India–Nepal trade corridor Treaty of Trade and Treaty of Transit · no FTA

Rendered from the All Frontier Global corridor registry · every figure below carries a numbered source

India and Nepal have no free trade agreement in the ordinary sense. The corridor is governed by a pair of standing bilateral treaties — a Treaty of Trade and a Treaty of Transit — with an Agreement of Co-operation to Control Unauthorized Trade beside them and the South Asian Free Trade Area underneath as a plurilateral floor[1][2][3]. The Government of India describes the substantive effect in one line: the Trade Treaty allows Nepal unilateral duty-free access to the Indian market[1]. Two arms of one Indian ministry answer the plain question “does India have an FTA with Nepal” in opposite ways, and the registry records the conflict rather than picking a side[2][4]. Two genuine full-year government series describe the corridor, one from each side, and they are not comparable: they differ on year definition, currency, direction convention and source institution at once. No exchange rate was fetched, so nothing on this page is converted between rupees and dollars anywhere. This page renders the corridor registry record.

At a glance

• RegimeTreaty of Trade and Treaty of Transit, not an FTA[1][2]Unilateral duty-free access for Nepal into India, in the Government of India’s own word. Nothing in the record describes a reciprocal Nepali obligation, and no bilateral free trade agreement is announced, proposed or scheduled by either side[1][4].
• ClassificationConflicted inside the Government of India[2][4]The Directorate General of Foreign Trade lists the Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade inside its table of free trade agreements already signed and operational; the Department of Commerce’s own stocktake of India’s FTAs does not name Nepal at all[2][4].
• Headline trade — Indian seriesUS$9,388.98 mn total, 2025-26 = April 2025 to March 2026[1] Indian FY seriesMinistry of Commerce and Industry figures republished by the Embassy of India, Kathmandu, on the Indian financial year April to March, in US dollars. Printed as a total; the printed total and the printed components differ in the last decimal place[1].
• Headline trade — Nepali seriesRs. 224.68 billion of exports to India and Rs. 1,071.2 billion of imports from India, 2024/25 = 2081/82 = mid-July 2024 to mid-July 2025[5] Nepali FY seriesNepal Rastra Bank, on the Nepali fiscal year running mid-July to mid-July, in Nepalese rupees. A different year, a different currency and a different institution from the Indian series. The two are never blended and never converted[5][1].

The treaty regime

THERE IS NO BILATERAL INDIA-NEPAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IN THE ORDINARY SENSE AND NONE IS UNDER NEGOTIATION IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED. THE CORRIDOR IS GOVERNED BY A PAIR OF STANDING BILATERAL TREATIES — A TREATY OF TRADE AND A TREATY OF TRANSIT — PLUS AN AGREEMENT OF CO-OPERATION TO CONTROL UNAUTHORISED TRADE, WITH SAFTA SITTING UNDERNEATH AS A PLURILATERAL FLOOR. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu states the substantive effect in one line: 'The Trade Treaty allows Nepal unilateral duty-free access to the Indian market.' The word 'unilateral' is the Government of India's own; this is not a reciprocal liberalisation instrument. BUT THE CLASSIFICATION IS NOT CONSISTENT ACROSS THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: DGFT's Appendix 2A lists the 'Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade' inside its table of FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 'Already Signed and Operational', alongside India-Sri Lanka FTA and SAFTA — while the Department of Commerce's own March 2026 stocktake of India's FTAs does not name Nepal at all. See the classification conflict recorded above.[1][2][4]

The two treaties

• Treaty of Trade[2]

  Treaty of Trade between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. DGFT's Appendix 2A prints the instrument and its dates as: 'Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade | 06.12.1991 (Revised on 27.10.2009) | 27.10.2009' — that is, an original of 6 December 1991, revised on 27 October 2009, with 27 October 2009 given as the date of entry into force of the revision.

  This is the only fetched source that gives the Treaty of Trade a signature date and an entry-into-force date. The treaty TEXT itself was not obtained — see Not yet verified.

• Treaty of Transit[1][6]

  Treaty of Transit between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal, revised text signed 1 June 2023. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu: the revised Transit Treaty 'was signed on 1 June 2023 for a period of 7 years, which will then will be automatically renewed for further period of 7 years' [sic, as printed]. Nepal's Prime Minister confirmed the act on the day: 'The revised Treaty of Transit was signed and exchanged today.'

  BOTH SIDES AGREE ON THE DATE. India's Embassy gives the term (7 years, auto-renewing for a further 7); Nepal's MoFA record of the same day gives the act of signature and exchange. 1 June 2023 + 7 years places the first term's expiry at 1 June 2030.

• 1 June 2023

  Nepal’s own confirmation, on Nepal’s own domain[6]

  'The revised Treaty of Transit was signed and exchanged today.' — Statement by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda', Joint Press Meet between the Prime Ministers of Nepal and India, New Delhi, 1 June 2023.

  NEPAL'S OWN WORDS, ON NEPAL'S OWN DOMAIN. This is the Nepali-side confirmation of the 2023 transit treaty.

• The third standing instrument[1]

  A third standing instrument sits beside the two treaties: the 'Agreement of Co-operation to Control Unauthorized Trade - 2009'. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu names it alongside the Treaty of Trade and states that both 'were automatically renewed in October 2023'. The bilateral committee that services the corridor is formally the 'Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) on Trade, Transit and Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade' — the third limb is in the committee's own name.

  SMUGGLING CONTROL IS A NAMED TREATY OBJECT IN THIS CORRIDOR, NOT AN AFTERTHOUGHT. An open land border with unilateral duty-free access in one direction creates the arbitrage this instrument exists to police.

Renewal status as officially stated

AS OFFICIALLY STATED TODAY, 19 AUGUST 2026, ON A PAGE STAMPED 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026': THE TRADE SIDE RENEWED AUTOMATICALLY AND THE TRANSIT SIDE IS RUNNING INSIDE ITS FIRST SEVEN-YEAR TERM. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu states that the 'India-Nepal Treaty of Trade, and the Agreement of Co-operation to Control Unauthorized Trade - 2009' were 'automatically renewed in October 2023'; and that the revised Transit Treaty 'was signed on 1 June 2023 for a period of 7 years, which will then will be automatically renewed for further period of 7 years'. NO OFFICIAL SOURCE FETCHED SAYS EITHER TREATY IS LAPSED, SUSPENDED OR IN DISPUTE.[1]

The review, and the amendment that happened without it

BOTH TREATIES ARE UNDER REVIEW AND THE REVIEW HAS NO PUBLISHED DEADLINE. The Press Information Bureau's readout of the India-Nepal Inter-Governmental Committee held in Kathmandu on 10-11 January 2025 records that 'The agenda also included discussions on review of the Treaty of Transit and the Treaty of Trade, proposed amendments to existing agreements.' No completion date was specified in that release. The same review language appears in the readout of the IGC of 7 December 2020, which records 'comprehensive reviews of the Treaty of Transit and the Treaty of Trade'.[7]

THE TRANSIT REGIME WAS AMENDED IN NOVEMBER 2025 WITHOUT REOPENING THE TREATY. On 13 November 2025 the two governments exchanged a Letter of Exchange amending the PROTOCOL to the Treaty of Transit. PIB: 'Both countries interchanged Letter of Exchange (LoE) on 13th November 2025 to facilitate the movement of rail-based freight between Jogbani (India) and Biratnagar (Nepal) including bulk cargo under an expanded definition.' The liberalisation 'extends to key transit corridors - Kolkata-Jogbani, Kolkata-Nautanwa (Sunauli), and Visakhapatnam-Nautanwa (Sunauli)'. Signed on the Indian side by Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Piyush Goyal and on the Nepali side by the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Supplies Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha.[8]

The classification conflict, recorded and not resolved

CONFLICT, UNRESOLVED, INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. (a) DGFT's Appendix 2A lists 'Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade' as item 2 in its table of FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 'Already Signed and Operational', between 'India-Bhutan' and 'India-Sri Lanka FTA', and separately lists SAFTA as item 4 of the same table. (b) The Department of Commerce's 'India's Free Trade Agreements (2025-26) - Key Highlights', dated March 2026, enumerates the FTAs it counts — India-USA Framework for Interim Agreement (announced 2 February 2026), India-EU FTA (announced 27 January 2026), India-New Zealand FTA (announced 22 December 2025), India-Oman CEPA (18 December 2025), India-UK CETA (24 July 2025) — AND DOES NOT NAME NEPAL, SAFTA OR SAPTA ANYWHERE. Two arms of the same ministry therefore give incompatible answers to 'does India have an FTA with Nepal'.[2][4]

A second conflict, on which body met in January 2025

CONFLICT ON A BASIC FACT: WHICH BODY MET IN JANUARY 2025. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu's Commerce Wing Brief, as accessed today, states: 'The last meetings of the IGSC and IGC were held in Kathmandu on 10-11 January 2025 and 12-13 January 2024, respectively' — assigning 10-11 January 2025 to the Inter-Governmental SUB-Committee and putting the last full IGC back in January 2024. THREE OTHER GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SOURCES SAY THE OPPOSITE. PIB Release 2092280 is headed 'India-Nepal Inter-Governmental COMMITTEE meeting on trade transit and cooperation to combat unauthorised trade concludes in Kathmandu' and covers 10-11 January 2025. PIB's 2025 Year End Review states 'The lnter-Governmental Committee (lGC) meeting on Trade, Transit and Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade, between lndia and Nepal was held on 10th - 11th January 2025 in Kathmandu, Nepal.' The Embassy's own press release of 12 January 2025 describes the 10-11 January 2025 meeting as the IGC, led on the Indian side by Commerce Secretary Sunil Barthwal and on the Nepali side by Secretary Gobinda Bahadur Karkee.[1][7][8]

No new agreement is under negotiation

NO SOURCE FETCHED ON EITHER SIDE ANNOUNCES, PROPOSES OR SCHEDULES A BILATERAL INDIA-NEPAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. The Department of Commerce's March 2026 FTA stocktake omits Nepal entirely. Nepal's Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies bilateral-treaty category lists a 'Treaty of Transit between GoN and GoI' but no trade-agreement negotiation with India. What both sides describe instead is REVIEW of the two existing treaties and INCREMENTAL amendment of protocols.[4]

Primary official sources for the treaty position: [1][10][2][4][7][11][8][12][6][13][14][15][16][17][3][18][19][5][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][9][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42]

Trade flows

The Indian series — Indian Financial Year, April to March, in US dollars

Series owner: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India — named as the source on the page that carries the table. The publishing vehicle is the Embassy of India, Kathmandu.[1]

Series publisher: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief (HTML page, not a statistical release)[1]

Year definition as printed: 'Indian Financial Year (April to March)'. Unit as printed: 'Figures in US$ million'. Source line as printed: '[Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Govt of India]'[1]

Table heading as printed: 'India-Nepal merchandise trade statistics over the past few years are given below.' Page stamp as printed: 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'[1]

Provisional marker: NONE. No asterisk, no 'P', no 'provisional' and no 'as on' qualifier appears against the 2025-26 column or any other column. The only date on the page is the last-updated stamp.[1]

Values are reproduced exactly as printed, including the source’s own inconsistent use of thousands separators: Printed as 7447.12 in the 2025-26 column of the row 'EXPORT from INDIA to NEPAL'. Note the table's own typography is inconsistent: the 2021-22 and 2022-23 columns use thousands separators ('9,645.74') and the 2023-24 through 2025-26 columns do not ('7040.98'). The values are unaffected.[1]

Nepal’s side of the same table: Printed as 1941.87 in the 2025-26 column of the row 'EXPORT from NEPAL to INDIA'. THIS IS THE HIGHEST VALUE IN THE FIVE-YEAR TABLE FOR THIS DIRECTION, above the 1,371.04 of 2021-22, and more than double the 831.11 low of 2023-24.[1]

The printed total does not equal the printed components

The registry performs one arithmetic check on this table and records it as a check, not as a correction. The printed total is left standing; nothing is adjusted.

