TRADESTAT export-import databank, country-wise total trade page[7]

The Korean government series — absent, and why

NOT OBTAINED — ALL SOURCES BLOCKED

Four Republic of Korea government hosts were attempted and all four failed before any content was served: tradedata.go.kr (Korea Customs trade statistics), customs.go.kr (Korea Customs Service), english.motir.go.kr (trade ministry), mofa.go.kr (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Direct HTTPS attempts returned 'CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403' at the network layer; the fetch tool returned ROBOTS_DISALLOWED with an underlying connect timeout on robots.txt for the same hosts. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN CUSTOMS RETURNS ARE ENTIRELY ABSENT FROM THIS FILE. Nothing from Korea Customs is asserted anywhere here.[27]

Source as the registry records it: Korea Customs Service — trade statistics portal (unreachable)[27]

Two Indian round numbers that are not a series

• USD 27 billion, described as 'the current' level of bilateral trade.[14]

  Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026 — remarks of Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush Goyal at the India-Korea Business Forum, New Delhi

  Verbatim: 'Shri Goyal said that India and the Republic of Korea have been tasked by their leadership to double bilateral trade from the current USD 27 billion to USD 54 billion by 2030, requiring an annual growth rate of nearly 18%.' NO PERIOD, NO BASIS, NO SOURCE for the 27. It does not match the KITA calendar-2025 total of 25,653 million.

• USD 25 billion, described as 'the current' annual trade volume.[6]

  Embassy of India, Seoul — trade and economic relations page, page last updated 17 August 2026

  Verbatim: 'India and ROK agreed to...expand the annual trade volume from the current USD 25 billion to USD 50 billion by 2030.' NO PERIOD, NO BASIS, NO SOURCE for the 25.

The doubling target, and the adopted text that does not contain it

A DOUBLING TARGET BY 2030 EXISTS AND IS OFFICIALLY STATED, BUT ITS TWO ENDPOINTS ARE PUBLISHED AT TWO DIFFERENT VALUES BY TWO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SOURCES. Version A: 'double bilateral trade from the current USD 27 billion to USD 54 billion by 2030, requiring an annual growth rate of nearly 18%' (Commerce Minister Goyal, 20 April 2026). Version B: 'expand the annual trade volume from the current USD 25 billion to USD 50 billion by 2030' (Embassy of India, Seoul, 17 August 2026). Both attribute the mandate to the leaders.[14][6]

Attribution as the registry records it: CONFLICT: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026 versus Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026[14][6]

Investment

• Cumulative Korean FDI into India — the first figure[6]

  US$10.29 billion

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026 — NO SOURCE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS FIGURE

  Verbatim: 'Korea's total FDI to India from 1980 up to December 2025 stands at US$10.29 billion.' Period stated as 1980 to December 2025. No statistical source named.

• Cumulative Korean FDI into India — the second figure, on the same page[6]

  US$ 7.27 billion

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026, attributing the figure to the Export-Import Bank of Korea

  Verbatim: 'Korean FDI to India (up to Dec 2025, latest data as of July 2025) stood at US$ 7.27 billion, as per the Export-Import Bank of Korea'. THE PERIOD LABEL IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY ON ITS FACE — it claims coverage 'up to Dec 2025' while simultaneously saying the underlying data is 'as of July 2025'. Worse, the SAME NUMBER, 7.27 billion, appears on the Embassy's older page (last updated August 2022) with the period 'through December 2021', which means the figure has been carried forward across at least four years of page updates with only the period label changed. TREAT AS STALE.

• Korean investment into India in the latest year[6]

  US$824 million

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul, attributing the annual breakdown to the Export-Import Bank of Korea

  Verbatim: 'In 2025, Korea's investment to India recorded US$824 million.' Part of a year-by-year breakdown running from 2010 ('$200 million was received in 2010, US$ 457 million in 2011') through 2025.

• Indian investment into the Republic of Korea[6]

  approximately US$ 5.2 billion

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul — NO SOURCE ATTRIBUTED

  Verbatim: 'Investments from India to Korea are to the tune of approx. USD 5.2 billion led by Tata Daewoo and Aditya Birla Group (Novelis).' The Embassy's older page (August 2022) gave 'approximately USD 3 billion' for the same measure. Company-level figures also given without source: Novelis 'total investment in Korea is over US$ 700 million'; Tata Motors 'cumulative investment now is over US$ 400 million'. NOTE THESE TWO COMPANY FIGURES SUM TO FAR LESS THAN THE HEADLINE AND NO SOURCE BRIDGES THEM.

• The POSCO Holdings–JSW Group steel joint venture[6]

  Approximately USD 7.3 billion planned investment in an integrated steel plant.

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026

  Verbatim: 'POSCO Holdings significantly expanded its investment plans in India through a landmark joint venture with JSW Group...to establish an integrated steel plant with a planned investment of approximately USD 7.3 billion.' A PLANNED figure, not a realised one. The Embassy places it in the context of the 2026 Korea-India Summit.

• Korean banks in India[6]

  Six Korean banks operating 18 branches in India.

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026

  Verbatim: 'Six Korean Banks have overall 18 branches in India. These include KEB Hana, Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, Nonghyup and IBK.' The page adds that KEB Hana Bank and Korea Development Bank are opening additional branches and that KB Securities opened its Mumbai office in December 2025.

• The count of Korean companies in India[6]

  NO OFFICIAL COUNT OF KOREAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN INDIA IS PUBLISHED ON THE CURRENT PAGE.

  Source as the registry records it: Embassy of India, Seoul

  The current page names individual investors — Hyundai Motor Group, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, POSCO Holdings, Kia, LG Energy Solution, Hyosung, KRAFTON — but gives no total. The Embassy's OLDER page, last updated 21 November 2022, gave 'over 603 companies'. That figure is four years stale and is NOT carried forward here as current.

Top goods, each direction

Both lists are published by the Embassy of India, Seoul, in rank order as printed, with chapter-level HS codes supplied by the source itself. Neither list carries a value, a share or a period, and no commodity-level trade value for this corridor was obtained from any source at all.

• India’s exports to the Republic of Korea — period NOT STATED BY THE SOURCE[6]

  Light oils and preparations / mineral fuel distillates (mainly naphtha) (HS Code: 27); Unwrought aluminum (HS Code: 76); Iron and steel products (HS Code: 72); Refined lead (HS Code: 78); Ores and concentrates (HS Code: 26); Cereals (HS Code: 10)

  Series owner: Embassy of India, Seoul (Government of India). No statistical series is cited for the list itself.

  NO VALUES, NO SHARES AND NO PERIOD ARE PUBLISHED. The list is ordered as printed; whether that order is by value is not stated. HS codes are chapter-level and are given by the source itself, which is more than the India-Japan corridor offers. The composition is overwhelmingly primary and semi-processed — refined petroleum, aluminium, steel, lead, ores, cereals — with no engineering, pharmaceutical or IT-goods line named, which is the structural fact behind the deficit, though NO OFFICIAL SOURCE DRAWS THAT CONCLUSION. An older Embassy page (last updated August 2022) stated that naphtha was 'over 20% of exports'; that page is four years stale and its share figure is NOT carried forward as current.