India’s surplus on the Indian series is derived. Here is the derivation.

The Indian series shows a corridor that shrank hard and is now recovering asymmetrically. Total trade fell from 11,016.79 in 2021-22 to 7872.09 in 2023-24 — a fall of about 29 per cent over two years — then rose to 8674.82 in 2024-25 and 9388.98 in 2025-26, still below the 2021-22 peak. India's exports have barely moved off their floor (7040.98 to 7447.12 over two years) while Nepal's exports to India have more than doubled from 831.11 to 1941.87 over the same two years.[1]

The Nepali series — Nepali fiscal year, mid-July to mid-July, in Nepalese rupees

Series owner: Nepal Rastra Bank — the central bank of Nepal, a government institution[5]

Series publisher: Nepal Rastra Bank, Annual Report 2024/25 (English edition)[5]

Year definition: Nepali fiscal year 2024/25, samvat 2081/82, running MID-JULY 2024 TO MID-JULY 2025. The report states the fiscal year runs mid-July to mid-July.. Unit: Nepalese rupees (Rs.), billions, as printed[5]

Exports: Printed in this sentence: 'exports to India surged by 117.8 percent to Rs.224.68 billion in 2024/25 compared to a 3.3 percent decline in the previous year'. A 117.8 PER CENT RISE IN ONE YEAR IS THE LOUDEST NUMBER IN THIS FILE. The Nepali-language annual release for the same year carries the same 117.8 per cent figure.[5][23]

Imports: Printed in this sentence: 'Imports from India increased by 7.5 percent to Rs.1071.20 billion in 2024/25, compared to a 3.0 percent decline in the previous year'. The Nepali-language annual release carries the same 7.5 per cent figure.[5][23]

Every Nepali aggregate and share below is derived. Here are the derivations.

• Total trade with India[5]

  Operation: exports to India + imports from India. Parents: Nepal’s exports to India = 224.68; Nepal’s imports from India = 1071.20. Arithmetic: 224.68 + 1071.20 = 1295.88. Unit: Rs. billion

  DERIVED. Nepal Rastra Bank does not print a bilateral total in the passages fetched.

• Nepal’s deficit with India[5]

  Operation: imports from India minus exports to India. Parents: 1071.20; 224.68. Arithmetic: 1071.20 - 224.68 = 846.52. Unit: Rs. billion

  DERIVED. Nepal's bilateral deficit with India is 846.52 Rs. billion, which is 55.4 per cent of Nepal's TOTAL trade deficit with the world of 1527.09 Rs. billion (846.52 / 1527.09 = 0.554). MORE THAN HALF OF NEPAL'S ENTIRE TRADE DEFICIT IS WITH ONE COUNTRY.

• India’s share of Nepal’s merchandise exports[5]

  Operation: exports to India divided by total merchandise exports. Parents: 224.68; 277.03. Arithmetic: 224.68 / 277.03 = 0.8110. Value: 81.1%

  DERIVED. FOUR OF EVERY FIVE RUPEES NEPAL EARNS FROM MERCHANDISE EXPORTS COMES FROM INDIA. No fetched source prints this share.

• India’s share of Nepal’s merchandise imports[5]

  Operation: imports from India divided by total merchandise imports. Parents: 1071.20; 1804.12. Arithmetic: 1071.20 / 1804.12 = 0.5937. Value: 59.4%

  DERIVED. India supplies close to three fifths of everything Nepal imports.

Nepal’s own totals with the world, in the same year and the same unit

Deficit: Stated as increasing 6.0 per cent and equal to 25.0 per cent of GDP. NEPAL'S TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE WORLD IS A QUARTER OF ITS ECONOMY.[5]

TWO NEPAL RASTRA BANK PRODUCTS IN TWO LANGUAGES AGREE ON THE GROWTH RATES. The Nepali release is typeset in a legacy Devanagari font encoding and extracted only partially; the growth rates and the convertible-currency figure came through cleanly, the absolute India levels did not.[23][5]

The Nepali year that has closed, and the eleven months that are all there is

Period as printed: Eleven months of 2025/26, ending mid-June 2026. Publisher: Nepal Rastra Bank, Economic Research Department — 'Current Macroeconomic and Financial Situation' (English), based on eleven months' data of 2025/26, published 13 July 2026[20]

Convertible currency: 'merchandise imports from India against payment in convertible foreign currency amounted Rs.180.10 billion', against Rs.167.30 billion in the same period of the previous year. THIS IS A MECHANICS FACT AS MUCH AS A TRADE FACT — see mechanics: not all India-Nepal trade settles in rupees.[20]

THE INDIA EXPORT GROWTH RATE INSIDE FY 2082/83 SWUNG VIOLENTLY AND THE OFFICIAL RELEASES RECORD THE SWING WITHOUT COMMENT. Four months (to mid-November 2025): 'exports to India and other countries increased 113.9 percent and 2.9 percent respectively'. Eight months (to mid-March 2026): 'exports to India and other countries increased 25.3 percent and 7.8 percent respectively'. Eleven months (to mid-June 2026): 13.6 per cent. The year-on-year growth rate of Nepal's exports to India fell from 113.9 to 25.3 to 13.6 as the year progressed.[22][21][20]

Imports from India grew far slower than imports from everywhere else through FY 2082/83. Four months: 'imports from India, China, and other countries increased 6.6 percent, 28.5 percent, and 48.9 percent respectively'. Eight months: '5.1 percent, 21.2 percent, and 26.0 percent respectively'. Eleven months: India 11.8 per cent.[21][22][20]

The two series are not reconciled, and no attempt is made

THE TWO SERIES CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH ANYTHING IN THIS FILE, AND NO ATTEMPT IS MADE. Consider the single flow 'Nepal's goods entering India'. The Indian series values it at 1288.83 US$ million for April 2024-March 2025 and 1941.87 US$ million for April 2025-March 2026. The Nepali series values it at Rs. 224.68 billion for mid-July 2024-mid-July 2025. These are three different periods measured in two different currencies by two different institutions with unstated valuation bases. NO EXCHANGE RATE FOR ANY OF THESE PERIODS WAS FETCHED IN THIS SESSION, so no conversion is offered. A reader who wants a single number for this corridor must pick one series and stay inside it.[1][5]

Top goods, each direction

Not one commodity-level bilateral trade value was obtained from either government, in either direction, for any year. Every list below is names only. Two are the Indian mission’s, two are Nepal Rastra Bank’s and describe goods that grew rather than goods that are largest, and two are node-level lists published by the Land Ports Authority of India for a single physical crossing each.

• India’s exports to Nepal — period Not stated. The page gives no year for the commodity list.[1]

  India's main exports to Nepal are 'petroleum, iron & steel, automobiles, machinery, cereals, etc.'

  NAMES ONLY, NO VALUES, NO YEAR, AND THE LIST ENDS IN 'etc.' — THE SOURCE ITSELF DECLINES TO CLOSE THE LIST. This cannot be ranked, shared or summed. It is recorded because it is the Government of India's own published characterisation of what it sells Nepal, and for no stronger purpose.

• Nepal’s exports to India — period Not stated.[1]

  Nepal's exports to India are 'cardamom, rolled iron sheets, edible oil, juices, plywood and jute'

  NAMES ONLY, NO VALUES, NO YEAR. Note this list is closed — it does not end in 'etc.' — unlike the Indian export list.

• Nepal’s exports to India that grew — Nepali fiscal year 2024/25 = 2081/82 = mid-July 2024 to mid-July 2025[5]

  'Notably, the exports of commodities such as soyabean oil, polyster yarn, jute goods, and tea increased to India during the review period.' [spellings as printed]

  THIS IS THE ONLY COMMODITY LIST IN THIS FILE THAT IS TIED TO A NAMED FISCAL YEAR AND TO THE 117.8 PER CENT EXPORT SURGE. STILL NO VALUES. The verb is 'increased', not 'were the largest' — these are the goods that GREW, which is not the same as the goods that are BIGGEST, and the source does not claim otherwise. Soyabean oil appearing at the top of a list of what grew, in a year Nepal's exports to India more than doubled, is the most suggestive fact available — but NO OFFICIAL SOURCE FETCHED ATTRIBUTES THE SURGE TO ANY COMMODITY, and this file does not either.

• Nepal’s imports from India that grew — Nepali fiscal year 2024/25 = 2081/82[5]

  'The imports of vehicles and spare parts, sponge iron, other machinery and parts, paddy and rice, and medicine is increased from India.' [grammar as printed]

  Again goods that GREW, not goods that are largest. Note what is ABSENT from the central bank's list but first on the Embassy's: PETROLEUM. Nepal imports all its petroleum from India, partly through a dedicated cross-border pipeline described in mechanics, and the central bank's list of growing imports does not include it.

• Commodity mix at one crossing — Jogbani and Biratnagar[35]

  Exports as printed: Iron and Steel; Petroleum Products; Food Grains; Machinery and Parts; Vehicles. Imports as printed: PP Woven Fabrics; Mustard Oil Cake; Refined Oil (Soyabean); Jute Sacking Bag.

  Series owner: Land Ports Authority of India. Period: Not stated; the page's trade table runs 2017-18 to 2025-26

  THE ONLY COMMODITY LIST IN THIS FILE ATTACHED TO A SPECIFIC PHYSICAL CROSSING. 'Refined Oil (Soyabean)' and 'Jute Sacking Bag' on the import side corroborate the central bank's soyabean-oil and jute-goods entries from a completely independent institution. Still no values.

• Commodity mix at one crossing — Rupaidiha[36]

  Exports as printed: Soyabean; Chicken Feed; Vegetables; Red Chilies; Plastic Dana; Plastic Yarn. Imports as printed: Dry Fruits; Dry Dates; Gypsum; Cement; Glass; Rock salt; Herbs.