• The Republic of Korea’s exports to India — period NOT STATED BY THE SOURCE[6]

  Semiconductors (HS Code: 85); Machinery and mechanical appliances (HS Code: 84); Iron and steel products (HS Code: 72); Electrical machinery and equipment (HS Code: 85); Automobile parts and vehicles (HS Code: 87); Petroleum products (HS Code: 27); Plastics and petrochemical products (HS Code: 39); Optical, precision and medical instruments (HS Code: 90)

  Series owner: Embassy of India, Seoul (Government of India). No statistical series is cited for the list itself.

  NO VALUES, NO SHARES AND NO PERIOD ARE PUBLISHED. The source lists 'semiconductors' and 'electrical machinery and equipment' as separate items while assigning BOTH the same HS chapter 85, which is an internal defect in the source and is transcribed rather than corrected. Note that iron and steel (HS 72) and petroleum/mineral fuel (HS 27) appear on BOTH directions' lists, so the corridor trades the same chapters in both directions at different stages of processing — the source does not comment on this.

Mechanics and open issues

The origin rules were read from a Government of India mirror of the treaty text; the schedules behind them were not returned by the fetch, so no tariff rate, no staging category and no product-level outcome appears anywhere on this page. Two items in this section are negative findings recorded as mechanics because their absence is load-bearing: no utilisation rate, and no stated automotive treatment.

• Rules of origin — the general rule[3]

  Article 3.4 sets the substantive test for goods that are not wholly obtained. Paragraph 1 opens: 'Except as under Article 3.14 and provided that the final process of manufacturing is performed within the territory of the exporting Party, goods would be considered as originating within the meaning of Article 3.2(b),' and then splits into two routes: '(a) which satisfy the Product Specific Rules provided in Annex 3-A;' or '(b) except for goods covered under subparagraph (a)...if; (i) the regional value content is not less than 35 percent of the FOB value; and (ii) the goods have undergone a change in tariff classification in a subheading, at the six digit level.' Article 3.2 sets the two routes to originating status generally: goods 'wholly obtained or produced in the territory of the exporting Party' or goods satisfying Article 3.4.

  RVC 35 PERCENT OF FOB VALUE **AND** CTSH AT THE SIX-DIGIT LEVEL. The two limbs are conjunctive — (i) and (ii), not (i) or (ii) — so this is a strict combined rule, structurally the same shape as the India-Japan CEPA general rule. THE STRUCTURE MATTERS: the Annex 3-A product-specific rules are the PRIMARY route under 3.4(1)(a) and the 35%+CTSH test in 3.4(1)(b) is the RESIDUAL that applies only to goods NOT covered by Annex 3-A. Do not quote the 35 percent as a universal threshold. A 'final process of manufacturing' territorial condition additionally gates the whole article.

  Source organisation: Export Inspection Council of India, Government of India — hosted India-Korea CEPA treaty text, Articles 3.2 and 3.4

• Rules of origin — product specific rules vary the threshold[3]

  Annex 3-A contains the Product Specific Rules. The fetched rendering indicates the regional value content requirement for specific products varies in the range of 25 to 40 percent depending on the product category, rather than sitting uniformly at the residual 35 percent.

  RECORDED WITH A CAVEAT. Annex 3-A WAS NOT READ LINE BY LINE in this pass, so it is not known which specific lines carry 25 percent, which carry 40 percent, or how many lines are covered by Annex 3-A at all. The 25-40 range is recorded because it was surfaced from the treaty document itself, but NO INDIVIDUAL PRODUCT LINE IS ASSERTED. Anyone relying on a specific line must read Annex 3-A directly.

  Source organisation: Export Inspection Council of India — hosted India-Korea CEPA treaty text, Annex 3-A

• Rules of origin — de minimis[3]

  Article 3.8 sets the tolerance. For goods generally, non-originating materials that do not satisfy the applicable change-in-tariff-classification requirement may nonetheless be disregarded where they do not exceed ten percent of the FOB value of the good. For textiles the tolerance is expressed by weight instead: seven percent of the total weight.

  The split basis — value for general goods, weight for textiles — is a material trap for classifiers and is stated by the treaty itself. The exact textile scope to which the seven percent applies was not read.

  Source organisation: Export Inspection Council of India — hosted India-Korea CEPA treaty text, Article 3.8

• Bilateral safeguard measures and the transition period[3]

  Article 2.22 provides for bilateral safeguard measures, available 'During the transition period only'. The transition period is defined as 'a period for a good from the date of entry into force of this Agreement until ten years from the date of completion of tariff elimination or completion of tariff reduction.' The substantive trigger requires that imports from the other Party alone constitute 'a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof.'

  THE MOST OPERATIONALLY IMPORTANT MECHANIC IN THIS FILE FOR STEEL. The transition period is measured PER GOOD and runs ten years past that good's own tariff-elimination completion date, not ten years from 2010 — so for a line with an eight-year staging track the bilateral safeguard remains available roughly eighteen years after entry into force. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES WHETHER EITHER PARTY HAS EVER INVOKED ARTICLE 2.22, and no such invocation was located. Nothing is asserted about whether any safeguard is currently in force.

  Source organisation: Export Inspection Council of India — hosted India-Korea CEPA treaty text, Article 2.22

• Tariff commitments — the operative article[3]

  Article 2.4, Reduction or Elimination of Customs Duties: 'Each Party shall reduce or eliminate its customs duties on originating goods of the other Party in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-A.'

  THE SCHEDULES THEMSELVES WERE NOT READ. Annex 2-A carries the staging tracks and every line-level outcome, and it was not returned by the fetch. Consequently NO TARIFF RATE, NO STAGING CATEGORY AND NO PRODUCT-LEVEL OUTCOME IS ASSERTED ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE, including for steel and for automobiles.

  Source organisation: Export Inspection Council of India — hosted India-Korea CEPA treaty text, Article 2.4

• Certificate of origin — Indian issuing agencies[21]

  DGFT Appendix 2B lists three agencies authorised to issue Preferential Certificates of Origin under the India-Korea CEPA: '(i) Export Inspection Council (EIC)-for all goods (ii) Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) -for Marine products (iii) Textile Committee- Textile and made ups'. DGFT's own process document repeats the same three under the heading 'Indo - KOREA'.

  THIS IS A SHARPER RESULT THAN THE INDIA-JAPAN CORRIDOR, where DGFT Appendix 2A names no issuing agency at all. Here three agencies are named, with EIC as the general-purpose issuer and two commodity-specific issuers. NOTE THE INCONSISTENT AGREEMENT NAMING: Appendix 2B and the SCOO document label the row 'Indo - KOREA' without using the words CEPA or IKCEPA, while DGFT Appendix 2A calls it 'India - South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)'. The Export Inspection Council's own compliance-services page lists 'Certificate of Origin' among its services but DOES NOT NAME the India-Korea CEPA or any list of agreements it covers, so EIC does not itself confirm the mandate DGFT assigns it.