  Series owner: Land Ports Authority of India. Period: Not stated; the page's trade table covers 2024-25 and 2025-26 only

  RECORDED AS PRINTED, WITH A FLAG. Several of the listed 'imports' — dry dates, gypsum, rock salt — are not goods Nepal is known to produce, and the page does not say whether 'import' means into India from Nepal, or third-country goods moving under transit. THE PAGE DOES NOT DEFINE ITS DIRECTION LABELS. Do not read this row as bilateral origin data.

Mechanics and open issues

In a corridor where one side charges no tariff at all, the operative mechanics are quarantine orders, anti-dumping duties, a currency peg, an exchange-control regime with a large convertible-currency carve-out, and a discretionary wheat channel. They are reproduced as the sources print them, including a denomination rule the registry flags as undated and unverified for present-day application.

• The market-access rule — unilateral, not reciprocal[1]

  'The Trade Treaty allows Nepal unilateral duty-free access to the Indian market.' That single sentence is the whole preference architecture of the corridor as stated by the Government of India. Nepal's goods enter India duty-free by treaty; nothing in the fetched sources describes a reciprocal Nepali obligation to admit Indian goods duty-free.

  THE ASYMMETRY IS THE DESIGN, NOT A DEFECT. It also means the corridor's large Indian surplus cannot be explained by Indian tariffs on Nepali goods — there are none to explain it with. NO FETCHED SOURCE STATES THE CONDITIONS, RULES OF ORIGIN, QUANTITY CEILINGS OR EXCLUSIONS ATTACHED TO THIS DUTY-FREE ACCESS.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

• SAFTA — the plurilateral floor underneath the bilateral treaty[3]

  Both governments are parties to the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area. Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states SAFTA was signed at 'Islamabad, 6 January 2004' and 'entered into force in January 2006'. India's DGFT lists SAFTA in Appendix 2A as 'Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) (India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan Maldives and Afghanistan) | 04.01.2004 | 01.01.2006'. Its predecessor, SAPTA, is listed by DGFT in the PTA table as '(India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives) | 1993 | 1995'.

  DATE CONFLICT ON THE SIGNATURE: Nepal's MoFA says 6 January 2004, India's DGFT says 04.01.2004. Both agree on entry into force in January 2006 (DGFT: 01.01.2006). RECORDED AS A CONFLICT, NOT RESOLVED. Also note SAFTA is largely redundant for Nepal-into-India flows, since the bilateral Treaty of Trade already gives unilateral duty-free access — SAFTA's operational bite in this corridor appears mainly in origin documentation, on which see the next entry.

  Source organisation: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs — 'Nepal and SAARC'; and Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Government of India — Appendix 2A at https://content.dgft.gov.in/Website/dgftprod/086fdd70-626b-4aab-8acc-9052f8bc043f/Updated%20Appendix%202A.pdf

• SAFTA certificates of origin — the live administrative workstream[7]

  The India-Nepal Inter-Governmental Committee of 10-11 January 2025 established a Joint Working Group to discuss acceptance of the Online Certificate of Origin with Nepal, under the SAFTA framework.

  THIS IS WHERE SAFTA ACTUALLY TOUCHES THE CORRIDOR: paperwork. A Joint Working Group on online certificates of origin is the concrete SAFTA deliverable named in the most recent IGC readout. NO OUTCOME OF THAT JOINT WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2092280

• India's LDC duty-free scheme does not cover Nepal[18]

  India's Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for Least Developed Countries names its beneficiaries explicitly. The Department of Commerce brief states 'As of October, 2017; 34 LDCs have been notified as beneficiaries to the scheme' and NEPAL IS NOT AMONG THEM, although Nepal is a least developed country. The scheme itself provides 'duty free/preferential market access on about 98.2% of India's tariff lines' and 'market access on 95.5% of the lines on which LDCs have made to exports to India over the last two financial years'. A second Department of Commerce page, fetched separately, describes the same scheme and its '35 beneficiary LDCs as of June 2023' — and likewise does not name Nepal.

  CONSISTENT WITH THE BILATERAL TREATY BEING MORE GENEROUS: an LDC that already has unilateral duty-free access under a bilateral treaty has nothing to gain from a 98.2 per cent scheme. THIS IS AN INFERENCE AND IS LABELLED AS ONE — no fetched source explains Nepal's absence from the list. CAUTION ON VINTAGE: the enumerated list fetched states its beneficiary count 'As of October, 2017'; the second page gives a count of 35 as of June 2023 but does not enumerate the members. NEITHER NAMES NEPAL. A current, enumerated DFTP beneficiary list was NOT obtained; see Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Department of Commerce — brief on the DFTP Scheme for LDCs; second page: Government of India, Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov.in/17182-2/ (DFTP scheme page, 35 beneficiary LDCs as of June 2023)

• Land border regime — the corridor is overwhelmingly a land corridor[1]

  Every trade and transit mechanism described by either government in the sources fetched is a land mechanism: integrated check posts, road crossings, rail links and a buried pipeline. No maritime bilateral route exists — Nepal is landlocked, and the only sea access described is transit THROUGH India: 'Transit of goods related to Nepal's trade with other countries, is routed through the ports of Kolkata/Haldia and Vishakapatnam.'

  THE DISTINCTION THAT MATTERS: Kolkata/Haldia and Visakhapatnam serve NEPAL'S THIRD-COUNTRY TRADE under the Treaty of Transit. They are not bilateral India-Nepal nodes. Bilateral goods cross by land at the check posts.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

• What the 2023 Treaty of Transit grants[1]

  'the revised Treaty of Transit signed in June 2023 allows Nepal's merchandise to move seamlessly through India's road, railway, inland waterways and ports networks.' On the day of signature India's Prime Minister described the outcome as 'a Transit Agreement has been concluded' providing 'new rail routes for the people of Nepal' and access to 'India's inland waterways'.

  INLAND WATERWAYS ARE THE NEW LIMB. Road, rail and ports pre-existed; the 2023 revision is described by both the Embassy and the Prime Minister as adding inland waterways. NO FETCHED SOURCE NAMES A SINGLE OPERATING INLAND-WATERWAY ROUTE, TERMINAL OR CARGO VOLUME FOR NEPAL.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'; corroborated by Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 1929243, press statement of the Prime Minister of India, 1 June 2023

• Axle-weight harmonisation on the transit route to Bangladesh[7]

  The IGC of 10-11 January 2025 harmonised maximum axle weights for Nepali vehicles at '18.5 tonnes for two axle vehicles and 28 tonnes for three axle vehicles' on the Kakarbhitta-Banglabandha route via India.

  A REMINDER THAT TRANSIT HERE IS NOT ONLY TO THE SEA. The Kakarbhitta-Banglabandha-Phulbari corridor moves Nepali goods overland to Bangladesh across a narrow strip of Indian territory, and its binding constraint is a lorry axle limit negotiated between governments.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2092280

• Rail Services Agreement — freight liberalised in 2021 by Letter of Exchange[9]

  A Letter of Exchange of 9 July 2021 amended the India-Nepal Rail Services Agreement 2004 so that 'All kinds of cargoes in all categories of wagons that can carry freight on Indian Railways network within India can also carry freight to and from Nepal.' It admits 'public and private container trains Operators, automobile freight train operators, special freight train operators or any other operator authorized by Indian Railways'.

  THE PATTERN OF THIS CORRIDOR: substantive liberalisation arrives by Letter of Exchange amending a protocol or a services agreement, not by renegotiating a treaty. The same device was used again on 13 November 2025.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 1734254, 9 July 2021

• Payment regime — rupee settlement is the default, convertible currency the exception[25]

  The Reserve Bank of India's exchange-control supplement for Nepal and Bhutan states: 'Rupee transfers from accounts in India of Indians, Nepalese and Bhutanese resident in Nepal and Bhutan...against exports to these countries from India...can be made freely without reference to Reserve Bank.' But 'Payments from other persons in or resident in Nepal and Bhutan...should be made in convertible foreign currency.' On freight: 'Where shipment is made by an Indian or Nepalese/Bhutanese carrier, freight may be freely paid in rupees. Where, however, other carriers are used, freight is permitted to be collected only in convertible foreign currency.' And a hard prohibition: 'Payments from India to suppliers in third countries against import of goods into Nepal/Bhutan are not permitted.'

  THE CONVERTIBLE-CURRENCY CARVE-OUT IS NOT THEORETICAL AND IT IS LARGE. Nepal Rastra Bank reports that in the eleven months of 2025/26 'merchandise imports from India against payment in convertible foreign currency amounted Rs.180.10 billion', against Rs.167.30 billion a year earlier — and the full previous fiscal year figure was Rs. 181.15 billion. Roughly a sixth of Nepal's imports from India are settled in hard currency, not rupees. NO FETCHED SOURCE EXPLAINS WHICH GOODS FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY.

  Source organisation: Reserve Bank of India — 'Exchange Control Regulations Applicable to Nepal and Bhutan' (supplement)

• Indian currency notes physically carried to Nepal — the denomination rule[25]

  'Any person may take or send to Nepal, Indian currency notes other than notes of denominations of above Rs.100/- and Indian coins without limit.'

  AS PRINTED IN THE DOCUMENT FETCHED. This restricts high-denomination Indian notes in Nepal while leaving small notes and coins unrestricted. CAUTION: this supplement is undated on its face and India's note denominations have changed since the rule was framed; a currently-dated FEMA notification restating the limit was NOT obtained — see Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Reserve Bank of India — exchange control supplement for Nepal and Bhutan

• The exchange-rate peg[24]

  'The pegged exchange rate of the Nepali Rupee vis-a-vis the Indian Rupee as a nominal anchor of the monetary policy has been kept unchanged as an intermediate target.'

  NEPAL'S MONETARY POLICY IS ANCHORED TO ITS LARGEST TRADING PARTNER'S CURRENCY. This is the deepest mechanism in the corridor and it is stated by Nepal's own central bank as a live policy setting for the current fiscal year. THE PEG RATIO ITSELF IS NOT STATED IN THE PASSAGE FETCHED — see Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Nepal Rastra Bank — Monetary Policy for 2082/83 (English), Central Office, Baluwatar, Kathmandu, August 2025

• Retail and person-to-person payment rails[26]

  Two distinct rails are described. (a) The Indo-Nepal Remittance Facility Scheme: the Reserve Bank of India raised the ceiling per transaction 'from Rs.50,000 to Rs.2 lakh' and removed the 'cap of 12 remittances in a year per remitter', effective 1 October 2021, under RBI/2021-22/94 dated 27 August 2021; cash walk-in customers remain at Rs.50,000 and 12 remittances. (b) A 'Peer-to-Peer (P2P) linkage between Unified Payments Interface (UPI) of India and National Payments Interface (NPI) of Nepal for facilitating cross-border personal remittances between the two countries', launched by the two ministers. The Press Information Bureau separately states 'UPI is now live in 8 countries including the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, France, Mauritius and Qatar.'

  BOTH RAILS ARE EXPLICITLY PERSONAL/REMITTANCE RAILS, NOT TRADE SETTLEMENT RAILS. The RBI notification does say the scheme 'boosts trade payments', but its stated design purpose is person-to-person transfer. NO FETCHED SOURCE DESCRIBES AN INR-DENOMINATED TRADE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM, A VOSTRO ARRANGEMENT OR A LOCAL CURRENCY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR INDIA-NEPAL MERCHANDISE TRADE.

  Source organisation: Reserve Bank of India — 'Enhancements to Indo-Nepal Remittance Facility Scheme', CO.DPSS.RPPD.No.S475/04.09.003/2021-22, 27 August 2021; Embassy of India, Kathmandu Commerce Wing Brief for the UPI-NPI linkage; Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Press Note 157684, 6 March 2026 for the eight-country UPI list

• Non-tariff friction is the live bilateral complaint, not tariffs[6]

  Nepal's Prime Minister, standing beside India's, asked on 1 June 2023 'for non-reciprocal market access to India with more flexible and easy quarantine procedures', for the lifting of anti-dumping duties on Nepali jute, and for improved quarantine procedures for agricultural exports. The IGC of January 2025 worked the same seam from the other end: India agreed to include Sal Seeds and Chayote in India's Plant Quarantine Order and to admit processed plant items including Jatamasi root extract, Sugandhkokila berry extracts, Sugandhwal Rhizome extract and Timur berry extracts; Nepal agreed to 'consider the request of the Indian side positively for milk products' such as whey and cheese.

  IN A CORRIDOR WITH NO TARIFF ON ONE SIDE, THE BINDING CONSTRAINTS ARE PLANT QUARANTINE ORDERS AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES. Note that Nepal asked for anti-dumping duties on jute to be LIFTED and no fetched source records that they were.

  Source organisation: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs — statement by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda', New Delhi, 1 June 2023; and Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2092280 for the January 2025 IGC outcomes

• Wheat — a discretionary supply channel outside the tariff regime[7]

  At the IGC of 10-11 January 2025 'Nepal's request for 200,000 MT wheat supply was accepted' by India. PIB's 2025 Year End Review records that 'Export permissions were issued for wheat to Nepal'.

  STAPLE FOOD MOVES BY POLITICAL DECISION, NOT BY TREATY RIGHT. India restricts wheat exports generally; Nepal's access is a case-by-case permission. NOTE THE FOLLOW-ON: India's Government approved export of 25 lakh metric tonnes of wheat and 5 lakh metric tonnes of wheat products on 13 February 2026 — and that release does not mention Nepal anywhere. See developments and Not yet verified.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2092280; and Release ID 2201284, '2025 Year End Review for Department of Commerce', 10 December 2025

• Unauthorised trade control as a standing treaty object[1]

  The bilateral committee servicing this corridor is formally the Inter-Governmental Committee on Trade, Transit and Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade, and a separate 'Agreement of Co-operation to Control Unauthorized Trade - 2009' stands beside the Treaty of Trade, renewed automatically with it in October 2023.

  NO FETCHED SOURCE GIVES A SINGLE ENFORCEMENT STATISTIC, SEIZURE FIGURE OR ESTIMATE OF THE SCALE OF UNAUTHORISED TRADE. A treaty object with no published measurement.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

Logistics

Every mechanism either government describes is a land mechanism: integrated check posts, road crossings, rail links, a buried petroleum pipeline and fifteen electrical interconnections. Nepal is landlocked and its only sea access is transit through India, under the Treaty of Transit, to two port clusters.

• Raxaul (India) / Birgunj (Nepal) — THE PRINCIPAL CROSSING[34]

  Land Ports Authority of India trade table excluded — see the exclusion above

  THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S OWN WORDS RANK THIS CROSSING FIRST, FOR BOTH BILATERAL AND THIRD-COUNTRY TRADE. BUT THE LPAI TRADE TABLE ON THIS PAGE IS DEFECTIVE AND MUST NOT BE USED AS A TIME SERIES — see Not yet verified for the specific malformed cells. On the Nepal side the counterpart facility is the ICP at Birgunj, operational since 2018.

  Source organisation: Land Ports Authority of India — statutory authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. GOVERNMENT SOURCE.

• Jogbani (India) / Biratnagar (Nepal)[35]

  Land Ports Authority of India trade table excluded — see the exclusion above

  THE 2022-23 CELL, Rs. 877.41 CRORES, IS AN OUTLIER OF AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE against Rs. 10,423.00 the year before and Rs. 7,850.04 the year after, and the cargo count for that year also halves. TREAT 2022-23 AS SUSPECT. The 2025-26 figure of Rs. 11,833.08 crores is the highest in the table. Note the Nepali town is spelt 'Biratgunj' on this page and 'Biratnagar' elsewhere in Government of India material.

  Source organisation: Land Ports Authority of India — statutory authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. GOVERNMENT SOURCE.

• Rupaidiha (India), Bahraich district, Uttar Pradesh[36]

  Land Ports Authority of India trade table excluded — see the exclusion above

  THE PASSENGER NUMBERS DWARF THE OTHER CROSSINGS — 376,696 in 2025-26 against 3,789 at Raxaul and 443 at Jogbani. THE PAGE DOES NOT SAY WHY, and the counts are plainly measuring different populations (Raxaul and Jogbani explicitly count FOREIGN passengers only). Note also that trade value FELL slightly year on year while cargo movements rose 23 per cent — unexplained in the source. THE PAGE DOES NOT NAME THE NEPAL COUNTERPART TOWN.

  Source organisation: Land Ports Authority of India — statutory authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. GOVERNMENT SOURCE.

• Sonauli (India), Maharajganj district, Uttar Pradesh — NOT BUILT[37]

  'The Land Port is spread over a total area of 115.5 acres.' It sits 'along the international border between India and Nepal' and 'in close proximity to popular Buddhist tourist Centre such as Lumbini i.e birthplace of Gautam Buddha in Nepal'. As of the status statement on the page, dated September 2021, an architectural consultant had been appointed and construction was pending completion of land acquisition. NO TRADE, CARGO OR PASSENGER STATISTICS APPEAR ON THIS PAGE.

  A LIVE PROBLEM. The Sunauli crossing is one of the three transit corridors named in the November 2025 Letter of Exchange — 'Kolkata-Nautanwa (Sunauli)' and 'Visakhapatnam-Nautanwa (Sunauli)' — yet the Indian Integrated Check Post there is, on LPAI's own page, still at the land-acquisition stage with a status note nearly five years old. FREIGHT CORRIDORS WERE LIBERALISED THROUGH A NODE WHOSE CHECK POST DOES NOT YET EXIST.

  Source organisation: Land Ports Authority of India — statutory authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. GOVERNMENT SOURCE.

• Banbasa (India), Champawat district, Uttarakhand — NOT BUILT[38]

  '84 acres of land for development of Land Port Banbasa' have been identified; as of September 2021 'the process for land acquisition has been initiated by LPAI'. It lies proximate to Asian Highway 2. The Nepal counterpart is Mahendranagar in Sudurpashchim Pradesh, where Nepal has 'selected mirror image location for development of land-port'. The crossing 'is predominantly used by the international travellers for entering into Nepal'. A Detailed Project Report has been completed by LPAI. NO TRADE, CARGO OR PASSENGER STATISTICS APPEAR.

  PASSENGER CROSSING, NOT A FREIGHT NODE, ON LPAI'S OWN DESCRIPTION. Status note is dated September 2021.

  Source organisation: Land Ports Authority of India — statutory authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. GOVERNMENT SOURCE.

• Integrated Check Posts on the NEPAL side — India-funded[10]

  An MoU was signed in 2005 for 'development of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) along the Indo-Nepal Border in Nepal'; four are under construction with Indian grant assistance. Three are operational: Birgunj (2018), Biratnagar (2020) and Nepalgunj (2024). The two Prime Ministers virtually inaugurated the Nepalgunj ICP and performed the groundbreaking for the Bhairahawa ICP in June 2023. An additional MoU for the ICP at Dodhara Chandani was signed in 2023 and preparatory work has commenced. The Embassy's current brief states: 'Integrated Check Posts at Birgunj, Nepalgunj and Biratnagar are fully functional. An ICP in Bhairahawa (Nepal) are under construction while preparatory work for the construction of the ICP in Dodhara Chandani in Nepal is underway.'

  THE CHECK POSTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS BORDER ARE INDIAN-FUNDED. That is an unusual feature and it is stated plainly by the funder. Bhairahawa is the Nepali side of the Sunauli crossing — so at that crossing the NEPALI facility is under construction while the INDIAN one is still acquiring land.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal'; corroborated by Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

• Cross-border rail — Jaynagar to Bardibas[10]

  An MoU for 'development of railway infrastructure at five border points' was signed in 2010. The Jaynagar-Kurtha cross-border section became operational in April 2022 after joint inauguration by the two Prime Ministers. In July 2023 the extension to Bijalpura was completed; work from Bijalpura to Bardibas is ongoing.

  A PASSENGER-ORIENTED LINE IN THE SOURCES FETCHED — no freight role is described for Jaynagar-Kurtha-Bijalpura.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal'

• Cross-border rail freight — the two working freight routes[1]

  'At present, there are two rail freight routes from India to Nepal viz. the Raxaul - Birgunj ICD line and the Jogbani- Nepal Customs Yard.' The Jogbani-Biratnagar cross-border section, from Bathnaha to the Nepal Customs Yard, was jointly inaugurated for freight operations in June 2023; it was constructed with Indian government grant assistance and enables transport from Kolkata and Visakhapatnam ports to the Nepal Customs Yard cargo station in Morang District.

  TWO FREIGHT RAIL ROUTES FOR THE WHOLE CORRIDOR, BOTH ENDING AT CUSTOMS YARDS RATHER THAN PENETRATING NEPAL. Neither reaches Kathmandu.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'; corroborated by Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal' and by Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2189629, 13 November 2025

• Raxaul-Kathmandu railway — proposed only[10]

  'Final Location Survey Report of the new Raxaul-Kathmandu railway link is also being discussed by both countries.'

  STILL AT SURVEY-REPORT DISCUSSION STAGE. NO ALIGNMENT, COST, GAUGE, FUNDING DECISION OR DATE IS STATED IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED. This is the project that would put rail freight into the Kathmandu valley and it does not exist.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal'

• Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline (MAPL) — the only cross-border pipeline[1]

  'The Raxaul-Amlekhgunj cross-border petroleum pipeline project is a 41-kilometer pipeline for transportig petroleum products from India to Nepal.' [typo as printed]. It was inaugurated in September 2019 and is described by the Embassy's development-partnership brief as commissioned in 2019 and 'the first cross-border petroleum product pipeline in South Asia region'. A Phase-II extension, Motihari-Amlekhgunj, is described as completed and in commercial operation.