  Source organisation: Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Appendix 2B, Certificate of Origin (Preferential); corroborated by DGFT's SCOO process document

• Certificate of origin — electronic issuance for Indian exports[10]

  DGFT's Common Digital Platform for Issuance of Certificate of Origin carries the entry: 'Online filling and Issuance of Preferential Certificate of Origin under India Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IKCEPA) for Indias Exports to Republic of Korea w.e.f. 06th March 2020.'

  Transcribed with the source's own typography, including 'Indias' without an apostrophe. The entry covers ONE DIRECTION ONLY — India's exports to the Republic of Korea. Nothing is stated about how a Korean exporter obtains a certificate for shipment to India, and no Korean issuing body is named anywhere in this file because all Korean government sources were unreachable.

  Source organisation: Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Common Digital Platform for Issuance of Certificate of Origin, relevant documents listing

• Electronic Origin Data Exchange System (EODES) — customs-to-customs origin data[11]

  India's Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) and the Korea Customs Service (KCS) launched EODES on 6 December 2023 in New Delhi, by CBIC Chairman Sanjay Kumar Agarwal and KCS Commissioner KO Kwang Hyo. Under the system, 'data fields in a Certificate of Origin (CoO) shall be electronically shared by the exporting customs administration with the importing customs, as soon as the certificate is issued.' Officials described the launch as 'a major milestone in the flourishing bilateral relations between the two countries'. Both sides committed to deploying the system in live operational environments.

  THIS IS THE MOST CONCRETE PIECE OF BILATERAL CEPA MACHINERY IN THE ENTIRE FILE and it is the ONLY item here jointly operated by both governments' agencies. It is expressly tied to the CEPA. Note the source ministry is FINANCE, not Commerce — origin verification sits with the revenue administration, not the trade negotiators, on both sides. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE PUBLISHES ANY EODES VOLUME, COVERAGE OR UTILISATION FIGURE, and no official source states whether the December 2023 launch has since moved from pilot to full live operation.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, via Press Information Bureau, 8 December 2023

• CEPA utilisation — no rate published[4]

  NO UTILISATION RATE FOR THE INDIA-KOREA CEPA IN EITHER DIRECTION WAS PUBLISHED BY ANY SOURCE LOCATED.

  Recorded as a mechanic because its absence is load-bearing: both governments have now committed at summit level to correcting a deficit that has 'risen significantly since the IK CEPA came into force in 2010', and neither publishes any measure of how much of the trade actually moves under the agreement's preferences. Without a utilisation rate it is not possible to say from official data whether the CEPA is causing the deficit, is irrelevant to it, or is the only thing restraining it.

  Source organisation: Negative finding across all Government of India sources fetched

• Automotive treatment — NOT ESTABLISHED[3]

  NO OFFICIAL SOURCE FETCHED STATES THE AUTOMOTIVE OR AUTO-PARTS TARIFF TREATMENT UNDER THE INDIA-KOREA CEPA, AND NOTHING IS ASSERTED HERE.

  'Automobile parts and vehicles (HS Code: 87)' is named by the Embassy of India, Seoul among Korea's principal exports to India, and Hyundai Motor Group and Kia are named among the largest Korean investors in India, but NO SOURCE CONNECTS EITHER TO A CEPA TARIFF LINE, STAGING TRACK OR ORIGIN RULE. The gap is a reading failure on Annex 2-A, not evidence of an absence of provisions.

  Source organisation: Negative finding — Annex 2-A schedules not returned by the fetch of the treaty text

• Steel — an official bilateral instrument exists but no CEPA linkage[15]

  An 'MOU on Technology and Trade for Steel Supply Chain' was concluded between India and the Republic of Korea on 20 April 2026 and appears in the Press Information Bureau's official list of outcomes of the State Visit of the President of the Republic of Korea to India.

  THE INSTRUMENT'S TITLE IS ALL THAT IS OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED. No text, no signatories, no scope, no duration and no tariff or quota content were located, and NO OFFICIAL SOURCE LINKS THIS MOU TO THE CEPA OR TO ARTICLE 2.22 BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS. Iron and steel (HS 72) is the one chapter the Embassy of India, Seoul names in BOTH directions of trade, and POSCO Holdings' approximately USD 7.3 billion planned integrated steel plant joint venture with JSW Group is placed by the Embassy in the context of the same 2026 summit — but the connection between the MOU, the joint venture and the CEPA is inference, and is not made by any source.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'List of Outcomes: State Visit of President of Republic of Korea to India', 20 April 2026

Logistics

Everything recorded under logistics in this corridor is a 2026 institutional instrument about future shipbuilding capacity and port development. No shipping route, sailing time, port pair, air cargo route, transit time, freight volume or container count for the corridor as it operates today was published by any source fetched.

• India-ROK Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics ('VOYAGES')[16]

  Adopted 20 April 2026. The framework is titled 'Shared Vision for Operation of Yard Assisted Growth with Efficiency and Scale (VOYAGES)' and provides for cooperation between Indian and Republic of Korea entities across shipbuilding, shipping and maritime logistics. Elements include greenfield shipyard development in southern India with HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering as technical anchor, brownfield expansion of existing yards, block fabrication facilities for specialised vessels, vessel flagging through India's GIFT IFSCA and E-Samudra platforms, maritime and port crane manufacturing, skill training via the Korea International Cooperation Agency, and a maritime education partnership between Indian Maritime University and Korea Maritime and Ocean University. Port development infrastructure collaboration is stated at approximately USD 13.3 billion over five years.

  CEPA IS NOT MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN THIS RELEASE. This is the single largest logistics commitment in the corridor and it sits entirely outside the trade agreement. The USD 13.3 billion / five years figure is stated as port development infrastructure collaboration; NO BREAKDOWN, NO FINANCING SOURCE AND NO COMMITMENT MECHANISM IS PUBLISHED, and it is not stated whether it is Korean investment, Indian investment, or joint.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'India-ROK Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics', 20 April 2026

• Named Indian port projects inside the VOYAGES framework[16]

  Three Indian port projects are named with capacities: the '23 million TEU Vadhvan container port (Maharashtra)'; a '150 MTPA multipurpose terminal in Bahuda (Odisha)'; and the '135 MTPA modern terminal of Deendayal Port (Gujarat)'.

  CAPACITIES ARE AS PRINTED AND ARE DESIGN OR TARGET CAPACITIES, NOT CURRENT THROUGHPUT — the release does not say which, and none of the three is described as operating at these levels today. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THAT ANY OF THESE THREE PORTS HANDLES INDIA-KOREA TRADE, names a Korea service or route calling at them, or connects them to the CEPA. Their appearance here is as the projects the framework covers, nothing more.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026

• MOU on Ports Cooperation[15]

  A standalone 'MOU on Ports Cooperation' between India and the Republic of Korea appears in the official list of outcomes of the State Visit of 19-21 April 2026.

  TITLE ONLY. No text, signatories, scope, named ports or duration were located. Recorded because it is a distinct instrument from the VOYAGES framework signed the same day, and the relationship between the two is not explained by any source.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — List of Outcomes, 20 April 2026

• Shipping as a leader-level priority[14]

  At the April 2026 summit the President of the Republic of Korea stated that 'Cooperation in the shipping sector will be strengthened.' The Joint Strategic Vision separately records that 'The two sides adopted a Comprehensive Framework for Partnership on Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics and looked forward to its early implementation.'

  Note the title discrepancy between the two PIB documents of the same day: the Joint Strategic Vision calls it a framework 'on Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics' while the list of outcomes and the dedicated release call it 'in Shipbuilding, Shipping & Maritime Logistics'. Trivial, but recorded because it is one of several instances in this corridor where PIB gives an instrument two titles.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026 (President Lee Jae Myung's remarks); Joint Strategic Vision, PIB, 20 April 2026, paragraph 14

• No physical trade-corridor logistics published[6]

  NO OFFICIAL SOURCE FETCHED PUBLISHES ANY SHIPPING ROUTE, SAILING TIME, PORT PAIR, AIR CARGO ROUTE, TRANSIT TIME, FREIGHT VOLUME OR CONTAINER COUNT FOR THE INDIA-KOREA CORRIDOR.

  Everything recorded under logistics in this file is a 2026 institutional instrument about future shipbuilding and port capacity. NOT ONE FACT ABOUT HOW GOODS ACTUALLY MOVE BETWEEN INDIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TODAY was obtained. The Korea Customs Service, which would hold port-level and mode-level data, was unreachable.

  Source organisation: Negative finding across all sources fetched

Developments 2022–26

• 3 November 2022

  9th round of India-ROK CEPA upgrade negotiations held in Seoul, ending a three-year stall[17]

  Held 3-4 November 2022 at the Lotte Hotel Seoul. Led for India by Anant Swarup, Joint Secretary, Department of Commerce, and for the Republic of Korea by Yang Ghi-Wuk (rendered by korea.net as Yang Gi-uk), Director General, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. Topics: trade in goods, services, rules of origin and investment; SPS and TBT issues; and India's concerns regarding 'the growing trade deficit between the two countries'. Both sides committed to 'make utmost efforts to expedite negotiations in order to reach a mutually beneficial and satisfactory outcome during 2023', citing the coming 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The 10th round was to be hosted by India in early 2023. korea.net records that talks had 'stalled after June 2019' and that eight rounds preceded this one.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 4 November 2022; corroborated with additional detail by korea.net, the official website of the Republic of Korea, 3 November 2022

• 6 December 2023

  India-Korea Electronic Origin Data Exchange System (EODES) launched in New Delhi[11]

  CBIC and the Korea Customs Service launched EODES on 6 December 2023, enabling certificate-of-origin data fields to be shared electronically between the two customs administrations as soon as a certificate is issued. Announced by India's Ministry of Finance on 8 December 2023.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, via Press Information Bureau, 8 December 2023

• 1 July 2024

  11th round of CEPA upgrade negotiations held in Seoul — the last round before a 22-month stall[8]

  The Department of Commerce Annual Report 2024-25 and PIB's 2024 Year End Review both state that 'the negotiations for upgradation of India-Korea CEPA started in 2016 and so far, 11 rounds of negotiations have been held with the last round held in Seoul in July 2024.' NO DAY OF THE MONTH IS PUBLISHED and no press release for this round was located from either government; the date recorded here is the month only.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 2024 Year End Review for the Department of Commerce; Department of Commerce Annual Report 2024-25

• 19 August 2025

  Department of Commerce lists India-Korea CEPA as a live workstream in a Lok Sabha answer[9]

  Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4198, tabled by Shri Arun Bharti and answered 19 August 2025, carries an annexure of India's trade-agreement negotiations in which item 10 reads 'India-Korea CEPA (Review)'. The answer contains no India-Korea trade figures and no statement about the bilateral deficit.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce — answer to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4198

• 1 December 2025

  KB Securities opens its Mumbai office[6]

  The Embassy of India, Seoul records that KB Securities opened its Mumbai office in December 2025, and that KEB Hana Bank and Korea Development Bank are opening additional branches in India. Six Korean banks operate 18 branches in India: KEB Hana, Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, Nonghyup and IBK. NO DAY OF THE MONTH IS PUBLISHED.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Seoul, page last updated 17 August 2026

• 19 April 2026

  State Visit of President Lee Jae Myung of the Republic of Korea to India begins (19-21 April 2026)[15]

  The State Visit of H.E. Lee Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea, and First Lady Mrs. Kim Hea Kyung, to New Delhi ran from 19 to 21 April 2026. It is the visit at which every 2026 bilateral instrument in this file was concluded.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — List of Outcomes of the State Visit, 20 April 2026

• 20 April 2026

  Joint Declaration signed resuming the CEPA upgrade negotiations[15]

  The 'Joint Declaration on Resuming the Negotiations to upgrade the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and ROK' appears in PIB's official list of State Visit outcomes. PIB's later readout of the 12th round states the Joint Declaration was 'signed on April 20, 2026 by the commerce ministers of both nations'. THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ITSELF COULD NOT BE OBTAINED. The Embassy of India, Seoul renders the same instrument with a longer title including 'Expediting' and 'for Early Conclusion by first half of 2027'; PIB's list of outcomes does not.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — List of Outcomes, 20 April 2026; title conflict with Embassy of India, Seoul, CEPA page

• 20 April 2026

  Joint Strategic Vision for the India-ROK Special Strategic Partnership adopted[5]

  Paragraph 19: 'Emphasizing the importance of realizing the full potential of India-ROK bilateral trade and to promote mutually beneficial exchanges in new avenues of trade including digital trade, supply chain collaboration and green economy, the two leaders welcomed the decision to resume and expedite the CEPA upgrade negotiations for early conclusion.' Paragraph 13 welcomes 'the conclusion of the MOU on India-ROK Industrial Cooperation Committee to bolster bilateral economic ties, expand trade and investment'. Paragraph 14 records adoption of the maritime framework. Paragraph 16: 'The leaders agreed to foster a more conducive business environment to encourage further investment by Korean and Indian companies in each other's markets.' THE DOCUMENT CONTAINS NO BILATERAL TRADE VALUE AND NO TRADE TARGET.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026, 10:53PM

• 20 April 2026

  State Visit outcomes: roughly twenty instruments signed, including steel, ports, industrial and payments MOUs[15]

  PIB's list of outcomes names, among others: the Joint Strategic Vision; the India-ROK Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping & Maritime Logistics; the Joint Declaration on resuming CEPA upgrade negotiations; MOU on Ports Cooperation; MOU establishing an Industrial Cooperation Committee; MOU on Technology and Trade for Steel Supply Chain; MOU on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; MOU on Maritime Heritage; MOU between IFSCA and the Korean FSS/FSC; MOU between NPCI International Payments and the Korea Financial Telecommunications Institute; a Framework for India-Korea Digital Bridge; Joint Statement on Sustainability; Joint Statement on Energy Resource Security; MOU on Climate and Environment; MOU on Paris Agreement Article 6.2 cooperation; a Cultural Exchange Programme 2026-2030; MOU on Cultural and Creative Industries; and MOU on Sports Cooperation.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau — List of Outcomes, 20 April 2026, 3:57PM