  NOTE THE NAMING INCONSISTENCY WITHIN ONE GOVERNMENT: the Embassy's commerce brief calls it the 'Raxaul-Amlekhgunj' pipeline; the same Embassy's development brief and the Prime Minister's 2023 statement call it 'Motihari-Amlekhganj'. Raxaul and Motihari are both in East Champaran district, Bihar. NO THROUGHPUT, CAPACITY OR TONNAGE FIGURE FOR THIS PIPELINE APPEARS IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'; corroborated by Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal'

• Pipeline expansion agreed 1 June 2023 — Siliguri-Jhapa and Amlekhgunj-Chitwan[12]

  India's Prime Minister on 1 June 2023: the existing Motihari-Amlekhganj pipeline will extend to Chitwan, and a new pipeline from Siliguri to Jhapa is planned for eastern Nepal, with storage terminals at both locations. The Embassy's development brief records an MoU signed 1 June 2023 covering the new Siliguri-Jhapa line and the Amlekhgunj-Chitwan extension plus two greenfield terminals, with the Phase-II foundation stone laid the same day.

  THREE YEARS AND TWO AND A HALF MONTHS AFTER THE MoU, NO SOURCE FETCHED REPORTS THE SILIGURI-JHAPA PIPELINE OR THE AMLEKHGUNJ-CHITWAN EXTENSION AS COMPLETE, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, OR ON ANY SCHEDULE. The Embassy brief says only that 'Phase-II Motihari-Amlekhgunj Pipeline extension completed'.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 1929243 — press statement by the Prime Minister of India, 1 June 2023; corroborated by Embassy of India, Kathmandu — 'Brief on Development Partnership with Nepal'

• Sea access for Nepal's third-country trade[1]

  'Transit of goods related to Nepal's trade with other countries, is routed through the ports of Kolkata/Haldia and Vishakapatnam.' The November 2025 Letter of Exchange names the corridors: 'Kolkata-Jogbani, Kolkata-Nautanwa (Sunauli), and Visakhapatnam-Nautanwa (Sunauli)'.

  TWO PORT CLUSTERS SERVE A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY OF THIRTY MILLION. NO TRANSIT VOLUME, TRANSIT TIME, DWELL TIME OR COST FIGURE FOR NEPAL'S THIRD-COUNTRY CARGO APPEARS IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'; corridors from Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2201284, 10 December 2025

• Electricity interconnection — the physical grid links[28]

  The Ministry of Power's April 2026 statement to Parliament details fifteen transmission links between India and Nepal ranging from 132 kV to 400 kV, naming among them Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar (400 kV), Tanakpur-Mahendranagar (132 kV) and Gorakhpur-New Butwal (400 kV). Two further 400 kV double-circuit quad-moose links are being built through joint ventures agreed 29 October 2025: Inaruwa (Nepal)-New Purnea (India) and Lamki (Dododhara) (Nepal)-Bareilly (India).

  ELECTRICITY IS TRADE AND IT MOVES ON DEDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE THAT IS DENSER THAN THE RAIL NETWORK: FIFTEEN CROSS-BORDER ELECTRICAL LINKS AGAINST TWO FREIGHT RAIL ROUTES.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2248339, 'COOPERATION WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN POWER SECTOR', 2 April 2026; and Release ID 2183654, 29 October 2025

Developments 2023–26

• 1 June 2023

  Revised Treaty of Transit signed and exchanged; long-term Power Trade Agreement signed; pipeline and ICP package announced[12]

  India's Prime Minister: 'a Transit Agreement has been concluded' giving 'new rail routes for the people of Nepal' and access to 'India's inland waterways'; a 'long term Power Trade Agreement has been signed' with a target of 'importing 10,000 MW of electricity from Nepal in the coming ten years'; the Motihari-Amlekhganj pipeline to extend to Chitwan and a new Siliguri-Jhapa pipeline for eastern Nepal with storage terminals at both; three new Integrated Check Posts to be constructed. Nepal's Prime Minister the same day: 'The revised Treaty of Transit was signed and exchanged today'; 'Under this agreement, India will import 10,000 MW of power from Nepal in the next 10 years'; he appreciated India's existing 452 MW import and requested approval for a further 1,200 MW including Upper Tamakoshi (456 MW); and noted 'export of upto 50 MW of power from Nepal to Bangladesh via India would commence soon'.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 1929243; and Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://mofa.gov.np/content/112/joint-press-meet-between-the-prime-ministers/

• 3 October 2024

  Tripartite power sales agreement signed in Kathmandu for Nepal-Bangladesh electricity through the Indian grid[30]

  The agreement was signed between NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam, the Nepal Electricity Authority and the Bangladesh Power Development Board.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2073606

• 15 November 2024

  First trilateral power transaction inaugurated — Nepal to Bangladesh through the Indian grid[30]

  Described as 'the first trilateral power transaction which has been carried out through the Indian grid', covering 'export of upto 40 MW of power' from Nepal to Bangladesh across India. NO TARIFF WAS DISCLOSED in the release.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2073606

• 10 January 2025

  India-Nepal Inter-Governmental Committee meets in Kathmandu; Treaty of Trade and Treaty of Transit reviews on the agenda[7]

  Indian delegation led by Commerce Secretary Sunil Barthwal; Nepal led by Gobinda Bahadur Karkee, Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies. Outcomes: Nepal's request for 200,000 MT of wheat accepted; Sal Seeds and Chayote to be included in India's Plant Quarantine Order; processed plant items admitted including Jatamasi root extract, Sugandhkokila berry extracts, Sugandhwal Rhizome extract and Timur berry extracts; Nepal to 'consider the request of the Indian side positively for milk products' such as whey and cheese; axle weights harmonised at '18.5 tonnes for two axle vehicles and 28 tonnes for three axle vehicles' on the Kakarbhitta-Banglabandha route; a Joint Working Group formed on Online Certificate of Origin under SAFTA; and 'discussions on review of the Treaty of Transit and the Treaty of Trade, proposed amendments to existing agreements' with NO COMPLETION DATE SPECIFIED. The Second Joint Business Forum met on the sidelines on 11 January 2025 at Chandragiri, Kathmandu.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2092280; Embassy of India, Kathmandu readout of 12 January 2025 at https://www.indembkathmandu.gov.in/media-detail/671; sidelines detail from PIB Release ID 2201284

• 7 May 2025

  Central Electricity Authority approves Nepali hydro imports for the 2025-26 season — Upper Kalangagad and Upper Chameliya[27]

  NVVN approved to import from Upper Kalangagad (37.3 MW) valid 7 May 2025 to 30 April 2026, and Upper Chameliya (38.8 MW) valid 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 19 May 2025

  CEA approves a block of five Nepali hydro projects for import into India[27]

  NVVN approved for Kaligandaki 'A' (140 MW), Marsyangdi (67 MW), Middle Marsyangdi (68 MW), Likhu IV (51 MW) and Solu (22.8 MW), each valid 19 May 2025 to 30 April 2026.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 12 June 2025

  CEA approves Devighat import[27]

  NVVN approved for Devighat (14.55 MW), valid 12 June 2025 to 31 October 2025.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 11 August 2025

  CEA approves a 199.70 MW multi-project block of Nepali hydro for import[27]

  NVVN approved for Likhu-2, Likhu Khola A, Lower Solu, Thulo Khola, Super Kabeli Khola A and Super Kabeli together totalling 199.70 MW, across validity periods running from 2025 to 2028.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 21 August 2025

  CEA approves PTC India Limited to import from Mewa Khola and Karuwa Seti[27]

  79.54 MW, with validity split across 21 August 2025 to 31 October 2025 and 15 June 2026 to 31 October 2026 — a monsoon-season window pattern.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 28 October 2025

  CEA approves EXPORT of Indian power to Nepal — 300 MW and 50 MW via power exchange[27]

  Two NVVN approvals dated 28 October 2025, for 300 MW and 50 MW respectively, each valid 28 October 2025 to 31 December 2025. Earlier export approvals on the same page: 1,100 MW valid 4 November 2024 to 31 May 2025; 600 MW and 54 MW valid 19 November 2024 to 30 June 2025.

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 29 October 2025

  POWERGRID and Nepal Electricity Authority sign joint venture agreements for two new 400 kV cross-border links[29]

  Joint Venture and Shareholders' Agreements signed between POWERGRID and NEA for the Inaruwa (Nepal)-New Purnea (India) 400 kV double circuit (quad moose) link and the Lamki (Dododhara) (Nepal)-Bareilly (India) 400 kV double circuit (quad moose) link, on the occasion of a meeting between Nepal's Minister of Energy Kulman Ghising and India's Union Minister Manohar Lal. Stated objective: to 'substantially enhance the electricity exchange between India and Nepal'. NO MW CAPACITY, COST OR COMPLETION DATE WAS GIVEN.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2183654

• 29 October 2025

  CEA approves a further seven Nepali hydro projects for import into India[27]

  NVVN approvals dated 29 October 2025 for Upper Dordi HPP (24.25 MW, to 31 August 2026), Lower Modi HPP (19.4 MW, to 30 September 2026), Kabeli B-1 HPP (24.25 MW, to 30 September 2026), Upper Balephi HPP (34.92 MW, to 31 May 2026), Likhu-2 HPP (50.89 MW, to 14 June 2026), Lower Solu HPP (80 MW, to 14 June 2026), Likhu Khola A HPP (28.2 MW, to 14 June 2026) and Thulo Khola HPP (20.7 MW, to 14 June 2026).

  Source organisation: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India — 'Import/Export (Cross Border) of Electricity' approvals page

• 13 November 2025

  Letter of Exchange signed amending the Protocol to the Treaty of Transit — rail freight liberalised[11]

  Signed by India's Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal and Nepal's Minister for Industry, Commerce and Supplies Anil Kumar Sinha. It facilitates movement of rail-based freight, containerised and bulk, between Jogbani (India) and Biratnagar (Nepal) 'including bulk cargo under an expanded definition', and extends to the Kolkata-Jogbani, Kolkata-Nautanwa (Sunauli) and Visakhapatnam-Nautanwa (Sunauli) corridors, 'thereby strengthening multimodal trade connectivity between the two countries and Nepal's trade with third countries'.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2189629, 'India, Nepal Ink Deal to Boost Rail Trade Connectivity'; text of the corridors from Release ID 2201284

• 10 December 2025

  Department of Commerce 2025 Year End Review records the Nepal workstream[8]

  Records the IGC of 10-11 January 2025, the Second Joint Business Forum of 11 January 2025, the Letter of Exchange of 13 November 2025 and its three corridors, and that 'Export permissions were issued for wheat to Nepal and broken rice to Senegal'.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2201284

• 13 February 2026

  India approves export of 25 lakh MT of wheat and 5 lakh MT of wheat products — Nepal not named[33]

  'The Government of India has approved the export of 25 Lakh Metric Tonnes (LMT) of wheat along with an additional 5 LMT of wheat products'. The release cites private wheat stocks of about 75 LMT in 2025-26, projected central pool availability of about 182 LMT as on 1 April 2026, and Rabi 2026 acreage of about 334.17 lakh hectares against 328.04 lakh hectares. It also permits an additional 5 LMT of sugar exports for Sugar Season 2025-26 on top of 15 LMT permitted by order of 14 November 2025. THE RELEASE DOES NOT MENTION NEPAL ANYWHERE.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2227493

• March 2026

  Department of Commerce publishes its FTA stocktake for 2025-26 — Nepal, SAFTA and SAPTA absent[4]

  'India's Free Trade Agreements (2025-26) - Key Highlights' enumerates the India-USA Framework for Interim Agreement (announced 2 February 2026), the India-EU FTA (announced 27 January 2026), the India-New Zealand FTA (announced 22 December 2025), the India-Oman CEPA (signed 18 December 2025, 'To be implemented after completion of ratification process') and the India-UK CETA (signed 24 July 2025, same ratification note). Neither Nepal, nor SAFTA, nor SAPTA appears anywhere in the document.