• 20 April 2026

  India-ROK maritime framework 'VOYAGES' adopted with approximately USD 13.3 billion of port infrastructure collaboration over five years[16]

  See the logistics section for the full contents. Names the Vadhvan (23 million TEU), Bahuda (150 MTPA) and Deendayal (135 MTPA) port projects and HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering as technical anchor for a greenfield shipyard in southern India. CEPA is not mentioned in the release.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026

• 20 April 2026

  India-Korea Business Forum: 16 MoUs signed; Commerce Minister states a USD 27bn to USD 54bn by 2030 doubling mandate[14]

  Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush Goyal: 'India and the Republic of Korea have been tasked by their leadership to double bilateral trade from the current USD 27 billion to USD 54 billion by 2030, requiring an annual growth rate of nearly 18%.' Also: 'Shri Goyal further informed that Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and President Mr Lee Jae Myung have discussed the establishment of a large industrial township-a Korea-specific enclave in India with plug-and-play infrastructure to encourage greater investments and facilitate the entry of more Korean companies into the Indian market.' And: 'A total of 16 MoUs were signed today at India Korea Business Forum.' President Lee Jae Myung is recorded as saying 'India, as the world's fourth-largest economy and home to 1.4 billion people, stands as a key pillar of the global economy', that 'There is significant scope to further expand business and trade', and that 'Cooperation in the shipping sector will be strengthened.'

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026

• 25 May 2026

  12th round of India-Korea CEPA upgrade negotiations held in New Delhi (25-27 May 2026)[4]

  Led for India by Ms. Kapil Chaudhary, Joint Secretary, Department of Commerce, and for the Republic of Korea by Mr. Park Geun-oh, Director General for Trade Agreement Policy, MOTIE. Covered Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures, Investment, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards. 'It was also decided to constitute sub-groups to discuss cooperation in the areas of digital trade, supply chain cooperation, and strategic industrial cooperation.' 'Both sides acknowledged India's bilateral trade deficit, which has risen significantly since the IK CEPA came into force in 2010.' Both countries 'reaffirmed their commitment to conclude the CEPA upgrade negotiations in a time-bound manner'. NO NEXT ROUND DATE AND NO COMPLETION DATE ARE PUBLISHED.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 28 May 2026 (Release ID 2266170)

• 7 August 2026

  India's DGCI&S trade data updated to cover fiscal 2025-26, but remains behind an unsubmittable form[7]

  The Department of Commerce TRADESTAT country-wise total trade page states 'Data available 2017-2018 to 2025-2026' and 'Last data updated on 07/08/2026', sourced from 'Metadata on DGCI&S', with 'KOREA RP' in the country dropdown. The figures could not be retrieved.

  Source organisation: Department of Commerce, Government of India — TRADESTAT / DGCI&S

• 17 August 2026

  Embassy of India, Seoul refreshes its CEPA and economic pages with the 2025 KITA data and the 12th round[1]

  Both the CEPA page and the trade and economic relations page carry 'Page last updated on August 17, 2026'. The refresh added the calendar-2025 trade row (total 25,653; Indian exports 6,422; ROK exports 19,231 in US$ million), the 12th round of 25-27 May 2026, the 'first half of 2027' conclusion objective, the USD 25bn to USD 50bn by 2030 target, cumulative Korean FDI of US$10.29 billion to December 2025, 2025 Korean investment of US$824 million, and the POSCO-JSW joint venture at approximately USD 7.3 billion. The refresh did NOT reconcile the page's two conflicting cumulative FDI figures and did NOT correct the defective 2017 row in the trade table.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Seoul — CEPA page and trade and economic relations page, both last updated 17 August 2026

Not yet verified

The first two items are this corridor’s foundational weakness: neither government’s own trade statistics are in the record, one because every Korean government host was blocked at the network layer and one because India’s own figures sit behind a form that could not be submitted. Both are recorded as refusals rather than as absences. Where an item quotes a figure, the marker points to the source this page does carry on that subject — not to a source for the unverified figure itself, which by definition has none.

The registry records what could not be sourced as well as what could. These are open items, listed exactly as the registry states them — not gaps we have filled from memory or inference.