  Source organisation: Government of India, Department of Commerce

• 6 March 2026

  PIB confirms UPI is live in Nepal[32]

  'UPI is now live in 8 countries including the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, France, Mauritius and Qatar.'

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Press Note 157684, 'India's Digital Public Infrastructure'

• 2 April 2026

  Ministry of Power sets out India-Nepal power cooperation: six instruments, six generation projects, fifteen cross-border links[28]

  Lists a government-to-government electric interconnection accord and agreements involving NHPC with Nepal's Investment Board, VUCL and RPGCL; NTPC with the Nepal Electricity Authority; Power Grid Corporation with NEA; and SJVN with Nepal's Ministry of Water Resources and the Investment Board. Generation projects named with capacities: Pokhra (1 MW), Trisuli (21 MW), Western Gandak (15 MW), Devighat (14.1 MW), Arun-3 (900 MW), Lower Arun (669 MW). Fifteen cross-border transmission links from 132 kV to 400 kV including Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar (400 kV), Tanakpur-Mahendranagar (132 kV) and Gorakhpur-New Butwal (400 kV).

  Source organisation: Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Release ID 2248339

• 5 June 2026

  Nepal's Foreign Minister visits India, 5-7 June 2026[41]

  'Hon. Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Shisir Khanal is paying an official visit to India from 5 to 7 June 2026 at the cordial invitation of the Minister of External Affairs of India, His Excellency Dr S. Jaishankar... The two sides will discuss matters of mutual interest, with a view to enhancing cooperation across key areas including trade, investment, connectivity, energy and people-to-people ties.' The Embassy of India, Kathmandu records that during this visit an MoU between Digital India Bhashini and Kathmandu University was signed and that 'Both Ministers also launched the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) linkage between Unified Payments Interface (UPI) of India and National Payments Interface (NPI) of Nepal'.

  Source organisation: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs — press release on the visit; UPI-NPI launch and Bhashini MoU from Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

• 13 July 2026

  Nepal Rastra Bank publishes eleven-month data for FY 2025/26 — the last data point before the fiscal year closed[20]

  Exports to India up 13.6 per cent, imports from India up 11.8 per cent over the eleven months ending mid-June 2026; total exports up 12.3 per cent to Rs.277.97 billion; total imports up 15.2 per cent to Rs.1894.10 billion; total trade deficit up 15.7 per cent to Rs.1616.13 billion; convertible-currency imports from India Rs.180.10 billion against Rs.167.30 billion a year earlier.

  Source organisation: Nepal Rastra Bank, Economic Research Department

• 18 August 2026

  Embassy of India, Kathmandu updates its Commerce Wing Brief — the day before this record was compiled[1]

  The page carries the stamp 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026' and publishes the Indian financial-year trade series through 2025-26 (India to Nepal 7447.12, Nepal to India 1941.87, total 9388.98 US$ million), the treaty renewal statements, and the current status of the Integrated Check Posts, rail freight routes and the petroleum pipeline.

  Source organisation: Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief, page stamped 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026'

Not yet verified

The heaviest items here are refusals rather than absences: Nepal’s customs workbooks and India’s commodity databank both exist, are indexed, and were blocked at the egress layer. The corruption record for the Land Ports Authority tables excluded from this page is item ten. Where an item quotes a figure, the marker points to the source this page does carry on that subject — not to a source for the unverified figure itself, which by definition has none.

The registry records what could not be sourced as well as what could. These are open items, listed exactly as the registry states them — not gaps we have filled from memory or inference.