• REFUSAL, AND THE WORST GAP IN THIS FILE: NOT ONE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT SOURCE COULD BE FETCHED. Four Korean government hosts were attempted and all four failed before serving any content: english.motir.go.kr (the trade ministry's English site), www.customs.go.kr (Korea Customs Service), www.mofa.go.kr (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and www.tradedata.go.kr (the Korea Customs import-export trade statistics portal). Direct HTTPS requests to all four returned the network-layer error 'CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403'; the fetch tool returned ROBOTS_DISALLOWED for the same hosts with underlying causes recorded as 'robots.txt fetch failed: ConnectTimeout' and 'Failed to fetch or parse robots.txt'. THE CONSEQUENCE IS THAT THIS CORRIDOR IS RECORDED WITHOUT KOREA CUSTOMS' OWN TRADE RETURNS, WITHOUT ANY KOREAN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON THE CEPA OR ITS UPGRADE, AND WITHOUT ANY KOREAN-SIDE COMMODITY DATA. Every fact in this file about the Korean position is either an Indian government source describing it, or KITA data republished by an Indian mission. The only Korean-owned source that could be read at all was korea.net, the Republic of Korea's official government portal, and only one article on it loaded before the host began returning 'Too many redirects' on every subsequent request — a November 2022 piece on the 9th round. NO KOREAN SOURCE DATED 2025 OR 2026 WAS READ.[27][6]
• NO INDIAN OFFICIAL TRADE SERIES EXISTS IN THIS FILE EITHER, WHICH MEANS NEITHER GOVERNMENT'S OWN STATISTICS ARE RECORDED. India's official bilateral figures for the Republic of Korea sit in TRADESTAT, the Department of Commerce export-import databank sourced from DGCI&S. The country-wise total trade page was reached and read: 'KOREA RP' is in the country dropdown, years 2018-2019 through 2025-2026 are offered, currency options are 'US $ Million' and 'Rs Crore', the page states 'Data available 2017-2018 to 2025-2026' and 'Last data updated on 07/08/2026' with source 'Metadata on DGCI&S'. THE FIGURES REQUIRE A FORM SUBMISSION THAT THE FETCH TOOL CANNOT PERFORM, and the page returned 'No Result found'. A direct HTTPS request to tradestat.commerce.gov.in was separately refused at the network layer with 'CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403'. This is a REFUSAL, not an absence — the data demonstrably exists and is current to 7 August 2026. CONSEQUENCE: there is no Indian fiscal-year series in this file, no Indian-basis 2025-26 figure, and therefore NO TWO-SERIES COMPARISON OF THE KIND THE INDIA-JAPAN FILE CARRIES. The two series recorded in this registry's headline are the KITA calendar-year table on one hand and, on the other, nothing at all from India beyond two conflicting round numbers.[7]
• THE 'KOREAN SERIES' RECORDED HERE IS NOT A GOVERNMENT SERIES. The only complete year-by-year table obtained is published by the Embassy of India, Seoul and attributed in its own source line to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). KITA IS A KOREAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT AGENCY — its own website describes it as 'the largest business organization in Korea with over 77,000 member companies'. KITA's own K-Statistics landing page was fetched directly and CARRIES NO INDIA FIGURES; it offers only a 'Monthly Trade Report' and a list of overseas centres. So the table cannot be verified against KITA's own publication and rests entirely on an Indian mission's transcription of it. The structural position is the same as JETRO/Global Trade Atlas in the India-Japan file, except worse: there, a government series existed alongside the commercial one. Here it is the only series there is.[6]
• THE KITA TABLE AS PUBLISHED BY THE EMBASSY OF INDIA, SEOUL CONTAINS AT LEAST TWO ARITHMETIC DEFECTS THAT NO OFFICIAL SOURCE CORRECTS. (1) THE 2017 ROW IS BROKEN. Its total is printed as 15,785 — IDENTICAL TO THE 2016 TOTAL — while its components are printed as 4,949 and 15,056, which sum to 20,005. Its printed growth rate of 26.7% is also irreconcilable with an unchanged total. The 2017 total appears to be a copy of the 2016 cell. (2) THE 2013 GROWTH RATE IS WRONG: printed as -0.07% for a move from 18,843 to 17,568, which is roughly -6.8%. Both defects survived the 17 August 2026 page refresh. NEITHER IS CORRECTED IN THIS FILE — the row is transcribed as printed. CONSEQUENCE: any multi-year growth statement derived from this table is unsafe, and the 2016-2018 segment in particular cannot be used.[6]
• THE BILATERAL TRADE TARGET IS PUBLISHED WITH TWO DIFFERENT PAIRS OF NUMBERS BY TWO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SOURCES, AND APPEARS IN NO ADOPTED BILATERAL TEXT AT ALL. The Union Minister of Commerce and Industry said on 20 April 2026 that the two countries had been 'tasked by their leadership to double bilateral trade from the current USD 27 billion to USD 54 billion by 2030, requiring an annual growth rate of nearly 18%'. The Embassy of India, Seoul said on 17 August 2026 that 'India and ROK agreed to...expand the annual trade volume from the current USD 25 billion to USD 50 billion by 2030.' Neither figure carries a period, a basis or a statistical source, neither matches the KITA calendar-2025 total of 25,653 million, and neither document cross-references the other. Critically, THE JOINT STRATEGIC VISION ADOPTED BY THE TWO LEADERS AT THE SAME SUMMIT CONTAINS NO TRADE VALUE AND NO TARGET WHATSOEVER — its paragraph 19 goes only as far as welcoming 'the decision to resume and expedite the CEPA upgrade negotiations for early conclusion'. The doubling mandate is attested only in ministerial remarks and a mission webpage.[14][6][5]
• THE 'FIRST HALF OF 2027' CONCLUSION TARGET IS SINGLE-SOURCED AND THREE OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS DECLINE TO STATE IT. The Embassy of India, Seoul writes: 'A Joint Declaration on Resuming & Expediting CEPA Upgrade Negotiations for Early Conclusion by first half of 2027 was announced at the Summit meeting.' PIB's own List of Outcomes for that summit titles the instrument simply 'Joint Declaration on Resuming the Negotiations to upgrade the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and ROK', with neither 'Expediting' nor any year. The Joint Strategic Vision says 'early conclusion' with no date. PIB's readout of the 12th round says only 'in a time-bound manner'. THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ITSELF COULD NOT BE OBTAINED FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT, so it cannot be established which rendering of the title is correct or whether the 2027 date appears in the instrument at all.[1][5][4]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE PUBLISHES A CEPA UTILISATION RATE IN EITHER DIRECTION, DESPITE THE DEFICIT NOW BEING A SUMMIT-LEVEL AND NEGOTIATION-LEVEL ISSUE. PIB's readout of the 12th round states that 'Both sides acknowledged India's bilateral trade deficit, which has risen significantly since the IK CEPA came into force in 2010', which makes the agreement's actual usage the central empirical question of the corridor — and neither government publishes a number against it. No preferential-import share, no certificate-of-origin count, no EODES transaction volume, and no line-level preference claim data was located from CBIC, DGFT, the Department of Commerce, or any Korean source (all of which were unreachable).[4]
• CUMULATIVE KOREAN FDI INTO INDIA IS PUBLISHED AT TWO INCOMPATIBLE LEVELS ON ONE PAGE OF ONE INDIAN MISSION'S WEBSITE, AND THE LOWER FIGURE IS DEMONSTRABLY STALE. The Embassy of India, Seoul page last updated 17 August 2026 carries BOTH 'Korea's total FDI to India from 1980 up to December 2025 stands at US$10.29 billion' (no source attributed) AND 'Korean FDI to India (up to Dec 2025, latest data as of July 2025) stood at US$ 7.27 billion, as per the Export-Import Bank of Korea'. The second figure's own period label is self-contradictory, claiming coverage to December 2025 from data as of July 2025. WORSE: the identical number, US$ 7.27 billion, appears on the Embassy's OLDER page (last updated August 2022) against the period 'through December 2021' — meaning the figure has been carried forward across at least four years of page updates with only its period label changed. NO SOURCE BRIDGES THE 10.29 AND 7.27 FIGURES OR EXPLAINS THE 3.02 BILLION DIFFERENCE.[6]
• THE TWO TARIFF-COVERAGE FRAMINGS PUBLISHED BY THE SAME MISSION ON THE SAME DAY POINT IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. The Embassy of India, Seoul CEPA page gives a tariff-LINE framing: '93.1 % for India and 83.7% for Korea', with India's schedule at 12,124 lines (approximately 4,011 non-zero for Korea) and Korea's at 11,293 lines (approximately 1,617 non-zero). The Embassy's economic relations page, last updated the same day, gives a trade-SHARE framing: 'Korea was to phase out or reduce tariffs on 90 percent of Indian exports while India would phase out or cut tariffs on 85 percent of Korean exports.' The line framing gives India the higher number; the share framing gives Korea the higher obligation. Neither page acknowledges the other. A third, four-year-stale Embassy page adds an eight-year period to the share framing that the current pages omit. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE RECONCILES THEM AND NO SOURCE STATES WHICH IS THE OPERATIVE MEASURE.[1][6]
• THE 2018 EARLY HARVEST PACKAGE HAS BEEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE FOR EIGHT YEARS AND HAS NEVER BEEN NOTIFIED, AND ALMOST NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT IT. The Embassy of India, Seoul states that after six rounds both countries agreed 'in-principle' in 2018 on a package covering goods, rules of origin and services, 'subject to each country's domestic approval procedures. The same is yet to be notified.' NO OFFICIAL SOURCE names the goods, the origin rules or the services covered, gives a date beyond the year, identifies which side's domestic approval is outstanding, or explains why the package lapsed. NO PIB RELEASE, NO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DOCUMENT AND NO KOREAN SOURCE LOCATED MENTIONS IT AT ALL — it is attested by exactly one webpage. This is the clearest evidence in the official record that the upgrade track has repeatedly failed to convert agreement into law, and it is nearly undocumented.[1]
• THE 10TH AND 11TH ROUNDS OF THE UPGRADE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ESSENTIALLY UNDOCUMENTED. No press release from either government was located for either round. The 10th round is known only from the 9th round's readout, which said it 'will be hosted by India in early 2023' — whether it was actually held, when, or where is not stated by any source fetched. The 11th round is known only from two Indian documents that give 'Seoul in July 2024' with no day of the month, no delegation heads and no agenda. Between the 8th round (completed by June 2019) and the 9th (November 2022) there is a gap of about three years and five months; between the 11th (July 2024) and the 12th (May 2026) a gap of about twenty-two months. NEITHER GOVERNMENT PUBLISHES A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ROUNDS WITH DATES.[1][8]