• REFUSAL, AND THE WORST GAP IN THIS FILE: NOT ONE COMMODITY-LEVEL BILATERAL TRADE VALUE WAS OBTAINED FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT, IN EITHER DIRECTION, FOR ANY YEAR. Both governments publish commodity lists; neither publishes, in any document reachable in this session, a rupee or dollar figure against a named good moving between India and Nepal. What exists is four name-only lists: the Embassy of India, Kathmandu gives India's exports as 'petroleum, iron & steel, automobiles, machinery, cereals, etc.' and Nepal's as 'cardamom, rolled iron sheets, edible oil, juices, plywood and jute', with no year and no values, one of them not even closed; Nepal Rastra Bank's Annual Report 2024/25 names 'soyabean oil, polyster yarn, jute goods, and tea' as goods whose exports to India INCREASED and 'vehicles and spare parts, sponge iron, other machinery and parts, paddy and rice, and medicine' as imports that increased, again with no values; and the Land Ports Authority of India gives node-level lists with no values and, at Rupaidiha, with undefined direction labels. THE ROUTES TO THE VALUES WERE BLOCKED, NOT ABSENT. India's commodity-level bilateral data lives in TRADESTAT at tradestat.commerce.gov.in, whose country-wise and commodity-wise endpoints are indexed and public; every attempt to reach that host was refused at the egress proxy with 'gateway answered 403 to CONNECT (policy denial or upstream failure)' for tradestat.commerce.gov.in:443. The Department of Commerce's Trade Intelligence and Analytics portal at trade-analytics.commerce.gov.in was reached, and its metadata read — it offers 11,506 commodities at HS8, 240 countries, January 2016 to June 2026, Nepal present in the country dropdown, calendar or financial year views — BUT IT IS A JAVASCRIPT APPLICATION AND RETURNS NO NEPAL FIGURES TO A FETCH. Nepal's own commodity data lives in the Department of Customs Foreign Trade Statistics workbooks, which are enumerated on customs.gov.np but hosted on giwmscdnone.gov.np, a host refused at the egress proxy with the same 403 CONNECT denial. THE CONSEQUENCE IS SPECIFIC AND SERIOUS: Nepal's exports to India rose 117.8 per cent in one fiscal year, and this file cannot say what did it.[1][5]
• REFUSAL: NEPAL'S DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMS DATA IS ENUMERATED BUT UNREACHABLE. The index pages were fetched successfully. https://customs.gov.np/content/10/statistics-a--and-2081-82/ lists an annual file for fiscal year 2081/82 titled 'आ.व. २०८१/०८२ को वार्षिक तथ्याङ्क' at https://giwmscdnone.gov.np/media/files/FTS_Annual_2081_82_twybrul.xlsx, plus eleven monthly cumulative files. https://customs.gov.np/content/450/foreign-trade-statistics-came-208-83/ lists twelve monthly cumulative files for fiscal year 2082/83 including 'असारसम्म' — up to Ashadh, the twelfth and final month of the Nepali fiscal year, i.e. a full-year cumulative — at https://giwmscdnone.gov.np/media/files/FTS_Upto_Ashadh_82_83_gdfkmo9.xlsx. EVERY ONE OF THESE FILES SITS ON giwmscdnone.gov.np, the Government of Nepal's shared media CDN, and every attempt on that host was refused at the egress proxy: 'giwmscdnone.gov.np:443 gateway answered 403 to CONNECT (policy denial or upstream failure)', logged twice at 08:00:18Z and 08:00:43Z on 19 August 2026. THIS IS AN ORGANISATION POLICY DENIAL, NOT A DEAD LINK, AND IT WAS NOT RETRIED OR ROUTED AROUND. Its cost is exact: the primary customs source for both the latest complete Nepali fiscal year and the just-closed one is out of reach, and with it every commodity breakdown, every customs-point breakdown and every unit-precise India figure Nepal publishes.[5]
• NEPAL'S FISCAL YEAR 2082/83 CLOSED IN MID-JULY 2026, MORE THAN A MONTH BEFORE THIS RECORD, AND NO FULL-YEAR OFFICIAL FIGURE FOR TRADE WITH INDIA EXISTS IN THIS FILE. Nepal Rastra Bank's newest English release, published 13 July 2026, covers ELEVEN MONTHS ending mid-June 2026. Its category listing for fiscal year 2082/83 offers subcategories from 'One Month' through 'Eleven Months' and stops there — no annual entry. The Department of Customs' twelve-month cumulative workbook exists but is on the blocked CDN. THE ELEVEN-MONTH PARTIAL IS CARRIED IN THIS FILE UNDER AN EXPLICIT WARNING AND IS NOT A FULL YEAR. Anyone wanting the Nepali-side headline for the year just ended must wait for Nepal Rastra Bank's annual release, which on last year's timing appeared in August for the Nepali edition and the following May for the Annual Report.[20][5]
• NO ABSOLUTE RUPEE LEVEL FOR TRADE WITH INDIA APPEARS IN ANY NEPAL RASTRA BANK MONTHLY RELEASE FETCHED — ONLY GROWTH RATES. The four-month, eight-month and eleven-month English releases of 2025/26 each state India's export and import growth percentages ('exports to India and other countries increased 113.9 percent and 2.9 percent respectively'; '25.3 percent and 7.8 percent'; '13.6 percent') and each gives an absolute figure for the convertible-currency component of imports from India, but NONE gives the absolute rupee value of exports to India or imports from India. The absolute India levels live in the companion 'Tables' file. The eleven-month Tables file for 2025/26 exists at https://www.nrb.org.np/red/current-macroeconomic-and-financial-situation-tables-based-on-eleven-months-data-of-2025-26/ and was fetched, but returned binary content that could not be parsed by the available channel. THE ONLY ABSOLUTE INDIA LEVELS IN THIS FILE COME FROM THE ANNUAL REPORT NARRATIVE, WHICH IS WHY THE NEPALI SERIES HAS EXACTLY ONE FULL YEAR IN IT.[20][22][21]
• REFUSAL: THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WAS UNREACHABLE THROUGHOUT. Every fetch of mea.gov.in returned HTTP 403 from the target: the bilateral-documents pages for 'Treaty of Trade and Transit' (dtl/6379) and 'Treaty of Trade and Commerce' (dtl/6291), the treaty list at /treatylist-generic, the legal-treaties PDF at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/NP14B2673.pdf, and the press release announcing the inauguration of the first trilateral power transaction at /press-releases.htm?dtl/38523/. India's own treaty repository is therefore absent from this record, and with it any prospect of reading the operative treaty articles. Where MEA material was needed, PIB and the Embassy of India, Kathmandu were used instead — both Government of India, but neither a treaty repository.[7][1]
• NEITHER TREATY TEXT WAS OBTAINED. NOT ONE OPERATIVE ARTICLE OF EITHER THE TREATY OF TRADE OR THE TREATY OF TRANSIT IS QUOTED ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE. Everything recorded about their content is a government's DESCRIPTION of them, not their words. The Department of Commerce copies at https://www.commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/TransitTreaty_NEPAL.pdf and https://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/trade/TransitTreaty_NEPAL.pdf are indexed by search but both return HTTP 404 on fetch, as does the companion https://www.commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Unauthorized_Trade_Nepal.pdf. Nepal's Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies publishes an entry titled 'Treaty of Transit between GoN and GoI' at https://moics.gov.np/content/13375/treaty-of-transit-between-gon-and-goi123/, which was fetched successfully and found to be a directory placeholder carrying the title and no document link, no treaty text, no signature date and no articles. Nepal's Trade Information Portal at nepaltradeportal.gov.np, which indexes trade agreements, refused every fetch at the robots stage with a connect timeout on robots.txt. CONSEQUENCE: THE DURATION CLAUSE OF THE TREATY OF TRADE IS UNKNOWN. This file can state that the Treaty of Trade 'automatically renewed in October 2023' because the Embassy of India says so, but it cannot say what term it renewed for, on what notice period, or under which article — while it CAN state the transit treaty's term (7 years, auto-renewing for 7) because the Embassy spells that one out.[1][2]
• THE SAFTA AGREEMENT TEXT WAS NOT OBTAINED AND NO TARIFF SCHEDULE, SENSITIVE LIST OR LDC TIMELINE IS RECORDED. The Department of Commerce copy at https://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/trade/safta.pdf is indexed by search and returns HTTP 404 on fetch. The CBIC rules-of-origin page at https://www.cbic.gov.in/htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/formatted-htmls/cs-safta-rule was reached but serves only 'You must enable JavaScript to view this page' to a fetch, so the SAFTA value-content percentages and the special differential treatment for Least Developed Contracting States were not read. The SAARC Secretariat copy at saarc-sec.org returned HTTP 404 — and would in any case have been labelled here as an intergovernmental secretariat rather than a national government, outside the source list for this build. WHAT IS RECORDED ABOUT SAFTA IS THEREFORE ONLY ITS DATES, ITS MEMBERSHIP AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSTREAM — NOT ITS SUBSTANCE.[3][2]
• CONFLICT, UNRESOLVED: THE SAFTA SIGNATURE DATE. Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states SAFTA was signed at 'Islamabad, 6 January 2004'. India's DGFT Appendix 2A prints '04.01.2004'. India's PIB states it was 'signed during the 12th SAARC Summit held at Islamabad in January 2004' without a day. Two days apart, two governments, no way to adjudicate from the sources fetched. Both agree entry into force was 1 January 2006 (DGFT: '01.01.2006'; Nepal MoFA: 'entered into force in January 2006').[3][2]
• CONFLICT, UNRESOLVED: WHETHER THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OR ITS SUB-COMMITTEE MET IN JANUARY 2025. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu's Commerce Wing Brief, updated 18 August 2026, states 'The last meetings of the IGSC and IGC were held in Kathmandu on 10-11 January 2025 and 12-13 January 2024, respectively'. Three other Government of India sources — PIB Release 2092280, PIB's 2025 Year End Review (Release 2201284), and the Embassy's own press release of 12 January 2025 — all call the 10-11 January 2025 meeting the IGC, and the Embassy's own release names Commerce Secretary Sunil Barthwal as its Indian head. A GOVERNMENT PAGE UPDATED THE DAY BEFORE ACCESS CONTRADICTS THE SAME EMBASSY'S OWN NEWS ARCHIVE ON WHICH BODY MET AND WHEN.[1][7][8]
• THE LAND PORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA'S TRADE TABLE FOR ITS MOST IMPORTANT NEPAL CROSSING IS CORRUPTED, ON A GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DOMAIN, TODAY. The Raxaul land port page prints a nine-row time series in which: the 2021-22 total trade cell reads '3,32,27' — a malformed number with no possible reading; the 2021-22 cargo movement cell reads '2,11.257' — a decimal point where a thousands separator belongs; the 2023-24 total trade of '12,652' sits between 33,881.72 in 2022-23 and 17,995.00 in 2024-25 and then 38,425.95 in 2025-26, a pattern no explanation is offered for; and the passenger figure '2,516' is printed identically for both 2021-22 and 2023-24 while 2022-23 and 2024-25 read 'NA'. THE JOGBANI PAGE HAS THE SAME DISEASE: its 2022-23 total trade of Rs. 877.41 crores sits between Rs. 10,423.00 crores and Rs. 7,850.04 crores. THESE TABLES CANNOT BE USED AS TIME SERIES. Only the most recent rows, which are internally plausible and consistent across pages, are relied on in this file, and even those are flagged.[34][35]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE STATES THE VALUATION BASIS OF EITHER TRADE SERIES. Neither the Embassy of India's table nor Nepal Rastra Bank's Annual Report says whether its export and import values are FOB, CIF, or mixed. This alone would prevent reconciliation of the two series even if the year definitions and currencies matched, which they do not.[1][5]
• NO EXCHANGE RATE WAS FETCHED, SO THE TWO SERIES ARE NEVER PUT IN A COMMON UNIT ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE. Nepal Rastra Bank publishes an exchange-rate time series at https://www.nrb.org.np/contents/uploads/2025/02/Exchange-rate.xlsx and a live forex page at https://www.nrb.org.np/forex/, and Nepal's Monetary Policy for 2082/83 confirms the Nepalese rupee is pegged to the Indian rupee — but THE PEG RATIO ITSELF IS NOT STATED IN THE PASSAGE FETCHED, and no period-average rate for any fiscal year was obtained. A reader converting Rs. 224.68 billion or Rs. 1071.20 billion into dollars is inventing a number this file does not stand behind.[5][24]
• NO ELECTRICITY TRADE VALUE, VOLUME OR REVENUE FIGURE WAS OBTAINED FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD, ONLY CAPACITY APPROVALS. The Central Electricity Authority's page yields a rich, precisely dated table of MW approvals with validity windows through 2025 and 2026 in both directions — but MW is installed or contracted capacity, NOT ENERGY TRADED AND NOT MONEY. The only energy figure obtained anywhere is historical and one-directional: PIB stated on 19 March 2020 that India exported 1,839.25 Million Units to Nepal in FY 2019-20 up to January 2020, with no recorded imports from Nepal at that time. The Ministry of Power's Annual Report 2025-26 was fetched in full and mentions Nepal only once, in the phrase 'The Plan also covers cross-border interconnections with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka' — while giving Bhutan's power imports precisely, at 5.24 BU in 2024-25 and 7.76 BU in 2025-26. INDIA PUBLISHES ITS BHUTAN ELECTRICITY TRADE AND NOT ITS NEPAL ELECTRICITY TRADE IN THE SAME DOCUMENT. Nepal Electricity Authority's Year Book for FY 2081/082 was located at two URLs, https://pmitd.nea.org.np/uploads/shares/annual_report/89899842.pdf and https://nea.org.np/uploads/shares/annual_report/NEA_DCSD_Maganize_2082.pdf; the first returned HTTP 504 from the proxy and the second returned HTTP 404. THE 10,000 MW TEN-YEAR TARGET ANNOUNCED IN JUNE 2023 THEREFORE HAS NO PROGRESS MEASUREMENT ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE.[27][28]