• THE TREATY TEXT WAS READ ONLY IN PART AND ONLY FROM A MIRROR. The Department of Commerce's own copy of the agreement at commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/INDIA-KOREA-CEPA-2009.pdf returned HTTP 404, and the older commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/trade/ path also returned HTTP 404. The text used in this file is the copy hosted by the Export Inspection Council of India — a Government of India statutory body under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, so official, but a mirror rather than the negotiating department's own posting. FROM THAT COPY THE FOLLOWING WERE NOT RETRIEVED: the entry-into-force article and its wording; the full text of Chapter Four (Origin Procedure), including which body issues certificates of origin for each Party and the validity period of a certificate; Annex 2-A (the tariff schedules and staging tracks) for both Parties; Annex 3-A (Product Specific Rules) line by line; and the text of Article 15.5 on amendments. CONSEQUENCE: NO TARIFF RATE, NO STAGING CATEGORY, NO PRODUCT-LEVEL ORIGIN RULE AND NO CERTIFICATE VALIDITY PERIOD IS ASSERTED ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE.[3]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THE AUTOMOTIVE OR AUTO-PARTS TREATMENT UNDER THE CEPA, AND NOTHING IS ASSERTED. 'Automobile parts and vehicles (HS Code: 87)' is named among Korea's principal exports to India, and Hyundai Motor Group and Kia are named among the largest Korean investors in India, but no source connects either to a CEPA tariff line, staging track, origin rule or safeguard. The gap is caused by the failure to read Annex 2-A, not by an absence of provisions.[3][6]
• THE STEEL MOU IS A TITLE AND NOTHING MORE. An 'MOU on Technology and Trade for Steel Supply Chain' appears in PIB's list of State Visit outcomes of 20 April 2026. No text, signatories, scope, duration, tariff content or quota content was located. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE LINKS IT TO THE CEPA, to Article 2.22 bilateral safeguards, or to the POSCO Holdings-JSW Group integrated steel plant joint venture of approximately USD 7.3 billion that the Embassy of India, Seoul places in the context of the same summit. Iron and steel (HS 72) is the only chapter the Embassy names in BOTH directions of trade, which makes the missing detail unusually consequential.[15][6]
• NOT ONE FACT ABOUT HOW GOODS PHYSICALLY MOVE IN THIS CORRIDOR TODAY WAS OBTAINED. No shipping route, sailing time, port pair, air cargo route, transit time, freight volume or container count for India-Korea trade was published by any source fetched. Everything in this file's logistics section is a 2026 institutional instrument about FUTURE shipbuilding capacity and port development. The named port capacities — Vadhvan 23 million TEU, Bahuda 150 MTPA, Deendayal 135 MTPA — are design or target figures, the release does not say which, and NO SOURCE STATES THAT ANY OF THE THREE HANDLES INDIA-KOREA TRADE. The Korea Customs Service, which holds port-level and mode-level data, was unreachable.[16][27]
• THE USD 13.3 BILLION MARITIME FIGURE IS UNEXPLAINED. PIB states port development infrastructure collaboration of approximately USD 13.3 billion over five years under the VOYAGES framework. NO BREAKDOWN, NO FINANCING SOURCE, NO COMMITMENT MECHANISM AND NO COUNTERPARTY SPLIT IS PUBLISHED — it is not stated whether this is Korean investment into India, Indian investment, joint investment, or a pipeline value. CEPA IS NOT MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN THE RELEASE.[16]
• NO SERVICES TRADE FIGURE FOR THIS CORRIDOR EXISTS FROM ANY SOURCE. Every trade number in this file is merchandise. The CEPA covers trade in services, services are named as a subject of both the 9th and 12th negotiating rounds, and the 2018 Early Harvest Package covered services — and there is no bilateral services value, share or growth rate anywhere in the official record located.[3]
• THE OFFICIAL TEXTS OF THE APRIL 2026 SUMMIT ARE ACCESSIBLE ONLY THROUGH PIB, BECAUSE MEA.GOV.IN REFUSED EVERY REQUEST. The Ministry of External Affairs is the department that publishes bilateral documents, and four MEA URLs were attempted: the India-Republic of Korea Bilateral Relations country brief PDF (mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/INDIA-REPUBLIC_OFKOREA.pdf), the July 2024 version of the same brief, the press release on the State Visit, and the bilateral-documents pages for the summit instruments. ALL RETURNED HTTP 403. CONSEQUENCE: MEA's country brief, which in other corridors carries a consolidated trade and investment table, is absent; the Joint Declaration text is absent; and the Prime Minister's press statement at the summit could not be read (the PIB page for it returned only a navigation template, not the statement body).[4]
• THE EMBASSY OF INDIA, SEOUL PUBLISHES FOUR PAGES ON THIS RELATIONSHIP AT FOUR DIFFERENT VINTAGES AND THEY CONTRADICT EACH OTHER. Two pages carry 'Page last updated on August 17, 2026' (the CEPA page and the trade and economic relations page). A third carries 'Last Updated: August 2022' and still presents 2021 as the record year with FDI 'through December 2021'. A fourth carries 'Last Updated: 21 November 2022' and gives 'over 603 companies' for Korean firms in India and 'approximately USD 3 billion' for Indian investment in Korea, against the current pages' USD 5.2 billion. THE STALE PAGES ARE STILL LIVE AND ARE NOT MARKED AS SUPERSEDED. Additionally, the mission's human-readable URLs (indembassyseoul.gov.in/cepa and /india-rok-trade-and-economic-relations) returned HTTP 404 while the encoded /pages/ identifiers for the same content resolved correctly, so search results point at dead URLs for live pages.[1][6]
• THE KOREAN MINISTRY'S NAME COULD NOT BE VERIFIED AND IS THEREFORE NOT ASSERTED. PIB's readout of the 12th round (May 2026) names the Korean counterpart ministry as 'MOTIE'. The Korean ministry's English-language website is now served from english.motir.go.kr under the name 'Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources' (MOTIR), which would indicate a renaming from 'Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy'. THAT HOST WAS UNREACHABLE IN THIS PASS, so no Korean government page confirming a renaming, its date, or its statutory basis could be read. THIS FILE USES 'MOTIE' ONLY WHERE PIB USES IT, QUOTES IT AS PIB'S WORD, AND ASSERTS NOTHING ABOUT THE MINISTRY'S CURRENT NAME.[4]
• NO KOREAN ISSUING BODY FOR CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN IS NAMED ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE. DGFT names three Indian agencies (Export Inspection Council for all goods, MPEDA for marine products, Textile Committee for textiles and made-ups) and DGFT's Common Digital Platform covers 'Indias Exports to Republic of Korea w.e.f. 06th March 2020' — one direction only. HOW A KOREAN EXPORTER OBTAINS A CERTIFICATE FOR SHIPMENT TO INDIA IS NOT RECORDED, because Chapter Four of the treaty was not read and every Korean source was blocked. Separately, the Export Inspection Council's own compliance-services page lists 'Certificate of Origin' as a service but does not name the India-Korea CEPA or any list of agreements it covers, so EIC does not itself confirm the mandate DGFT assigns to it. DGFT Appendix 2A, which does carry the India-Korea row with dates 07.08.2009 and 01.01.2010, names NO issuing agency for it and carries no publication date of its own — its most recent internal reference is to October 2014, making it at minimum eleven years stale.[21][10]
• INDIA'S CAROTAR 2020 RULES WERE NOT READ. India's Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 govern how an Indian importer claims preferential duty under any Indian trade agreement including this one, imposing declaration, origin-information-possession and verification obligations that in practice determine whether a CEPA preference survives audit. No CBIC page was fetched in this pass. Nothing about Indian import-side origin compliance is asserted here.[3]
• THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE'S OWN LABELLING OF THIS WORKSTREAM IS INCONSISTENT ACROSS ITS OWN DOCUMENTS. The 2025 Year End Review annexure calls it 'India - Korea CEPA (upgraded negotiation)'. The Lok Sabha answer of 19 August 2025 calls it 'India-Korea CEPA (Review)'. The Annual Report 2024-25 calls it 'India Korea CEPA' and describes 'upgrade negotiations'. PIB press releases use 'IK CEPA' and 'India-Korea CEPA'. DGFT Appendix 2A uses 'India - South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)' while DGFT Appendix 2B and the SCOO process document use only 'Indo - KOREA'. Six labels for one agreement across one ministry.[2][9][21]
• THE 2025 YEAR END REVIEW AND THE ANNUAL REPORT 2024-25 CONTAIN NO INDIA-KOREA TRADE FIGURES AT ALL. Both were searched. The Annual Report yields only the round history and a mention that sub-groups and joint working groups under the CEPA institutional mechanism discuss 'market access, investment, rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade', plus Korea's appearance in a list of twenty countries for a commercial-wing retreat. Neither document gives a bilateral value, a deficit figure or a commodity breakdown. Two further PIB backgrounders that would plausibly have carried Korea — an export-performance explainer of 2025-26 and a logistics-sector explainer of 16 August 2025 — were fetched and DO NOT MENTION KOREA AT ALL, the export explainer listing the US, EU, ASEAN, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, Canada, GCC and Qatar as trade-agreement counterparties without Korea.[2]
• THE INDIA-KOREA INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION COMMITTEE, THE KOREA ENCLAVE, AND THE DIGITAL BRIDGE ARE ALL TITLES WITHOUT CONTENT. The Joint Strategic Vision welcomes 'the conclusion of the MOU on India-ROK Industrial Cooperation Committee to bolster bilateral economic ties, expand trade and investment' but no terms of reference, membership, cadence or first meeting date is published. The Commerce Minister said the two leaders 'have discussed the establishment of a large industrial township-a Korea-specific enclave in India with plug-and-play infrastructure' — 'discussed', with no location, no size, no timeline, no investment figure and no implementing instrument. A 'Framework for India-Korea Digital Bridge' appears in the list of outcomes with no text located. NONE OF THE THREE IS LINKED BY ANY SOURCE TO THE CEPA.[5][14]
• THE JOINT COMMITTEE OR EQUIVALENT GOVERNANCE BODY OF THE CEPA ITSELF IS UNDOCUMENTED. The Annual Report 2024-25 refers to 'sub-groups and joint working groups under the India-Korea CEPA institutional mechanism', and the 12th round created three new sub-groups on digital trade, supply chain cooperation and strategic industrial cooperation. But NO OFFICIAL SOURCE LOCATED NAMES THE TOP-LEVEL GOVERNANCE BODY, states its treaty article, lists its meetings or dates, or publishes any decision it has taken. Contrast the India-Japan corridor, where the Joint Committee's treaty function and its 7th meeting are both on the record.[4][2]

Sources

Numbered to match the markers in the text above. Every figure on this page traces to one of these; nothing is estimated, averaged or carried over from outside the registry.

1. Embassy of India, Seoul — CEPA page, page last updated 17 August 2026 indembassyseoul.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
2. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 2025 Year End Review for the Department of Commerce pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
3. Export Inspection Council of India, Government of India (Ministry of Commerce and Industry) — hosted copy of the India-Korea CEPA treaty text, preamble eicindia.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
4. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — '12th Round Of India-Korea CEPA Upgrade Negotiations Held In New Delhi', 28 May 2026 (Release ID 2266170) pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
5. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026, 10:53PM pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
6. KITA, published by Embassy of India, Seoul indembassyseoul.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
7. Department of Commerce, Government of India — TRADESTAT export-import databank, country-wise total trade page tradestat.commerce.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
8. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 2024 Year End Review for the Department of Commerce pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
9. Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce — answer to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4198 commerce.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
10. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Common Digital Platform for Issuance of Certificate of Origin, relevant documents listing coo.dgft.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
11. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, via Press Information Bureau, 8 December 2023 pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
12. indembassyseoul.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
13. indembassyseoul.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
14. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 20 April 2026 — remarks of Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush Goyal at the India-Korea Business Forum, New Delhi pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
15. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'List of Outcomes: State Visit of President of Republic of Korea to India', 20 April 2026 pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
16. Government of India, Press Information Bureau — 'India-ROK Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics', 20 April 2026 pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
17. Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 4 November 2022; corroborated with additional detail by korea.net, the official website of the Republic of Korea, 3 November 2022 pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
18. pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
19. pib.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
20. content.dgft.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
21. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Appendix 2B, Certificate of Origin (Preferential) content.dgft.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
22. content.dgft.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
23. eicindia.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
24. commerce.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
25. korea.net accessed 19 August 2026
26. kita.org accessed 19 August 2026
27. Korea Customs Service — trade statistics portal (unreachable) tradedata.go.kr accessed 19 August 2026

Data verified 19 August 2026 · rendered from the corridor registry.