• NO INDIAN SOURCE FETCHED PUBLISHES A CURRENT DFTP BENEFICIARY LIST. The finding that Nepal is not a beneficiary of India's Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for Least Developed Countries rests on a Department of Commerce brief whose beneficiary count is expressly stated 'As of October, 2017'. The later version, 'Annexure-I Brief on DFTP Scheme for LDC as on 16.06.2023', is indexed by search at https://commerce.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Annexure-I-Brief-on-DFTP-Scheme-for-LDC-as-on-16.06.2023-2.pdf and returns HTTP 404 on fetch. A separate Department of Commerce page at https://www.commerce.gov.in/17182-2/ was fetched and refers to '35 beneficiary LDCs as of June 2023' but does not enumerate them, and does not mention Nepal. SO THE NEGATIVE RESTS ON AN ENUMERATED LIST DATED OCTOBER 2017 PLUS A NON-ENUMERATED COUNT DATED JUNE 2023, NEITHER OF WHICH IS CURRENT. THAT IS STATED HERE RATHER THAN HIDDEN.[18]
• NEPAL'S LDC GRADUATION — A SCHEDULED EVENT THAT WOULD CHANGE THIS CORRIDOR'S PREFERENCE ARCHITECTURE — IS UNDOCUMENTED IN THIS FILE. Nepal's National Planning Commission maintains an 'LDC Graduation Smooth Transition Strategy' page at https://npc.gov.np/content/6480/ldc-graduation-smooth-transition-strategy/ which was fetched successfully and found to link an 'LDC Graduation - Progress Review Report of the Smooth Transition Strategy, March 2026' without exposing its content: no graduation date, no statement on loss of trade preferences, no SAFTA LDC treatment, no mention of India. NO GRADUATION DATE IS RECORDED IN THIS FILE FROM ANY SOURCE. Since SAFTA's concessions and India's LDC schemes both turn on LDC status, and since Nepal's access to India runs chiefly through a bilateral treaty that does not mention LDC status at all, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFECT IS UNKNOWN AND NOT GUESSED AT HERE.[18][3]
• THE 'KALIMATI' SOURCE NAMED IN THE BUILD BRIEF YIELDED NOTHING OFFICIAL. Searches for the Kalimati Fruits and Vegetable Market Development Board returned only non-government news portals republishing daily wholesale price lists — khabarhub, deshsanchar, arthakendra, ratopati, clicknepal, khojsamachar — plus a Facebook page and an Open Data Nepal organisation record. NO OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL DOMAIN FOR THE BOARD WAS REACHED, AND NO INDIA-ORIGIN OR IMPORT-SPECIFIC DATA WAS FOUND ON ANY OF THEM. Nothing from those sources is used in this file. Agricultural price transmission across this border — a real economic channel, given the peg and the open border — is therefore entirely absent from this record.[1]
• NO TRANSIT VOLUME, TRANSIT TIME, DWELL TIME OR COST FIGURE EXISTS ANYWHERE IN THIS FILE FOR NEPAL'S THIRD-COUNTRY TRADE. Both governments describe the Treaty of Transit as the instrument that gives a landlocked country its access to the sea through Kolkata/Haldia and Visakhapatnam, and the November 2025 Letter of Exchange names three corridors — yet NOT ONE TONNE, CONTAINER, RUPEE OR DAY IS PUBLISHED against any of them in any source fetched. The Land Ports Authority's node tables count cargo movements and trade value at the border but do not separate bilateral from third-country traffic, even though its own Raxaul page says the crossing serves both.[1][8]
• THE INLAND WATERWAYS LIMB OF THE 2023 TRANSIT TREATY IS AN EMPTY CATEGORY IN THIS RECORD. The Embassy of India states the revised treaty 'allows Nepal's merchandise to move seamlessly through India's road, railway, inland waterways and ports networks' and India's Prime Minister announced access to 'India's inland waterways' on 1 June 2023. NO SOURCE FETCHED NAMES A SINGLE WATERWAY, TERMINAL, VESSEL, ROUTE, CARGO OR VOLUME. Three years and two and a half months after the announcement, this file cannot say whether a single tonne has moved.[1][12]
• THE ICP AT SONAULI DOES NOT EXIST AND THE CORRIDOR THROUGH IT HAS BEEN LIBERALISED ANYWAY. The Letter of Exchange of 13 November 2025 extends rail-freight liberalisation to the 'Kolkata-Nautanwa (Sunauli)' and 'Visakhapatnam-Nautanwa (Sunauli)' corridors. The Land Ports Authority of India's own page for Sonauli carries a status note dated September 2021 saying an architectural consultant had been appointed and construction was pending completion of land acquisition, and prints no trade, cargo or passenger statistics at all. NO SOURCE FETCHED UPDATES THAT STATUS TO 2026, and none explains how the corridor operates without the check post.[37][8]
• PIPELINE THROUGHPUT IS ENTIRELY UNPUBLISHED. The Motihari-Amlekhgunj line is described by the Government of India as 'the first cross-border petroleum product pipeline in South Asia region' and given a length of 41 kilometres, but NO CAPACITY, NO ANNUAL TONNAGE AND NO UTILISATION FIGURE APPEARS IN ANY SOURCE FETCHED. IndianOil's petroleum product pipelines page at https://iocl.com/petroleum-product-pipelines — a state-owned enterprise, not a ministry, and labelled as such — mentions the line only as part of the Barauni-Kanpur system, saying 'Motihari-Amlekhgunj pipeline, the first trans-national pipeline of the country is part of the same pipeline' and giving figures only for the parent BKPL system (5.5 MMTPA, 1227 km). The PIB release announcing the 2019 inauguration, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1584627, returned a page-unavailable error on fetch. PETROLEUM IS THE FIRST-NAMED INDIAN EXPORT TO NEPAL AND ITS DEDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE HAS NO PUBLISHED THROUGHPUT.[1]
• NO INR TRADE-SETTLEMENT MECHANISM IS DOCUMENTED, ONLY PERSONAL REMITTANCE RAILS. Both payment instruments recorded in this file — the Indo-Nepal Remittance Facility Scheme and the UPI-NPI peer-to-peer linkage — are described by their own issuing authorities as personal, person-to-person channels. NO SOURCE FETCHED DESCRIBES A RUPEE VOSTRO ARRANGEMENT, A LOCAL CURRENCY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, OR ANY DEDICATED TRADE-SETTLEMENT RAIL FOR INDIA-NEPAL MERCHANDISE. What the sources establish instead is that rupee settlement is the DEFAULT under RBI's exchange-control regime, with a convertible-currency carve-out that Nepal Rastra Bank measures at Rs. 180.10 billion over eleven months of 2025/26 — and NO SOURCE EXPLAINS WHICH GOODS OR TRANSACTIONS FALL INTO THAT CARVE-OUT.[25][26][20]
• THE RBI EXCHANGE-CONTROL SUPPLEMENT USED FOR THE PAYMENT RULES IS UNDATED ON ITS FACE. Its denomination rule — 'Any person may take or send to Nepal, Indian currency notes other than notes of denominations of above Rs.100/- and Indian coins without limit' — is recorded here exactly as printed, but India's banknote denominations have changed since such rules were first framed and NO CURRENTLY-DATED FEMA NOTIFICATION RESTATING THE LIMIT WAS OBTAINED. Treat the denomination rule as unverified for present-day application.[25]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE ON EITHER SIDE STATES THE NUMBER OF TRADE OR TRANSIT POINTS ON THE INDIA-NEPAL BORDER. The Embassy of India's brief names Integrated Check Posts and rail routes but gives no total. The Land Ports Authority of India publishes five Nepal-facing land ports — Raxaul, Jogbani, Rupaidiha, Sonauli and Banbasa, of which two are unbuilt — but does not present them as an exhaustive list of crossings, and the border is known from the sources themselves to carry traffic at points with no ICP. THE DENOMINATOR OF THIS CORRIDOR'S PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY IS UNKNOWN.[1][34]
• REFUSAL: SHELL-LEVEL FETCHING WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE BUILD. Every curl attempt through the session's proxy returned 'CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403', including for hosts that the WebFetch channel served without difficulty. All retrieval in this file therefore ran through a single channel that renders pages to markdown and answers a prompt against them. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE IS THAT NO SPREADSHEET OR BINARY WAS PARSEABLE ANYWHERE IN THIS BUILD — which is why Nepal's customs workbooks and Nepal Rastra Bank's statistical tables, both of which are .xlsx, are absent even where the URL was known, and why the Nepali-language annual release extracted only partially. This is a limitation of the build, not of the sources.[5]
• NEPAL'S SIDE OF THE 2026 DIPLOMATIC RECORD IS THIN AND ONE-DIRECTIONAL. Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a release announcing the Foreign Minister's visit to India of 5-7 June 2026 and naming its themes — 'trade, investment, connectivity, energy and people-to-people ties' — but recorded NO OUTCOME, NO AGREEMENT AND NO PROGRESS ON THE TREATY REVIEWS. The two deliverables attributed to that visit in this file, the Bhashini MoU and the UPI-NPI launch, are known ONLY from the Embassy of India, Kathmandu. Across the whole build, Nepal's ministries were reachable but sparse: MoICS's bilateral-treaty index carries a placeholder for the transit treaty and nothing for the trade treaty; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' most substantive trade content is a 2023 press statement; and the Trade and Export Promotion Centre and the Nepal Trade Information Portal were unreachable at the TLS and robots layers respectively. THE INDIAN SIDE SUPPLIES MOST OF THE RECORD OF A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.[1][6]
• REFUSAL: NEPAL'S TRADE PROMOTION AND PORTAL INFRASTRUCTURE FAILED AT THE TRANSPORT LAYER. tepc.gov.np and www.tepc.gov.np refused with TLS errors — 'certificate has expired' and 'Hostname mismatch, certificate is not valid for www.tepc.gov.np'. archive.customs.gov.np refused with 'Hostname mismatch, certificate is not valid for archive.customs.gov.np'. nepaltradeportal.gov.np refused at the robots stage with connect timeouts on every path tried, including its trade-agreement, legal-documents, major-commodity and data-visualization pages. data.mof.gov.np was reached but serves its content through client-side scripting and returned 'Loading...' with no data. FOUR SEPARATE OFFICIAL NEPALI TRADE-DATA ROUTES WERE TRIED AND ALL FOUR FAILED FOR TECHNICAL REASONS ON THE PUBLISHERS' SIDE.[5]
• THE TREATY REVIEW HAS NO DEADLINE, NO ROUND COUNT AND NO PUBLISHED PROGRESS. Review of the Treaty of Transit and the Treaty of Trade appears as an agenda item in the IGC readout of 7 December 2020 and again in that of 10-11 January 2025, with no target date in either. NO SOURCE FETCHED SAYS HOW MANY REVIEW ROUNDS HAVE OCCURRED, WHAT IS IN DISPUTE, OR WHEN A CONCLUSION IS EXPECTED. Unlike corridors where a deadline was set and missed, here none was ever set — which is a different and less measurable kind of drift.[7]
• INDIA'S FEBRUARY 2026 WHEAT EXPORT APPROVAL DOES NOT MENTION NEPAL, THIRTEEN MONTHS AFTER INDIA ACCEPTED NEPAL'S REQUEST FOR 200,000 TONNES. PIB's release of 13 February 2026 approving 25 lakh metric tonnes of wheat and 5 lakh metric tonnes of wheat products was fetched in full and names no destination country at all. PIB's Year End Review of 10 December 2025 states only that 'Export permissions were issued for wheat to Nepal'. NO SOURCE FETCHED CONFIRMS THAT ANY OF THE 200,000 TONNES ACCEPTED IN JANUARY 2025 WAS ACTUALLY SHIPPED, OR HOW MUCH.[33][7]
• INVESTMENT FIGURES ARE PRESENT BUT STALE AND UNSOURCED TO A STATISTICAL SERIES. The Embassy of India, Kathmandu states 'India is the largest source of investment into Nepal, accounting for more than 32.3% of the total FDI stock of Nepal, which is worth nearly USD 809.11 million (by mid-July 2024)' and that 'GOI has extended various Lines of Credit (LoCs) to the Government of Nepal amounting to USD 750 million'. The FDI figure is dated mid-July 2024 — two Nepali fiscal years before this record — on a page updated 18 August 2026, and NEITHER FIGURE CARRIES A SOURCE CITATION. No Nepali source for FDI stock was obtained.[1]
• NO OFFICIAL SOURCE FETCHED EXPLAINS THE SINGLE MOST DRAMATIC MOVEMENT IN THE DATA. Nepal's exports to India rose 117.8 per cent in fiscal year 2081/82, and Nepal's total exports to the world rose 81.8 per cent in the same year — the India component doing nearly all of the work. On the Indian series the same flow rose from 831.11 to 1941.87 US$ million across two financial years. Nepal Rastra Bank names four goods that 'increased' and offers no analysis. The Embassy of India's brief publishes the numbers and offers none. NEITHER GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLISHED, IN ANYTHING REACHABLE HERE, AN ACCOUNT OF WHY THE LARGEST EXPORT SURGE IN THIS CORRIDOR'S RECENT HISTORY HAPPENED.[5][1]

How this record was built

EVERY FACT IN THIS FILE WAS READ FROM A URL FETCHED ON 19 AUGUST 2026. NOTHING IS FROM MEMORY. Derived quantities appear only inside 'derived' objects that carry their own arithmetic and name their parent fields. Sources that are not a national government are labelled as such at the point of use. Where a source could not be reached, the refusal is recorded verbatim in Not yet verified with the exact URL and the exact failure.[1][5]

Sources

Numbered to match the markers in the text above. Every figure on this page traces to one of these; nothing is estimated, averaged or carried over from outside the registry.

1. Embassy of India, Kathmandu — Commerce Wing Brief. The page carries the stamp 'Page last updated on : 18/08/2026', i.e. the day before access. indembkathmandu.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
2. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India — Appendix 2A, 'List of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) / Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)' content.dgft.gov.in accessed 19 August 2026
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Data verified 19 August 2026 · rendered from the corridor registry.